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The notion of a student debt jubilee has begun its march from the 
margin of policy debates to the center, yet scholarly debate on the 
value of canceling student debt is negligible.  This article attempts 
to jump start such debate in part by presenting a novel policy 
proposal for implementing a jubilee. In addition to reviewing the 
history of student debt and the arguments for canceling much or all 
of it, it presents a detailed legal argument that canceling public 
student debt (which accounts for 95% of student debt outstanding) 
could be undertaken by the Executive Branch without further 
legislation. The Secretary of Education has already been given the 
authority to “modify” and to “compromise, waive, or release” its 
claims against students. There is a strong argument under current 
case law that this authority is a grant of prosecutorial discretion, 
which would be unreviewable by courts. Even if a court were to rule 
otherwise, at least some cancellation plans would likely survive 
“arbitrary and capricious” review. In any case, this litigation risk is 
not a good enough reason for a President not to try to relieve the 
burdens of student debt if Congress cannot agree on a bill that will 
do so. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A student debt jubilee is an idea whose time is coming. 
Only a few years ago, talk about canceling student debt was 
confined to the radical fringes. Today there are two 
competing bills that would cancel different amounts of 
student debt bouncing around the Senate, both introduced 
by prominent progressive politicians during their runs for 
President. Things are moving so fast that between the time 
this Article was accepted for publication and was actually 
published, its proposal to cancel student debt via Executive 
Action was adopted by one of these candidates as part of her 
platform. The rapidly unfolding COVID-19 crisis seems only 
to have accelerated the mainstreaming of the idea. Even 
centrist Democrats are now getting behind the idea of 
canceling $10,000 of student debt as part of a relief package. 
The non-Progressive presumptive Democratic nominee has 
committed to at least some student debt cancellation.1 
Meanwhile, scholarly work on student debt cancellation 
remains thin to nonexistent. This Article begins to fill the 
gap. It discusses why such a jubilee would be desirable and 
how it might be implemented. After reviewing the history of 
student debt and the arguments for cancellation, the last 
section of the Article presents the possibility that a 
substantial amount of public student debt cancellation could 
be undertaken without further legislation. The Secretary of 
Education has already been given the authority to “modify” 
or “compromise, waive, or release” its claims against 
students. Under current law, at least some uses of these 
authorities would be treated as an exercise of “prosecutorial 
discretion,” which are unreviewable by courts (apart from 
Constitutional challenges). Although a court might be 
inclined to narrow the authority, current law provides ample 
 
 1. Joe Biden, Joe Biden Outlines New Steps to Ease Economic Burden on 
Working People, MEDIUM (Apr. 9, 2020), https://medium.com/@JoeBiden/joe-
biden-outlines-new-steps-to-ease-economic-burden-on-working-people-e3e12103 
7322. 
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room for maneuver and, in any case, the risk of having debt 
cancellation reversed by an increasingly unpopular judiciary 
is worth taking. 
Part of the reason that student debt cancellation has 
long been excluded from mainstream policy debates, is that 
the common wisdom is that student debt is mostly harmless. 
The logic goes that higher education is a high-yield 
investment in individual productivity and wage-earning 
potential, so high-yield that the cost of borrowing to fund this 
investment is well worth it.  Part I of this Article traces how 
this way of thinking about student debt came to be. Student 
debt was originally a compromise device to fill in small gaps 
in public subsidy while avoiding charged political debates. At 
the beginning of the postwar period, using federal spending 
to universalize public higher education was not far from 
enactment. Southern segregationist concerns about federal 
usurpation of state power, Catholic concerns about 
undermining parochial education, and a widespread 
assumption that one could work one’s way through college 
without much of a problem (and that doing so was virtuous) 
presented the main obstacles. Having the federal 
government subsidize students rather than institutions 
avoided some of these obstacles, and having it do so through 
lending rather than grants avoided others. Encouraging 
banks to lend by guaranteeing their return used an 
accounting trick to avoid concerns about an expanding 
federal budget in the guns-and-butter 1960s.  
For the first decade after the Higher Education Act first 
created a permanent student loan program, federal grants 
for low-income students managed to hold back the growth of 
the industry, reserving it primarily as a supplement for 
middle class students. But college costs continued to rise and 
political support for public subsidy waned. Student loans 
were always there as a compromise to fill in the gap. 
Meanwhile, the student loan industry came into its own as a 
lobbying force, and the idea of “democratizing credit” took on 
its own momentum. Student debt truly began to grow in the 
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1990s. It was then that for-profit colleges consolidated into 
big businesses designed to suck in as much federal student 
aid as possible, that Sallie Mae went private and began to 
develop innovative techniques for expanding student 
lending, and that state governments began cutting higher 
education budgets in earnest. Students, colleges, and 
policymakers all began to view higher education primarily as 
an investment in future employability, as “human capital.” 
Student debt came to seem a natural part of the lifecourse. 
Unique among varieties of household debt, the growth of 
student debt continued unabated through the 2008 crisis. It 
has continued its growth since. Yet the financial crisis also 
began to undermine the legitimacy of student debt and to 
loosen the grip of the student debt industry on politicians. 
Although some economists continue to insist that there is no 
student debt crisis, the rapidly growing default rate, the 
overwhelming evidence of systematic fraud at many for-
profit colleges, the increasing evidence of student debt’s role 
in deepening the racial wealth gap, and the undermining of 
the “skills gap” theory of growing income inequality, among 
other things, have made that an increasingly untenable 
position. Organizing by student debtors themselves 
combined with a dawning realization among politicians that 
the misery caused by student debt could be harnessed for 
political gain has pushed the possibility of canceling student 
debt and restructuring the higher education system so it no 
longer generates more of it into the mainstream. 
Part II describes the burdens that student debt creates. 
As debt is negative wealth, those who have it are necessarily 
that much less wealthy. This wealth gap is felt most strongly 
by those who already have little wealth to begin with (of 
course, those with a good deal of wealth are unlikely to take 
out debt). Student debt deepens the racial wealth gap as well 
as the class divide. Student debt has also been shown to 
increase anxiety and even to worsen health outcomes, while 
preventing people from making major investments such as 
buying a house or a car, or getting married or having kids. 
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These effects channel through families and communities, 
further deepening race and class divides. Even for the 
relatively well off, taking on debt pushes people into more 
lucrative but less socially valuable and less individually 
rewarding work, furthering the ongoing “Meritocracy Trap” 
by which the highly educated work themselves ragged as 
facilitators of extraction.2 As well, the aggregate effect of 
reduced ability to spend on anything but paying down debt 
presses down demand. In our demand-driven economy, that 
has the knock-on effect of lowering productivity and 
employment—again, deepening class and racial divides. 
Student debt also has knock-on social and political 
effects. It changes the way individuals, institutions, and 
policymakers think about the role of higher education in 
society—making it appear to all as fundamentally an 
investment in worker productivity, with a cost to be borne 
primarily by individuals. The idea of education as a collective 
good gets erased. And as more and more institutions—from 
servicers to for-profit colleges to public universities—come to 
be dependent on the student debt system, student debt 
creates its own political inertia. 
With these burdens in mind, Part III explores some 
arguments for canceling student debt. The main argument is 
that student debt creates unjustifiable burdens on 
individuals while distorting our political and higher 
education systems in unacceptable ways. There is no reason 
to force individuals to take out debt to finance their own 
educations that is not a better reason to make higher 
education free for all while implementing a progressive 
income (and wealth) tax. Canceling student debt would 
remove this unjustified burden. It would also end the 
pernicious influence that student debt has had on the 
institutional structure of and public consciousness about 
higher education. If done in combination with a program to 
render public higher education free to all who want to access 
 
 2. DANIEL MARKOVITS, THE MERITOCRACY TRAP (2020). 
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it, it would contribute to the reconstruction of higher 
education in a formation more fitting for a democratic 
society. Canceling student debt would also have major 
positive effects on many peoples’ lives, including those whose 
debts would be relieved, along with the debts of their friends, 
family, and communities. That relief would have a 
macroeconomic effect that would increase employment as 
well as opening up fiscal space for more productive 
investment. 
After a brief review of current legislative proposals to 
cancel student debt (sure to become rapidly out of date), Part 
IV lays out the argument for a jubilee without further 
Congressional action. The core argument is that the 
Secretary of Education has absolute—that is, 
unreviewable—discretion to determine when not to enforce a 
claim over which it has jurisdiction. In the leading case of 
Heckler v. Chaney, the Supreme Court declared that an 
agency’s non-enforcement decision could only be reviewed if 
a statute created “law to apply” of sufficient specificity to be 
a “meaningful standard against which to judge [an] agency’s 
exercise of discretion.”3 And the Higher Education Act 
contains no such standard. Though recent case law has 
complicated the Chaney test somewhat, the law as it stands 
now is still solidly on the side of judicial deference. 
The Department of Education’s prosecutorial discretion 
only applies to loans over which it has a claim, so only public 
loans (which now account for 95% of those outstanding) and 
only those already in the books would qualify for such relief. 
For Direct Loans, which account for approximately 80% of 
public student loans, this is not a problem. For the FFELP 
and Perkins Loans that remain outstanding, on the other 
hand, the Department would have to use its powers 
creatively to obtain possession. As well, the Department 
would have to consult with the Department of Justice to 
comply with its own regulations, the Office of Management 
 
 3. 470 U.S. 821, 830 (1985). 
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and Budget to dodge or eliminate the requirements of so-
called “Administrative PAYGO,” and the Treasury to ensure 
that the canceled debt is not taxed as income. Clearly, then, 
the White House would have to initiate and guide the debt 
cancellation program for it to be carried out effectively. 
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I. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF STUDENT DEBT 
A. Federal Higher Education Policy Before the Higher 
Education Act 
Student loans have come to seem a natural part of the 
U.S. higher education system, a right of passage for all but 
the luckiest people who attend college. Until very recently, 
all the debates about student loans among national 
policymakers and the academics they listen to revolved 
around how to make loans work more effectively as an 
investment instrument. The idea that funding higher 
education through student debt might be fundamentally 
misguided—even inhumane—was hardly considered. There 
is a deep irony here. None of the people who originally 
designed the student debt system thought that student debt 
should be a right of passage. Few of them even thought about 
higher education as primarily an individual investment. 
Rather, student debt was a compromise between competing 
visions, most potently between those who sought to expand 
higher education to all and those who wanted to limit access 
to a privileged few. To fully see the problems with student 
debt, it will be fruitful to explore how we got to the present 
from these origins. 
We must remember that before the National Defense 
Education Act of 1958, student loans were almost unheard 
of. At that time—and for many years after—banks were 
reluctant to offer unsecuritized loans to pay for an education. 
Indeed, in an era where commercial banks were highly 
decentralized, when credit scores did not yet exist, let alone 
follow everyone everywhere, and where there was plenty of 
money to be made lending to businesses, banks were 
reluctant to offer any unsecuritized loans for any non-
business expense.4 It was thought to be too risky (the debtor 
 
 4. See LOUIS HYMAN, DEBTOR NATION: THE HISTORY OF AMERICA IN RED INK 
69–88 (2011); Luke Herrine, Credit Reporting’s Vicious Cycles, 40 N.Y.U. REV. L. 
& SOC. CHANGE 305, 310–14 (2016) (on the history of credit reporting); Martha 
Poon, Scorecards as Devices for Consumer Credit: The Case of Fair, Isaac & 
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could just skip town!). When they were offered at all, student 
loans were offered only at prohibitively high interest rates 
after extensive background checks or as a loss-leading perk 
for wealthy customers.5 
When Congress created the market for student loans, it 
was as a grudging compromise. Nobody was particularly 
thrilled with the arrangement (aside, perhaps, from the 
neoclassical labor economists excitedly developing the 
concept of “human capital” and attempting to inject it into 
policy discussions),6 nor did anybody have any notion that it 
would take on the size and importance it has. Loans were the 
way that those who supported expanding higher education 
through federal subsidy could get enough votes from those 
who were skeptical of the project. 
Legislative discussion of federal higher education policy 
began after the GI Bill had opened the possibility of using 
federal fiscal power to expand access to higher education 
beyond the elite.7 Previously, the federal government had 
mostly left it to the states to finance and regulate every level 
of the educational system.8 (The Land Grant Acts of 1862 and 
 
Company Incorporated, 55 SOC. REV. 284, 288 (2007). 
 5. See Elizabeth Popp Berman & Abby Stivers, Student Loans as a Pressure 
on Higher Education, in THE UNIVERSITY UNDER PRESSURE 129, 134–35 
(Elizabeth Popp Berman & Catherine Paradeise eds., 2016); SUZANNE METTLER, 
DEGREES OF INEQUALITY: HOW THE POLITICS OF HIGHER EDUCATION SABOTAGED 
THE AMERICAN DREAM 61 (2014). 
 6. See Laura Holden & Jeff Biddle, The Introduction of Human Capital 
Theory into Education Policy in the United States, 49 HIST. OF POL. ECON. 537, 
537–38 (2017). 
 7. See METTLER, supra note 5, at 56–59. 
 8. See METTLER, supra note 5, at 115–16. Christopher Loss has shown that 
the project of expanding higher education began in the aftermath of World War 
I, but only really took form after the G.I. Bill. See CHRISTOPHER LOSS, BETWEEN 
CITIZENS AND THE STATE: THE POLITICS OF AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION IN THE 
20TH CENTURY 19–93 (2011). We might also note that history might have gone 
otherwise. Lawrence Gladieux and Thomas Wolanin pointed out that “[a]t the 
Constitutional Convention of 1787, several proposals were advanced to give the 
federal government authority to establish institutions of higher education,” but 
they all failed. LAWRENCE E. GLADIEUX & THOMAS R. WOLANIN, CONGRESS AND THE 
COLLEGES 3 (1976).  
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1890 are the notable exceptions).9 But the Servicemen’s 
Readjustment Act of 1944—the GI Bill—guaranteed a free 
college or trade school education to returning (and qualified) 
World War II veterans, and a quarter of all veterans, 2.6 
million men, took advantage of the opportunity.10 
Men’s college graduation rates had tripled by 1950.11 
Expanding higher education was widely seen as a success, by 
policymakers, by the ex-soldier beneficiaries, and by much of 
the population more broadly.12 The notion that people from 
working class backgrounds could not cut it in college had 
become difficult to defend.13 Indeed, as universal high school 
education had only recently become a national reality, the 
quelling of similar doubts about the ability of poor and 
working class students to make it past eighth grade was a 
living memory.14 The bounds of the possible seemed worth 
prodding. Many intellectuals and politicians began to 
imagine the possibility of expanding universal—though still 
racially segregated—education beyond the twelfth grade. 
In 1946, two years after the GI Bill became law, 
President Truman convened “outstanding civic and 
educational leaders” to “reexamine our system of higher 
education in terms of its objectives, methods, and facilities; 
and in the light of the social role it has to play” as part of a 
Commission on Higher Education.15 The Commission issued 
a six-volume report. It recommended: 
 
 9. METTLER, supra note 5, at 41. 
 10. Id. at 6; see also Loss, supra note 8, at 124. 
 11. METTLER, supra note 5, at 6. 
 12. Loss, supra note 8, at 95. 
 13. See generally CLAUDIA GOLDIN & LAWRENCE F. KATZ, THE RACE BETWEEN 
EDUCATION AND TECHNOLOGY 247–84 (2008). 
 14. Id. at 158–62, 195–99. 
 15. PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON HIGHER EDUCATION, HIGHER EDUCATION FOR 
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY, VOLUME I: ESTABLISHING THE GOALS v (1947) [hereinafter 
TRUMAN COMMISSION RPT.: VOL. I]. For background on the Commission, especially 
with respect to the changing attitudes about the role of higher education in the 
immediate postwar/early Cold War period, see Loss, supra note 8, at 133–39. 
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American people should set as their ultimate goal an educational 
system in which at no level—high school, college, graduate school, 
or professional school—will a qualified individual in any part of the 
country encounter an insuperable economic barrier to the 
attainment of the kind of education suited to his aptitudes and 
interests.16 
Although it acknowledged that “equal educational 
opportunity [could not] be attained immediately,” it 
envisioned that the “phenomenal increases in productivity 
per worker” that were already underway promised to 
generate enough social surplus to “be able to support 
education at all levels far more adequately in the future than 
we could in the past,” so long as political and social 
institutions prioritized doing so.17 
Accordingly, the Commission recommended immediately 
allocating the funds necessary to make thirteenth and 
fourteenth grade totally tuition and fee free at public 
universities for all who qualified, to reduce tuition and fees 
to nominal amounts for fifteenth and sixteenth grades, and 
to increase the availability of adult education.18 These funds 
would come both in the form of subsidies to states to increase 
their support for public universities and as a combination of 
scholarships and fellowships to fill in the gap for under-
resourced students. The Commission also recommended a 
program of federal grants to cover costs of living for under-
resourced students starting in tenth grade.19 All of this 
 
 16. TRUMAN COMMISSION RPT.: VOL. I., supra note 15, at 36. 
 17. Id. at 37. 
 18. See id. at 37–38; PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON HIGHER EDUCATION, HIGHER 
EDUCATION FOR AMERICAN DEMOCRACY, VOLUME V: FINANCING HIGHER EDUCATION 
3–4 (1947) [hereinafter TRUMAN COMMISSION RPT.: VOL. V]. After examining the 
finances and expected enrollment numbers in detail, the Commission concluded 
that “[t]he wide variation in the ability of the various States to support higher 
education makes a program of equalization imperative if a defensible minimum 
program of higher education is to be provided on a Nation-wide [sic] basis.” 
TRUMAN COMMISSION RPT.: VOL. V, supra note 18, at 38. 
 19. PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON HIGHER EDUCATION, HIGHER EDUCATION FOR 
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY, VOLUME II: EQUALIZING AND EXPANDING INDIVIDUAL 
OPPORTUNITY 38 (1947) [hereinafter TRUMAN COMMISSION RPT.: VOL. II]. 
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would be provided on a non-discriminatory basis: indeed (a 
decade before Brown, and half a decade before Sweatt)20 the 
Commission also included extensive recommendations on 
desegregation, on ending religious quotas, on increasing 
women’s enrollment (ending “antifeminism,” as the 
Commission put it), and on creating more flexible admission 
standards to account for ability rather than access to 
resources.21 
In sum, the so-called “Truman Commission” 
recommended striving for universality in higher education 
primarily through expanding public schools, with the federal 
government playing a large and growing role in financing. 
However, “advocates of broader federal support for higher 
education unrelated to military service faced an uphill 
struggle. In fact, aid-to-education proposals of all kinds 
repeatedly ran aground in Congress, blocked by civil rights 
and church-state controversies and fear of federal control of 
education.”22 In a familiar pattern, white supremacists only 
wanted federal funds if conditions of funding did not 
threaten segregation, and antiracists wanted to undermine 
segregation or at least avoid having the federal government 
support it. “Battle lines were also drawn between northern 
Catholic Democrats, who insisted on the inclusion of 
religious colleges, and others who viewed such an approach 
as a violation of the separation of church and state.”23 
Moreover, “[m]any members of Congress at that time had 
worked their way through college” and found the notion of 
non-veterans getting a “free ride” distasteful.24 
 
 20. Brown v. Board of Ed., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 
629 (1950). 
 21. See TRUMAN COMMISSION RPT.: VOL. II, supra note 19, at 25, 39.  
 22. Lawrence E. Gladieux, Federal Student Aid Policy: A History and 
Assessment, U.S. DEP’T EDUC. (Oct. 1995), https://www2.ed.gov/offices/OPE/PPI/ 
FinPostSecEd/gladieux.html [hereinafter Gladieux, Federal Student Aid]; see 
also METTLER, supra note 5, at 59–60. 
 23. METTLER, supra note 5, at 59. 
 24. Gladieux, Federal Student Aid, supra note 22. 
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Sputnik launched a panic that jogged the loggerheads 
open, but only enough for student loans to slip through.25 
Desperate not to fall behind the USSR’s military technology 
or international prestige, politicians sought to expand 
investment in the sort of research and education that could 
lead to innovations in mass destruction or advantages in 
espionage.26 Yet “suspicion of giving students a ‘free ride’” 
remained powerful enough to cool the Cold War fervor.27 The 
Eisenhower Administration’s and the Democratic Party’s 
bills would have created federal scholarships for 
undergraduates, but the program was “deleted on the House 
floor and cut back in the Senate, then abandoned entirely in 
the House-Senate conference.”28 A student-lending program 
made it through. After all, debt brings the moral individual 
responsibility along with it.29 The resulting National Defense 
Education Act of 1958 (NDEA) thus simultaneously created 
the federal government’s first direct aid to non-veteran 
college students and the first student loan program. 
But the suspicion of free riding and usurping states’ 
rights ran deep.30 The National Defense Education Loans 
(NDEL) program was temporary and highly conditional. The 
loans were made available only to students who 
demonstrated financial need and potential in science, math, 
 
 25. See Loss, supra note 8, at 156 (“Proposals for increased federal funding 
for the nation’s education system had been circulating around the Capitol for 
nearly two decades, but it took the Sputnik crisis to secure the political support 
needed to move the legislation through Congress. The handful of liberals who 
inhabited the ‘small world of education politics,’ as one leading historian on the 
topic has described it, seized their opportunity to increase federal support for 
elementary, secondary, and higher education.”). 
 26. See GLADIEUX & WOLANIN, supra note 8, at 8–9; METTLER, supra note 5, at 
58. 
 27. GLADIEUX & WOLANIN, supra note 8, at 9. 
 28. Id. 
 29. On the “political lightness” of federally financed debt programs as 
compared with direct federal subsidy, see SARAH QUINN, AMERICAN BONDS: HOW 
CREDIT MARKETS SHAPED A NATION (2019). 
 30. See Loss, supra note 8, at 157–58. 
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engineering, or foreign languages—that is, only those 
students whose educations could serve the interests of 
staffing the growing Cold War military and espionage 
apparatus.31 They “reached only about 25,000 students.”32 
And rather than having the federal government directly lend 
to students, Congress set up a system whereby each state 
had access to a pool of federal money to allocate among 
colleges. The colleges then issued the loans subject to terms 
dictated by Congress and the regulations of the Department 
of Health, Education, and Welfare (from which the 
Department of Education eventually split off).33 NDEL 
eventually became part of the Federal Perkins Loan 
Program, which was more generally focused on providing 
low-interest loans to students that demonstrated financial 
need.34 Although NDELs were phased out in 1972, Perkins 
Loans inherited NDEL’s basic structure and maintained it 
until the Perkins Loan program was terminated in 2015.35 
The details of this structure will become important later. 
B. The Higher Education Act Lays the Foundation for the 
Modern Regime 
If it took the Cold War to bring student loans into 
 
 31. National Defense Education Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-864, § 204(4)(B), 
72 Stat. 1580, 1584. On the role of Cold War thinking in designing higher 
education funding, see Loss, supra note 8, at 121–60. 
 32. Berman & Stivers, supra note 5, at 134. This was not seen as a small 
number at the time and, indeed, created the foundation for more federal 
involvement in higher education funding. See Loss, supra note 8, at 159. 
 33. Berman & Stivers, supra note 5, at 134; Loss, supra note 8, at 158 
(discussing the growth of the Commissioner’s office as a result of the NDEA). On 
the transfer of the Commissioner’s responsibilities to the Secretary, see 
Department of Education Organization Act, Pub. L. No. 96-88, 93 Stat. 668 
(1979). 
 34. See Volume 6—The Campus-Based Programs, FED. STUDENT AID 
HANDBOOK  6–3 (Oct. 5, 2015), https://ifap.ed.gov/fsahandbook/attachments/ 
1516FSAHbkVol6Master.pdf. 
 35. See Kelly Field, Perkins Loan Program, a Federal Stalwart Since 1958, 
Meets its Demise, CHRONICLE HIGHER ED. (Oct. 1, 2015), https://www.chronicle 
.com/article/Perkins-Loan-Program-a/233527. 
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existence, it took the War on Poverty to make them an 
indefinite fixture of federal higher education policy. 
President Johnson attributed his own rise from poverty to 
power to the access to education he received. So he saw 
federal funds for primary, secondary, and postsecondary 
education as crucial for equalizing empowerment.36 
Meanwhile, the mobilizations of the black freedom struggle, 
the campus free speech movement, and other progressive 
groups and the overwhelming Democratic victory in 1964 
created momentum for a wave of social democratic 
legislation.37 Yet the familiar segregationist and parochial 
countercurrents against democratizing higher education 
remained. And grants without conditions, especially for 
middle-class students, were still met with suspicion from the 
members of the elite preoccupied with the ideology of 
bootstraps.38 As well, the sense that tradeoffs and 
prioritization were necessary was acute even among 
progressive voices. The Beltway was abuzz with concerns 
about the size of the federal government’s balance sheet 
while domestic spending expanded alongside investment in 
foreign regime change in the increasingly hot Cold War.39 
As in 1958, student loans were hit on as a way to get 
 
 36. See Loss, supra note 8, at 168–71; GLADIEUX & WOLANIN, supra note 8, at 
17; METTLER, supra note 5, at 51. 
 37. See Loss, supra note 8, at 169–75. 
 38. See GLADIEUX & WOLANIN, supra note 8, at 20; Loss, supra note 8, at 175 
(“Democratic leaders . . . agreed to a Guaranteed Student Loan Program for the 
middle-class—guaranteed because the federal government insured the loans on 
behalf of the private banks and lending agencies that financed them—in order to 
garner Republican support for federal aid to students with ‘exceptional financial 
need.’ Democrats considered the guaranteed loan provision a small price to pay 
for the achievement of federal grants for needy students.”). 
 39. On the parallel role that this environment played on federal mortgage 
policy and the creation of the financial technique of securitization, see Neil 
Fligstein & Adam Goldstein, A Long Strange Trip: The State and Mortgage 
Securitization, 1968-2010, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF 
FINANCE 339, 345–46 (Karin Knorr Cetina & Alex Preda, eds., 2012); Sarah 
Quinn, “The Miracles of Bookkeeping”: How Budget Politics Link Fiscal Policies 
and Financial Markets, 123 AM. J. SOC. 48 (2017). 
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doubters on board (which is not to say that student loans 
were the only, or even the most important, program created 
by the HEA!). And, though creating a direct lending program 
surely would have had lower administrative and agency 
costs, the concerns about the size of the government’s 
balance sheet turned the Johnson Administration away from 
that path. The accounting rules in effect at the time placed 
direct loans on the liability side of the government’s balance 
sheet (as an up-front cost paid down over time), making their 
immediate cost similar to a grant, though reduced once 
repayment began.40 However, these same rules treated loan 
guarantees as creating no up-front cost: they would only 
show up as liabilities if and when the guarantee had to be 
paid out.41 The Higher Education Act of 1965 took advantage 
of this accounting trick to create a program that insured 
private agencies’ guarantees on student loans issued by 
approved financial institutions, calling it the Federal Family 
Education Loan Program (FFELP).42 The idea was to make 
lending to students as low risk as possible to encourage 
banks to lend in exchange for doing so on government-
dictated terms. 
As with the NDEA, the politicians responsible for the 
original HEA understood student loans as gap-fillers. They 
assumed that most of the cost of higher education would be 
borne by states, endowments, and parental wealth.43 This 
was, after all, the era that political scientist Suzanne Mettler 
refers to as “the zenith of mass public higher education.”44 
Most students without substantial family wealth could cover 
the cost of tuition, fees, supplies, room, and board by working 
a summer job.45 
 
 40. See Berman & Stivers, supra note 5, at 135. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Higher Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. 89-329, § 431, 79 Stat. 1219, 1245. 
 43. See GLADIEUX & WOLANIN, supra note 8, at 17–20. 
 44. See METTLER, supra note 5, at 118–23. 
 45. Id. 
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The post-GI Bill expansion of higher education had 
begun to increase its relative cost, putting the possibility of 
full affordability just out of reach for many middle class 
families. Policymakers understood student loans as a way to 
cover that difference without fully committing to making 
higher education universal—a compromise position 
acceptable to those who did not believe in universalism. In 
the few years surrounding the HEA, student loans accounted 
for only five percent of federal aid to higher education 
students.46 Moreover, since wages had consistently gone up 
for two decades and upward mobility over the life course 
seemed almost inevitable, especially for college graduates, it 
did not seem to be that much to ask of students pay back the 
little bit of money they would have to borrow to supplement 
for their summer wages. Nobody conceived that loans would 
become central to higher education finance. 
Those familiar with the state of higher education debate 
will recognize that this is precisely the inverse of the now-
standard human capital story in which individuals are 
primarily responsible for financing their own education and, 
because those with educations earn much more over the long 
term than they cost in the short term, it makes sense to 
borrow money to do so.47 From the perspective of human 
capital theory, the government’s main task is to encourage 
that socially beneficial investment. It can do so by facilitating 
lending as much as possible and directly subsidizing only as 
necessary to supplement for the poorest borrowers.48 
Midcentury politicians, on the other hand, operated within a 
 
 46. Gladieux, Federal Student Aid, supra note 22. 
 47. See Investing in Higher Education: Benefits, Challenges, and the State of 
Student Debt, EXECUTIVE OFF. PRESIDENT U.S. 10 (July 2016), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/page/files/20160718_ce
a_student_debt.pdf [hereinafter Investing in Higher Educ.]; see also Sherwin 
Rosen, Human Capital, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS (2d ed., 
Steven N. Durlauf & Lawrence E. Blume, eds., 2008). But see Blair Fix, The 
Trouble with Human Capital Theory, REAL-WORLD ECON. REV., Dec. 10, 2018, at 
15.  
 48. See Investing in Higher Ed., supra note 47, at 13. 
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reality in which financing education was primarily a 
collective responsibility except perhaps for the very wealthy. 
Loans were introduced to supplement for those who slipped 
through the cracks when consensus could not be reached on 
the value of universal higher education. And loans were 
understood to exist in a broader education policy apparatus 
focused on shaping not just workers, but citizens. 
C. Entrenchment and Metastasis  
In another strange inversion from today’s bonanza, the 
initial problem with FFELP was that not enough banks were 
willing to issue loans. Indeed, the banking lobby initially 
opposed FFELP, because they did not want the government 
dictating the terms of their loans, even if the government was 
taking all the risk.49 Apparently, creating a primary market 
was not enough to sweeten the pot. So, in the 1972 
reauthorization of the HEA, Congress created Sallie Mae—
i.e. the Student Loan Marketing Association—to get a 
secondary market in government-guaranteed student loans 
going. Subsequent reforms over the years made student 
loans more and more liquid and the deepening of the markets 
for collateralized debt increased supply of loans.50 
The 1972 reauthorization proved fateful for two other 
reasons. First, it also expanded federal grant funding for low-
income students, which eventually became the Pell Grant 
program. This was a crucial step for moving the federal role 
in making higher education affordable beyond subsidizing 
lending. Yet it was also a crucial step away from the idea that 
affordability in higher education should be achieved through 
subsidy to public schools. “During the debate leading up to 
this legislation, the higher education community urged 
Congress to enact formula-based, enrollment-driven federal 
aid to institutions. But legislators decided that funding aid 
to students was the more efficient and effective way to 
 
 49. See Berman & Stivers, supra note 5, at 135; METTLER, supra note 5, at 61. 
 50. See Berman & Stivers, supra note 5, at 135–36. 
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remove financial barriers for needy students.”51 
In a pattern of thinking that would become increasingly 
common, “Congress also viewed student aid as a way to 
harness market forces for enhancing the quality of higher 
education. Students, voting with their feet, would take their 
federal aid to institutions that met their needs; less 
satisfactory institutions would wither.”52 Here is when the 
notion of higher education as fundamentally a marketplace 
begins to take hold. Here is where it becomes increasingly 
mainstream to think of the federal government’s role as 
subsidizing the consumer-investors of that marketplace 
instead of “picking favorites” among “sellers” of education 
(i.e. colleges).53 
Second, the 1972 reauthorization opened up federal aid 
to so-called “proprietary institutions of higher education,” 
that is, for-profit colleges.54 Though the GI Bill had provided 
funding to trade and vocational schools, some of which were 
for-profit, the fly-by-night frauds that had ensued had 
discouraged policymakers from repeating the experiment.55 
Reincorporating for-profits into federal higher education 
policy was part of an effort to emphasize “postsecondary 
 
 51. Gladieux, Federal Student Aid, supra note 22; see also GLADIEUX & 
WOLANIN, supra note 8, at 44–49. 
 52. Gladieux, Federal Student Aid, supra note 22. 
 53. This shift had a number of causes. It was partially in response to efforts 
on behalf of economists to frame things in this way, most influentially through 
the “Rivlin Report” of 1969 and through Milton Friedman’s more radical 
popularizations. See GLADIEUX & WOLANIN, supra note 8, at 25–27 (on Friedman’s 
role), 52–53 (on the Rivlin Report). It was also partly a result of the emerging 
backlash against student radicalism and the connected backlash against taxes 
and partly a result of structural changes that had made higher education into a 
“buyer’s market.” Id. at 23–25, 28–29. These shifts must be understood in light 
of broader shifts towards offloading distributional conflict onto “the market.” See 
GRETA KRIPPNER, CAPITALIZING ON CRISIS: THE POLITICAL ORIGINS OF THE RISE OF 
FINANCE 58–85 (2012). 
 54. See A.J. ANGULO, DIPLOMA MILLS: HOW FOR-PROFIT COLLEGES STIFFED 
STUDENTS, TAXPAYERS, AND THE AMERICAN DREAM 85–91 (2016); METTLER, supra 
note 5, at 92–93; Gladieux, Federal Student Aid, supra note 22. 
 55. See ANGULO, DIPLOMA MILLS, supra note 54, at 85–91. 
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education” rather than “higher education” in order to de-
stigmatize educational programs beyond the traditional four-
year degree. As such, for-profits were swept in alongside 
increased funding to community colleges, part-time 
students, and non-profit vocational programs.56 
From another angle, the inclusion of for-profits and the 
more general move from “higher education” to 
“postsecondary” education was part of the emerging 
understanding of the higher education field as a market. 
More “sellers” of education—or, rather, easier entry into the 
market that the government was in the process of creating—
meant more competition as well as more variety. Both 
competition and variety ensure greater choice, with means 
higher consumer welfare/surplus. 
Unbeknownst to legislators, they had prepared the body 
politic for a metastasis of student debt. By 1973, student 
loans already accounted for over 20% of aid to higher 
education students, four times the share from a decade 
before.57 That number grew to 40% by 1983 and to 60% by 
1993.58 Over that same twenty years, federal grants followed 
the inverse pattern: going from almost half of aid to students 
to around 20%.59 Indeed, in 1986 the Reagan Administration 
nearly torpedoed all federal student aid to college students, 
along with the very existence of the Department of 
Education.60 Meanwhile tuition’s creep picked up the pace. 
In a time of unprecedented inflation, the price of college rose 
much faster than inflation. Increased enrollments put 
pressure on existing facilities. Increased productive 
 
 56. Gladieux, Federal Student Aid, supra note 22. 
 57. See id. 
 58. See id. This growth was not uniform, as Berman & Stivers point out “the 
rapid expansion of federal grant aid in the 1970s limited demand for loans[, but] 
[t]his changed after 1978, when Congress removed the income cap from the GSL 
program.” Berman & Stivers, supra note 5, at 135 (emphasis added). 
 59. See Gladieux, Federal Student Aid, supra note 22. 
 60. See id. 
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efficiency in sectors other than higher education also made 
the relative cost of higher education increase (since 
education has not become more “efficient”), a process known 
as “Baumol’s Cost Disease.”61 This put increasing pressure 
on states’ budgets, and state governments began to waver in 
their commitment to making public colleges and universities 
free or affordable for all.62 Hesitation to fund public goods 
adequately was in part due to a growing crisis of legitimacy 
connected to stagflation and in part due to the growing 
conservative campaign against “campus radicals” (initially 
led by Reagan himself in his California gubernatorial 
campaigns) and the “taxpayer revolt” against spending on 
public goods, especially those that had begun to benefit black 
and brown people who had previously been excluded.63 
Student loans maintained their role as gap fillers as the 
gap they had to fill stretched wider. Political deadlock on 
whether to expand or to contract federal aid for higher 
education could always be resolved by the compromise option 
of making student loans easier to access. And as student 
lending became big business, it grew a big-business-sized 
lobbying arm. Student debt was no longer just a pressure 
valve to avoid resolving debates about the role of public 
higher education in a pluralistic democratic society. It now 
 
 61. See GLADIEUX & WOLANIN, supra note 8, at 21–23 (on rising costs); 
METTLER, supra note 5, at 67–68 (same). See generally ROBERT B. ARCHIBALD & 
DAVID H. FELDMAN, WHY DOES COLLEGE COST SO MUCH? (2011) (making the cost 
disease argument for higher education); WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, THE COST DISEASE: 
WHY COMPUTERS GET CHEAPER AND HEALTH CARE DOESN’T (2012) (elaborating on 
the theory of a “cost disease”). 
 62. See Gladieux, Federal Student Aid, supra note 22. See generally David A. 
Tandberg, Politics, Interest Groups and State Funding of Public Higher 
Education, 51 RES. HIGHER EDUC. 416 (2010). 
 63. See GLADIEUX & WOLANIN, supra note 8, at 23–25 (on the role of campus 
radicalism). See generally Aaron Bady & Mike Konczal, From Master Plan to No 
Plan: The Slow Death of Public Higher Education, 59 DISSENT 10 (Fall 2012) (on 
Reagan’s role and its larger significance to California’s public higher education 
system in particular); CAMILLE WALSH, RACIAL TAXATION: SCHOOLS, SEGREGATION, 
AND TAXPAYER CITIZENSHIP, 1869–1973 (2018) (on the role of tax politics and 
taxpayer identity in the reinforcement of segregation and racial hierarchy). 
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created its own political pressure.64 
D. Student Debt Becomes Natural 
By the 1990s, the student loan market, and higher 
education more generally, had already become something 
entirely different from that envisioned by the drafters of the 
HEA, let alone the NDEA. Yet, in retrospect, it was not until 
that point that student debt really began to take off. 
Sociologists Beth Popp Berman and Abby Stivers argue 
that three legal changes account for this turning point. First, 
Congress changed the federal accounting rules both to reduce 
the cost of direct loans based on expected repayment amount, 
and to require counting loan guarantees as a liability from 
the date of the guarantee based on their expected payout. 
This change made it such that federal accounts would reflect 
the cost savings that would result by cutting out the for-
profit middlemen, which almost immediately led to calls for 
replacing the convoluted FFELP program with a direct 
lending program.65 Direct Loans were first created as a pilot 
in 1992.66 Private lenders, having switched from reluctant to 
enthusiastic, lobbied heavily against direct lending, while 
simultaneously ramping up lending in an attempt to crowd 
out the government.67 At least some members of Congress 
welcomed this competition as a way to test out the Direct 
Loan program against the “market” alternative. 
Second, faced with this possibility of extinction, Sallie 
Mae lobbied successfully to “go private,” i.e. to no longer be 
subject to even the minimal rules that came with being a 
government-sponsored entity.68 It then began to issue both 
 
 64. On this dynamic, see Berman & Stivers, supra note 5, at 137–41 and 
METTLER, supra note 5, at 67–82. 
 65. See Berman & Stivers, supra note 5, at 138. 
 66. Higher Education Amendments of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-325, 106 Stat. 
448, 569 (1992). 
 67. Berman & Stivers, supra note 5, at 138–39. 
 68. See id. at 139–40. 
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federally guaranteed and non-guaranteed “private” student 
loans. The first company to do business solely in student 
loans contributed greatly to their accelerating growth. 
Third, the competition that came with the creation of 
Direct Loans generated lobbying momentum for the 
development of so-called “unsubsidized” loans. Unlike the 
“subsidized” loans previously offered to undergraduates, the 
federal government did not pay the interest on these loans 
while borrowers were enrolled. Unsubsidized loans were not 
means tested, so they enabled higher-income students to 
enter the market.69 
These higher income students, and indeed every other 
student, were increasingly interested in loans because the 
price of college continued to rise. Even adjusting for inflation, 
the sticker price for a college degree increased by 120% 
between 1987 and 2010.70 After netting out institutional aid, 
the increase is still 92% over and above general inflation.71 
Economists Grey Gordon and Aaron Hedlund helpfully point 
out that this inflation greatly exceeds that of “much 
maligned healthcare costs”: had the average price of college 
risen at the rate of the average price of healthcare, it would 
have only grown by 32%.72 Added on top of the increase in 
costs from the 1970s and 80s, and higher education has risen 
five times faster than inflation.73 As only the wealthiest 
families in a world of mostly stagnant incomes can afford to 
pay these prices out of pocket, student debt has gushed 
 
 69. See id. at 139. 
 70. See Grey Gordon & Aaron Hedlund, Accounting for the Rise in College 
Tuition, in EDUCATION, SKILLS, AND TECHNICAL CHANGE: IMPLICATIONS FOR 
FUTURE U.S. GDP GROWTH 357, 357 (Charles R. Hulten & Valerie A. Ramey eds., 
2019). 
 71. See id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Tyler Kingkade, Pell Grants Cover Smallest Portion of College Costs in 
History as GOP Calls for Cuts, HUFFPOST (Aug. 29, 2012, 8:56 AM), 
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/pell-grants-college-costs_n_1835081. 
304 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol.  68 
accordingly.74 
The 1990s also saw the transformation of for-profit 
colleges from small vocational schools occasionally plagued 
by scandal to increasingly consolidated corporate behemoths 
that oriented their business strategy around maximizing 
access to student loans and, to a lesser degree, other forms of 
federal higher education aid.75 For most of these schools, 
students were merely the conduit for federal aid, and 
“education” was the thing to pretend to do in order to gain 
access to that aid. They spent big on marketing and lobbying 
while reducing the cost of all other expenditures through 
returns to scale and a new focus on “efficiency.”76 Using 
legally questionable practices to convince students to convert 
their eligibility for federal student loans into shareholder 
profits in exchange for increasingly questionable 
“educations,” for-profit colleges brought new, “non-
traditional,” lower-income, borrowers into the market and 
made sure they borrowed as much as possible.77 When the 
 
 74. Also worthy of mention is the fact that the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention 
and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (“BAPCPA”) made private student loans 
ineligible for bankruptcy protection, which seems to have increased loan volume 
while making holding debt more burdensome. See generally Alexei Alexandrov & 
Dalié Jiménez, Lessons From Bankruptcy Reform in the Private Student Loan 
Market, 11 Harv. L. & Pol’y Rev. 175 (2017). 
 75. See Berman & Stivers, supra note 5, at 140–41; METTLER, supra note 5, at 
92–110; Charlie Eaton et al., The Financialization of U.S. Higher Education, 14 
SOCIO-ECON. REV. 507, 525–27 (2016) [hereinafter Eaton et al., Financialization]; 
Charlie Eaton, Agile Predators: Shareholder Value and the Transformation of 
U.S. For-Profit Colleges SOCIO-ECON. REV. (forthcoming) (draft on file with 
author) [hereinafter Eaton, Agile Predators]. See generally TRESSIE MCMILLAN 
COTTOM, LOWER ED: THE TROUBLING RISE OF FOR-PROFIT COLLEGES IN THE NEW 
ECONOMY (2017). 
 76. See generally Eaton et al., Financialization, supra note 75. Some of these 
enormous FPCUs are publicly traded and some are owned private equity 
companies and investment banks. Many go back and forth between these two 
ownership structures. Eaton, Agile Predators, supra note 75. 
 77. See Gregory D. Katz, For-Profit Colleges: Undercover Testing Finds 
Colleges Encouraged Fraud and Engaged in Deceptive and Questionable 
Marketing Practices, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF. (Aug. 4, 2010, 10:00 AM), 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10948t.pdf; S. COMM. ON HEALTH EDUC., LABOR, 
AND PENSIONS, FOR PROFIT HIGHER EDUCATION: THE FAILURE TO SAFEGUARD THE 
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financial crisis crashed the job market, for-profits had 
developed finely-oiled machines to profit off of the 
desperation. 
In 2010, in the aftermath of the financial crisis, Congress 
finally eliminated FFELP. One reason for the shift, cited by 
Berman and Stivers, was that policymakers saw private 
lending dry up and realized that making students dependent 
on financial institutions to fund college put those students at 
the mercy of financial cycles even if interest rates were 
regulated.78 Surely at least as important was the fact that 
finance was weakened and delegitimized, leaving it unable 
to exert the same sway over Congress it had during 
neoliberal boom times. The Obama Administration, wanting 
to do something in higher education, saw an opportunity and 
took it. In stark contrast from 1965, finance lobbyists fought 
tooth and nail to be able to continue lending (and to avoid 
regulations). They kept the private student loan market, but 
that has become increasingly irrelevant. Today 95% of 
outstanding student loans are public.79 
 
FEDERAL INVESTMENT AND ENSURE STUDENT SUCCESS, S. PRT. NO. 112-37 (2012), 
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 78. See Berman & Stivers, supra note 5, at 141–42. 
 79. Author’s calculation based on data from Federal Student Loan Portfolio, 
FEDERAL STUDENT AID (last visited Feb. 17, 2020), https://studentaid.ed.gov/ 
sa/about/data-center/student/portfolio and Zack Friedman, Student Loan Debt 
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statistics-2018/#5221dccc7310. 
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Although the financial crisis did occasion the elimination 
of FFELP—and eventually of Perkins, too80—it did not stop 
the growth of student debt. Student debt, indeed, was the 
only type of household debt that was completely unaffected 
by the collapse in credit markets and its reverberations onto 
the balance sheets of businesses and households.81 Just 
between 2003 and 2017, the total level of student debt 
outstanding grew by a factor of seven, from around $200 
billion to around $1.4 trillion. And the growth accelerates: as 
of 2018, outstanding student debt was around $1.52 




 80. See Kelly Field, Perkins Loan Program, a Federal Stalwart Since 1958, 
Meets its Demise, THE CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUC. (Oct. 1, 2015), 
https://www.chronicle.com/article/Perkins-Loan-Program-a/233527. 
 81. See FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., HOUSEHOLD DEBT & CREDIT REPORT (Q3 
2019), https://www.newyorkfed.org/microeconomics/hhdc.html. 
 82. Friedman, supra note 79. 
 83. See FED. RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS, STUDENT LOANS (Q3 2019), 
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/FGCCSAQ027S. 
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II. THE PROBLEMS WITH STUDENT DEBT 
A. Direct and Indirect Burdens on Debtors, Communities, 
and Society 
Taking on enormous amounts of debt to pay for higher 
education has become so routine and widespread that it has 
transformed our higher education system, the political 
system that structures it, and much of our society more 
generally. By one measure, as of 2017, approximately 45% of 
white households headed by people between 25 and 40 years 
old and about 50% of black households headed by people 
between 25 and 40 years old had student debt.84 Those 
numbers in 1990 were 10% of white households and 25% of 
black households.85 In that same time period the median 
debt burden doubled, from $10,000 to $20,000 (the average 
among indebted students is now around $27,000).86 And 
these are certainly undercounts, since young people 
burdened by student debt are increasingly forced to live with 
parents or relatives, unable to form the “independent 
households” that the dataset (the Survey of Consumer 
Finances) counts.87 According to Department of Education 
data, 69% of all students graduating with a bachelor’s degree 
had student debt in 2016, in an average amount of nearly 
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1. Burdens on Individuals and Communities 
The most immediate impact of student debt is on debtors 
and their loved ones. Inability to form an “independent 
household” is not only or primarily a problem for 
demographers studying debtors, after all. This so-called 
“failure to launch” can be attributed to the fact that student 
debt burdens have risen most precipitously during a time 
when incomes for all but the wealthiest have plateaued or 
plunged.90 While those with college educations make 
significantly more on average than those without, all but the 
elite do worse than their counterparts from a generation ago.  
As Julie Morgan and Marshall Steinbaum have pointed 
out, this dynamic indicates that the “college premium” is not 
so much a measure of college graduates being rewarded for 
their superior skills (their “human capital”) as it is an 
indication of the increasing power of the capitalist and 
managerial class to suppress wages for workers across the 
board while demanding more education credentials from the 
workers they recruit.91 As a result, in the U.S. we now have, 
to borrow independent researcher Matt Bruenig’s phrase, 
“the most educated poor in history.”92 
This “credentialization” dynamic increases the burden of 
holding the same amount of student debt, because the same 
amount of education is rewarded less. A growing burden for 
the same amount of debt multiplied by the ballooning 
amount of debt has come to mean that student debt is a 
constraint of individual freedom throughout the life course 
and a growing collective weight on families and communities. 
Needless to say, this is quite the opposite of what the drafters 
of the HEA had in mind.  
Default rates are up, as are uses of income-based 
 
 90. See MORGAN & STEINBAUM, supra note 84, at 21. 
 91. Id. at 26–27. 
 92. Matt Bruenig, Why Education Does Not Fix Poverty, DEMOS (Dec. 2, 2015), 
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repayment plans that draw out repayment over a longer 
period of time.93 In addition to the aforementioned fact that 
increased student debt burdens leads people to delay 
marriage and other varieties of family or household 
formation, it reduces wealth both in the short and long 
terms,94 decreases entrepreneurship and business 
formation,95 and forces many to put off major purchases and 
investments like houses and cars.96 And all of this is during 
“normal” times—during a massive economic crisis of the sort 
that has now occurred twice in the span of less than 20 years, 
debts become even more crippling burdens. 
 Unsurprisingly to any student of stratification, some 
individuals, families, and communities feel these burdens 
disproportionately. A growing literature indicates that low-
income households and Black and Latino households have 
more burdensome debts, leading to higher delinquency rates 
and higher concentrations of the other ills that come along 
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publications/AtWhatCost.pdf; Richard Fry, Young Adults, Student Debt, and 
Economic Well-Being, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (May 14, 2014), http://www.pewsocial 
trends.org/2014/05/14/young-adults-student-debt-and-economic-well-being/; 
William Elliott & IlSung Nam, Is Student Debt Jeopardizing the Short-Term 
Financial Health of U.S. Households?, FED. RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REV. 
(Sep./Oct. 2013), https://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/13/09/Elliott
.pdf. 
 95. Konczal, supra note 87. 
 96. Meta Brown & Sydnee Caldwell, Young Student Loan Borrowers Retreat 
from Housing and Auto Markets, LIBERTY ST. ECON. (Apr. 17, 2013), 
http://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2013/04/young-student-loan-
borrowers-retreat-from-housing-and-auto-markets.html#.U6mTeJSwIvI; Meta 
Brown, Sydnee Caldwell, & Sarah Sutherland, Just Released: Young Student 
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with relatively heavy debt loads.97 This is in part due to the 
fact that for-profit colleges, which produce unusually high 
amounts of indebtedness for unusually low benefits, target 
“non-traditional students.” It is also in part because students 
from disadvantaged backgrounds face more challenges—
financial and otherwise—even when they attend public and 
non-profit colleges.98 Recent work indicates that 
indebtedness among Black households has increased at 
higher rates than among White or Hispanic households (to 
use the crude categories of the census).99 Morgan and 
Steinbaum estimate that 70 percent of Black student debtors 
who left school in 2004 will default.100 
These findings jibe with the long line of research showing 
that families that are struggling economically and who have 
been subject to systematic racialized dispossession have 
experienced the burdens of any type of indebtedness 
disproportionately. They can also be contextualized by 
findings that racial wealth disparities make it such that 
“black families whose members study and work hard are still 
hindered in their efforts to generate the resources necessary 
for their own security and to ensure the well-being of their 
children.”101 
 
 97. See MORGAN & STEINBAUM, supra note 84; Kavya Vaghul & Marshall 
Steinbaum, How the Student Debt Crisis Affects African Americans and Latinos, 
WASH. CTR. FOR EQUITABLE GROWTH (Feb. 17, 2016), http://equitablegrowth.org/ 
research-analysis/how-the-student-debt-crisis-affects-african-americans-and-
latinos/; Mark Huelsman, The Debt Divide: The Racial and Class Bias Behind the 
“New Normal” of Student Borrowing, DEMOS (May 19, 2015), 
http://www.demos.org/publication/debt-divide-racial-and-class-bias-behind-new-
normal-student-borrowing; Ending the Debt-For-Diploma System, DEMOS (Aug. 
2013), http://www.demos.org/publication/ending-debt-diploma-system. 
 98. See generally COTTOM, supra note 75; SARA GOLDRICK-RAB, PAYING THE 
PRICE: COLLEGE COSTS, FINANCIAL AID, AND THE BETRAYAL OF THE AMERICAN 
DREAM (2016). 
 99. See Monnica Chan et al., Indebtedness Over Time: Racial Differences in 
Student Borrowing, 20 EDU. RESEARCHER 558, 558 (2019). 
 100. MORGAN & STEINBAUM, supra note 84, at 30. 
 101. Darrick Hamilton et al., Umbrellas Don’t Make It Rain: Why Studying and 
Working Hard Isn’t Enough for Black Americans, INSIGHT CTR. FOR CMTY. ECON. 
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2. Macroeconomic Effects 
The burdens of student debt inevitably resonate from 
individual debtors to families and communities. When 
parents are co-signers, of course, their children’s debts are a 
burden, but even without such formal co-obligation, every 
individual depends on the support of family, friends, co-
workers, and others when they face hardship. People with 
less individual wealth to draw upon are especially likely to 
depend on community for financial difficulties. 
Beyond these social network effects, a society that places 
massive debts on a growing amount of its population at the 
beginning of adulthood creates a massive demand-
suppression program that suppresses employment, 
especially among the most vulnerable.102 Debts force 
individuals to divert income from spending on goods and 
services to paying down bills. The increased employment in 
the loan servicing and debt collection industries are not 
enough to fill in for the decreased demand, which thus 
depresses investment, which reduces job creation and wage 
increases, which holds back aggregate demand further, 
which reduces investment further, etc. 
As will be discussed in more detail below, student debt’s 
effects on demand are enough to reduce production and 
employment by non-trivial amounts.103 As well, those 
burdened with student debt are more likely to take high-
paying jobs that they do not like rather than relatively lower-
paying jobs that involve giving back to their communities.104 
 
DEV. (Apr. 2015), http://www.insightcced.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/ 
Umbrellas_Dont_Make_It_Rain_Final.pdf. 
 102. See Neil Irwin, How Student Debt May Be Stunting the Economy, N.Y. 
TIMES (May 14, 2014), http://eee.nytimes.com/2014/05/15/upshot/the-role-of-
student-debt-in-stunting-the-recovery.html. 
 103. SCOTT FULLWILER ET AL., LEVY ECON. INST., THE MACROECONOMIC EFFECTS 
OF STUDENT DEBT CANCELLATION (Feb. 2018), http://www.levyinstitute.org/ 
pubs/rpr_2_6.pdf [hereinafter “MACROECONOMIC EFFECTS”]. 
 104. See Jesse Rothstein & Cecilia Elena Rouse, Constrained After College: 
Student Loans and Early Career Occupational Choices, 95 J. PUB. ECON. 149 
(2011); Konczal, supra note 87. 
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And “[t]hese directly measurable effects of student debt 
cancellation would be complemented by unmeasured social 
benefits like greater social mobility and quality of life.”105 An 
initial study confirms intuition and anecdotal evidence that 
student loans take a toll on mental health, which can filter 
through to physical health as well (and this does not take 
into account the fact that student debt might make paying 
for healthcare more difficult).106 
3. But What About the Benefits of Student Debt? 
All of this only presents one side of the ledger. Student 
loans are not just impositions of burdens, after all. They are 
used to pay for educations. It is a perfectly plausible reading 
of the history of higher education policy to say that millions 
and millions of people would not have obtained educations 
without student debt to help them. 
It is such an appreciation for the increased access that 
student debt has enabled that has prevented student debt 
cancellation from being taken seriously for so long. It is not 
hard to find economic policy writing explaining how people 
with college educations tend to be better off than those 
without, due to the aforementioned “college premium.” The 
increased earnings that come with a college education are 
much greater, on average, than the (financial) cost of student 
debt over the course of a lifetime. For many, perhaps most, 
households, paying student debt is more an inconvenience 
than a burden—like paying the gas bill. Moreover, an 
educated population tends to produce more “value”—output 
measured in money—for every hour of labor, which (at least 
in theory) increases the “social surplus” that all can share (at 
least in theory). Put them together, and you have the 
 
 105. MACROECONOMIC EFFECTS, supra note 103, at 13. 
 106. See Katrina Walsemann, Gilbert C. Gee & Danielle Gentile, Sick of Our 
Loans: Student Borrowing and the Mental Health of Young Adults in the United 
States, 124 SOC. SCI. & MED. 85, 92 (2015); Elizabeth Sweet et al., The High Price 
of Debt: Household Finance and its Impact on Mental and Physical Health, 91 
SOC. SCI. & MED. 94 (2013). 
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standard “human capital” argument, where a college 
education is understood as an investment in an individual’s 
capacity to produce “value,” which makes that individual 
more valuable to capitalists oriented towards earning profits 
by maximizing value, thus allowing an individual to earn 
more money on the labor market. 
But one need not restrict one’s account of the value of 
higher education to wages and productivity to appreciate the 
fact that a student debtor uses their loan to buy something 
of value. Indeed, one can reject the story of the “college 
premium” (for reasons discussed below) and still believe that 
the benefits to both individuals and to society of subsidizing 
higher education well outweigh the costs of doing so through 
loans.   
While there is no doubt that one cannot account for the 
burdens of student debt without accounting for the benefits, 
there are several reasons to doubt that this is the right way 
to think about the balancing. 
First, for many people it is not even clear that they are 
made better off by exposure to the combination of a college 
education plus student debt. For-profit colleges have played 
an especially pernicious role in this regard. As mentioned, 
these institutions focus on attracting “non-traditional” 
college students, i.e. those who are already worse off 
economically than other college students. They encourage 
these students to take on as much debt as they can, either 
obscuring the amount of debt or assuring them that it will be 
easily paid off (why else would everybody else be doing it and 
the government approving of it?). Thus, for-profit college 
students take on the most debt relative to income, and they 
have the least likelihood of paying it off.107 Given their 
backgrounds (the racial discrimination many of them face, 
 
 107. See Robert Howarth & Robert Lang, Debt and Disillusionment: Stories of 
Former For-Profit College Students as Shared in Florida Focus Groups, CTR. FOR 
RESPONSIBILITY LENDING (Aug. 29, 2018), https://www.responsiblelending.org/ 
sites/default/files/nodes/files/research-publication/crl-florida-debt-disillusionmen 
t-l-aug2018.pdf. 
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the lack of social capital, the lack of family income support, 
etc.), these debtors are already likely to do less well in the 
labor market.108 And credentials from for-profit colleges 
generally do not improve their lot much, if at all. A 2012 
study found that for-profit students did worse than 
comparable students who went to community colleges, while 
a 2016 study found that, on average, students who attended 
for-profits actually made less money than before they 
enrolled—i.e. that their college premiums were negative.109 
Indeed, some former students have reported that the for-
profit college they attended served as an anti-credential: 
something that they leave off their resume if they want to 
increase their chances of employment. With 
disproportionately high debts and disproportionately low 
wealth and income, it should be no surprise that default 
rates on student loans among for-profit students are so high 
that they have pushed up the average default rate of the 
entire federal student loan portfolio.110 The burden of 
student debt compounded on top of other forms of financial 
precariousness has caused anxiety, depression, and even 
suicide.111 
Similar considerations apply to students who attended 
college at non-profit or public schools, but who failed to 
complete their studies. These students, often with relatively 
 
 108. See COTTOM, supra note 75, at 157–77. 
 109. See David J. Deming, Claudia Goldin & Lawrence F. Katz, The For-Profit 
Postsecondary School Sector: Nimble Critters or Agile Predators?, 26 J. ECON. 
PERSPS. 139 (2012); Stephanie Riegg Cellini & Nicholas Turner, Gainfully 
Employed? Assessing the Employment and Earnings of For-Profit College 
Students Using Administrative Data (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working 
Paper No. 22287, 2016), http://www.nber.org/papers/w22287?utm_campaign= 
ntw&utm_medium=email&utm_source=ntw. 
 110. See Deming, Goldin & Katz, supra note 109; Adam Looney & Constantine 
Yannelis, A Crisis in Student Loans? How Changes in the Characteristics of 
Borrowers and in the Institutions They Attended Contributed to Rising Loan 
Defaults (Brookings Institute, Working Paper, 2015), https://www.brookings.edu/ 
wp-content/uploads/2016/07/ConferenceDraft_LooneyYannelis_StudentLoanDef 
aults.pdf. 
 111. Adversary Complaint, supra note 77. 
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low student debt amounts, do less well financially and 
default disproportionately. And many others face negative 
college premiums. 
Even for people for whom post-college incomes justify the 
amount of debt taken on in terms of lifetime balance sheets 
(that is, the lifetime amount of debt payments is less than 
the lifetime amount of the college premium), the cost may not 
be worth it. That is both because people experience their 
balance sheets moment by moment rather than over the 
course of a lifetime—making the cost of debt relative to 
income at any given time more relevant for which 
opportunities are available and for resilience in the face of 
exogenous shocks—and because the other costs of debt 
should be accounted for. Those with substantial debts that 
are nevertheless well below their lifetime income may be 
worse off on net due to high stress levels, physical health 
deterioration, “failure to launch,” and other non-financial 
costs.112  
Second, even were the advantages of a college education 
to clearly outweigh the burden of debts for all who took on 
student debt, that fact in itself does not make financing 
higher education through individual indebtedness good 
policy. There is still the question of the relevant baseline to 
judge reality from. Suppose that we assume, along with the 
prevailing human capital framework, that college graduates 
are paid for their marginal productivity, which increases 
because of skills gained at college. Even if that were so, one 
could just as well finance human capital development by 
making public higher education free or creating a voucher 
program or some other alternative to individual 
indebtedness. Human capital development plus debt, and no 
human capital development at all do not exhaust the possible 
arrangements. One would need an account of why student 
debt is the superior form of higher education finance given 
other possible alternatives, not just why it is better than 
 
 112. See generally GOLDRICK-RAB, supra note 98. 
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fewer people going to college. 
Responding to this challenge, some have argued that 
student debt makes sense at least for those who earn high 
incomes and/or who come from families with high wealth 
(thus, “income-based repayment” makes sense), since these 
individuals who have benefited the most from education “pay 
it forward” to those who might benefit.113 One obvious 
problem with this response is that the current distribution of 
the debt burden does not come close to representing a world 
in which those who benefit most from education (on the 
human capital framework—i.e. those who earn most after 
college).114 But suppose one could correct for that. A deeper 
challenge is that the wealthiest (and luckiest—including 
recipients of financial aid, both “merit” and means based) 
beneficiaries of college do not take on debt, and never will. 
So they will not “pay it forward” under this logic. They might 
“pay it forward” via taxation,115 but then that raises a further 
point. It is not clear why one’s goal should be to have those 
who could not afford college without some sort of financial 
aid and then make a lot of money after college be the most on 
the hook for the cost of education. If the goal is to develop a 
scheme in which the payors are those who are the most able 
 
 113. See, e.g., Monica Potts, Paying it Forward on Student Debt, AM. PROSPECT 
(Aug. 13, 2013), https://prospect.org/article/paying-it-forward-student-debt; see 
Susan Dynarski, An Economist’s Perspective on Student Loans in the United 
States (Economic Studies at Brookings, Working Paper, 2014), 
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/economist_perspective_ 
student_loans_dynarski.pdf. 
 114. This is taking the human capital theory for granted and ignoring the fact 
that people’s incomes after college might reflect social capital, cultural capital, 
and the like. Even if one were to correct for that fact, it is not clear why, unless 
one is fully committed to the investment market metaphor, one would want those 
who experience the greatest difference between what they would have earned 
without a college degree and what they would have earned with it to pay the most 
for education. 
 115. This is speaking loosely, setting aside the question of whether taxes “pay 
for” spending. For currency issuers like the federal government, they do not; see 
Stephanie Bell, Do Taxes and Bonds Finance Government Spending?, 34 J. ECON. 
ISSUES 603 (2000). For currency users like state governments, they (plus bonds) 
do. 
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to pay (which would include those who benefit most from 
higher education, even if they did not themselves get one, 
since they receive the benefits of engineers, poets, etc.), then 
progressive taxation based on wealth and/or income is much 
superior. 
In any case, there is also strong reason to doubt that 
human capital theory, and the “skills gap” explanation it 
provides for income differences, accounts for what is going on 
with the college premium. As noted above, recent research 
has demonstrated that the college premium is largely 
explicable in terms of credentialization rather than skill 
differences.116 And many authors have pointed out that 
subsidizing education does not reduce inequality on its own. 
So emphasizing its role in equalizing income or wealth has 
the pernicious effect of drawing resources away from more 
effective programs for doing so, while also providing a way to 
blame the relatively worse off for their socio-economic 
standing. (Which is not to gainsay the value of higher 
education, only to question whether its value is properly 
comprehended as a replacement for industrial policy, labor 
regulation, redistribution of wealth, etc.).117 
What is more, a focus on the benefits of student debt to 
individuals and even to productivity fails to account for the 
reverberating burdens beyond individuals to families and 
communities. It fails to account for the collective loss—the 
reduction in goods and services, the increase in 
 
 116. See, e.g., Morgan & Steinbaum, supra note 84; David Card & John E. 
DiNardo, Skill-Biased Technological Change and Rising Wage Inequality: Some 
Problems and Puzzles, 20 J. LABOR ECON. 733 (2002); David Autor, How Long Has 
This Been Going On? A Discussion of “Recent Flattening in the Higher Education 
Wage Premium: Polarization, Skill Downgrading, or Both?” by Robert G. Valletta 
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Response Paper, 2017); Labor Market 
Monopsony: Trends, Consequences, and Policy Responses, COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC 
ADVISERS (Oct. 2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/ 
page/files/20161025_monopsony_labor_mrkt_cea.pdf; Marshall Steinbaum, How 
Widespread is Labor Monopsony? Some New Results Suggest It’s Pervasive, 
ROOSEVELT INST. BLOG (Dec. 17, 2017), https://rooseveltinstitute.org/how-
widespread-labor-monopsony-some-new-results-suggest-its-pervasive/. 
 117. See, e.g., Hamilton et al., supra note 101. 
318 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol.  68 
unemployment—that results from the dampening of 
aggregate demand. It fails to account for the diversion of 
people from socially valuable but low-paying work (teaching, 
social work, artmaking) into extractive but high-paying work 
(flash trading, private equity firm-flipping, engineering 
fracking equipment). A full accounting of the costs and 
benefits of student debt cannot be reduced to comparison of 
the aggregate of individual’s loan payments over a lifetime 
compared with the aggregate of their incomes above what 
they might have expected to earn without a college degree. 
And the accounting would have to specify the alternatives 
against which the costs and benefits are to be compared: 
student debt looks different when compared to restricting 
higher education to the elites than it does when compared to 
providing universal public higher education. 
More on such accounting will come out below, and no 
single article can cover its full scope. For now, it is enough to 
point out that the nature of the accounting is not a mere 
measuring of lifetime earnings versus debt burdens. It is not 
a matter of whether student debt is bearable or not. The 
question of what counts as an unjustified burden requires 
drawing moral baselines. It requires reasoning about the 
value of education to a good society and how the burden of 
payment ought to be divided in such a society. One cannot 
undertake a full accounting without something to say about 
when, if ever, charging individuals for the cost of education 
is justified and when such charges ought to force individuals 
to take on debt. 
B. Distortions of Higher Education 
Student debt has also contributed to the restructuring of 
higher education. The more higher education is funded by 
debt, the more transactional the relationship between 
students and college becomes. The fact that students will be 
on the hook for tens of thousands of dollars of tuition makes 
them more likely to ask whether they’re getting their 
“money’s worth” and, specifically, to think of that value in 
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terms of how much it increases their ability to earn money in 
the future. Students come to view themselves as customers 
relative to institutions of higher education, and as investors 
(in “human capital”) relative to the education itself. Colleges 
that depend increasingly on tuition—mostly funded through 
debt—come to view students as present and potentially 
future income streams, and education as a service that is 
being sold to these customers.118 Policymakers, who started 
out thinking of higher education as primarily a public charge 
with debt filling the gaps, have come to understand higher 
education in the same terms—as investment in human 
capital. 
Although modern (i.e. neoclassical) human capital 
theory was originally developed in the late 1950s, it only 
really began to influence discussions of higher education 
outside of economics departments when student debt became 
a mass phenomenon.119 The felt reality of higher education 
as leveraged investment made the financial metaphor less 
abstract, more plausible. Thus, the most influential policy 
voices for the past twenty years or so have understood the 
role of policy as that of facilitating profitable investments 
through access to credit (with some subsidy for lower-income 
students and some credit insurance via income-based 
repayment) and consumer protection regulation that forces 
students and colleges to “internalize” the cost of their 
actions.120 
 
 118. See Berman & Stivers, supra note 5, at 145–51; WENDY BROWN, UNDOING 
THE DEMOS: NEOLIBERALISM’S STEALTH REVOLUTION 175–200 (2015). 
 119. See Elizabeth Popp Berman, How College Became an Investment in 
Human Capital (unpublished draft chapter, on file with author). 
 120. See, e.g., CEA Report; Dynarski, supra note 113; Beth Akers & Matthew 
M. Chingos, Is a Student Loan Crisis on the Horizon?, BROOKINGS (June 24, 2014), 
https://www.brookings.edu/research/is-a-student-loan-crisis-on-the-horizon/; 
Nicole Allan & Derek Thompson, The Myth of the Student-Loan Crisis, THE 
ATLANTIC (Mar. 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2013/03/ 
myth-student-loan-crisis/309231/; Diane Harris, The Truth About Student Debt: 
7 Facts No One is Talking About, NEWSWEEK (Aug. 8, 2019, 12:44 PM), 
https://www.newsweek.com/2019/08/23/student-debt-loans-truth-facts-cover-
story-1453057.html. See generally GARY S. BECKER, HUMAN CAPITAL (1993). 
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The notion that education might have value to individual 
or society beyond increasing an individual’s ability to 
compete on an increasingly monopsonistic job market (or, 
according to human capital theory, through increased worker 
“productivity”) fades into the background. Why would we 
care whether our fellow Americans have knowledge of, say, 
the basics of climate science or the history of racialized 
domination in the United States if this knowledge does not 
produce returns on the labor market? Why would we care if 
colleges decide who to hire and fire based on desire to meet 
job-focused student demand and to adjunctify the college 
workforce, undermining investment in research and 
academic freedom? 
Indeed, focusing on a return on investment at the retail 
level obscures the social value of investing in the sorts of 
skills that are useful for doing particular types of labor. 
Individual students will make “investment” decisions based 
on the current state of the labor market, with perhaps some 
information about what the near future will look like. But 
the labor market can be subject to rapid changes, and society 
can suddenly need particular types of skills that were not 
well remunerated previously. The COVID-19 crisis has made 
abundantly clear how suddenly skills such as knowledge of 
infectious disease, ability to produce medical devices, ability 
to design a fiscal and monetary response to a sudden collapse 
in supply and demand, and the like become highly valuable 
while others suddenly collapse in market value. As with 
other areas of investment, it makes sense to have the state 
fund long-term investments in knowledge and skills that 
may not produce immediate returns or even be of obvious use 
in the short term to ensure that such investments are made 
rather than leaving it to profit-maximizing individuals to 
invest in the skills most likely to produce returns over their 
lifetime based on present information.121 
 
 121. See generally MARIANNA MAZZUCATO, THE ENTREPRENEURIAL STATE: 
DEBUNKING PUBLIC VS. PRIVATE SECTOR MYTHS (2013). 
2020] STUDENT DEBT JUBILEE 321 
The focus on short-term employability has been most 
explicit in the for-profit sector, where the colleges explicitly 
sell themselves in terms of return on investment and charge 
as much as possible to maximize revenue from students.122 
Students, meanwhile, understand education almost entirely 
in terms of how it will increase their job prospects (and then, 
only in relatively low-wage job markets). Policymakers 
understand their role as ensuring for-profits actually 
produce the return on investment that they advertise, 
whether through disclosure regulation, consumer fraud 
enforcement, or more “intrusive” ways of forcing for-profits 
to internalize bad job market outcomes.123 
Much as the suffering of for-profit college students 
provides an extreme example of the negative impacts that 
student debt can have on people’s lives, the success of for-
profit colleges provides an extreme example of the negative 
structural dynamics engendered by funding education 
through student debt. Although generally less explicitly 
transactional, many more “traditional” colleges have begun 
to sell themselves in terms of return on investment as 
students increasingly view themselves as consumers of 
educational (investment) services.124 Manifestations of this 
tendency include adding more specialized terminal masters 
degree programs that charge high tuition and advertise 
professionalization of one type or another (often without the 
promised return on investment), changing undergraduate 
curricular offerings to tilt away from purportedly “useless” 
low-demand disciplines like history, philosophy, and art, and 
 
 122. See ANGULO, supra note 54, at 114–46 (2016); COTTOM, supra note 75, at 
113–56; HELP Report, supra note 77; ITT Educ. Svcs. Inc., Annual Report (Form 
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 124. See Berman & Stivers, supra note 5, at 145–51. 
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towards more “useful” high-demand disciplines like exercise 
science and business management.125 
C. A Self-Reproducing Political Economy 
Funding through student debt also creates a political 
dynamic in which more and more entities depend on how the 
government manages its student debt programs, and on how 
they can attract investment from non-governmental actors. 
In the process of what sociologist Charlie Eaton and his co-
authors have called “the financialization of higher 
education,” running a college becomes more and more like 
running a business.126 Administrators have to spend more 
time with budgets, donors, investors, and lobbyists than with 
curricula, professors, and students. Mutual dependence on 
student debt among colleges, financial companies, servicers, 
guaranty agencies, etc. creates a powerful lobby for the 
expansion of debt with as little accountability as possible (or, 
when accountability is non-negotiable, it should be measured 
in terms of return on investment so that colleges can take 
credit for the college premium that results from wage 
repression and everybody that makes money from student 
debt can stay in business). We have seen that non-profit and 
public colleges had initially opposed funding through debt—
favoring funding directly to them instead, but, as they have 
become more dependent on debt and the possibility for 
anything else has faded into the background, their lobbying 
arms have mostly come around as advocates for more 
loans.127 In the face of policy disagreement and 
immobilization among students and faculty, concentrated 
 
 125. See Yoni Appelbaum, Why America’s Business Majors Are in Desperate 
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interests, the existence or profitability of which depend on 
colleges remaining unaffordable and debt remaining 
plentiful, kept the gravy train rolling.128 Berman and Stivers 
refer to this effect as the creation of a “policy field” in student 
debt, which caused student debt to become “a pressure on 
higher education.”129 
Again, for-profits provide an extreme illustration of the 
general dynamic. Higher education expert Bob Shireman has 
identified a cyclical politics of for-profit colleges, which he 
refers to as “scandal, regulate, forget, repeat.”130 This cycle 
goes all the way back to the GI Bill, when for-profit 
vocational schools first received access to federal aid, but it 
took on a more regular rhythm after the 1972 amendments 
to the HEA first granted for-profit colleges access to student 
loans and other Title IV aid. Every half decade or so since 
then, amongst a steady trickle of lawsuits, out comes an 
excoriating report from one or another branch of the federal 
government or from enterprising investigative journalists 
about widespread fraud in the for-profit sector. These reports 
lead for calls for accountability, which are fought tooth and 
nail by for-profits until they result in some more-or-less tepid 
regulatory action. Some of these regulations have limited the 
outright fraud and stemmed the tide of odious debt, but only 
somewhat and only until a new deluge wipes them away. 
Once the fury dies down and the news cycle rolls elsewhere, 
for-profits’ lobbyists continue their usual business of 
neutralizing or eliminating unfavorable regulations and, 
when enough Republicans are in Congress, gaining new 
regulatory favors.131 
 
 128. See METTLER, supra note 5, at 51–60. 
 129. Berman & Stivers, supra note 5, at 137. The concept of “field” Berman and 
Stivers employ comes from NEIL FLIGSTEIN & DOUG MCADAM, A THEORY OF FIELDS 
(2015). 
 130. Robert Shireman, The For-Profit College Story: Scandal, Regulate, Forget, 
Repeat, CENTURY FOUND. (Jan. 24, 2017), https://tcf.org/content/report/profit-
college-story-scandal-regulate-forget-repeat/. 
 131. See id.; METTLER, supra note 5; ANGULO, supra note 54 at 58–84 (on the 
324 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol.  68 
Not infrequently, for-profit lobbyists work alongside the 
lobbyists for more “traditional” colleges. And, of course, 
Sallie Mae and others that profit most directly from student 
loans have fought for their own regulatory favors with a 
similar ability to win when the light does not shine too 
brightly on them. As discussed above, even common sense 
policy like cutting out the middlemen in student lending took 
nearly thirty years of fighting once the first pilot program 
was created, and then the victory only came because of a 
world-historical financial crisis.132  
Most perniciously, the Department of Education (DOE) 
itself, the federal administrative agency responsible for 
regulating higher education, has come to think like a student 
debt profiteer. This is both because it is one—that is, it is 
directly responsible for the issuance and collection of nearly 
all student debt and subject to multiple incentives to 
maintain its budget in the black—and because many of its 
appointed staff come through the revolving door from these 
concentrated interests who profit from student debt.133 So 
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to which for-profits will go to stop regulations, see Eric Lichtblau, With Lobbying 
Blitz, For-Profit Colleges Diluted New Rules, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 9, 2011), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/10/us/politics/for-profit-college-rules-scaled-
back-after-lobbying.html. For the current state of affairs, with the Secretary of 
Education totally in the bag for for-profit colleges, see David Dayen, Betsy DeVos 
Quietly Making it Easier for Dying For-Profit Schools to Rip Off a Few More 
Students on the Way Out, THE INTERCEPT (Apr. 12, 2019, 9:55 AM), 
https://theintercept.com/2019/04/12/betsy-devos-for-profit-colleges/; Erica L. 
Green & Stacy Cowley, Emails Show DeVos Aides Pulled Strings for Failing For-
Profit Colleges, N.Y. TIMES (Jul. 23, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/23/ 
us/politics/dream-center.html.  
 132. See infra note 67 and accompanying text.  
 133. See, e.g., David Halperin, Another For-Profit College Lobbyist to Join 
DeVos Education Department, REPUBLIC REPORT (Mar. 6, 2018, 11:33 AM), 
https://www.republicreport.org/2018/another-profit-college-lobbyist-join-devos-
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Obama Ties, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Feb. 8, 2016), https://www.insidehighered.com/ 
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each time DOE considers what to do about abuses among for-
profit colleges, student loan servicers, accreditors, or some 
other branch of the student loan complex, it is subject both 
to external and internal lobbying to keep the gravy train 
rolling. 
Student debt, in other words, creates the conditions for 
its own perpetuation, transforming the higher education 
system and many other aspects of our society along with it. 
For many years, the only opponents of increased student 
debt with any voice in Washington were non-profit advocacy 
groups without mobilized bases, and thus without much 
political capital to throw around. In addition to the general 
difficulty of mobilizing a mass group of people without a 
common identity, many student debtors have internalized 
the morality of individual responsibility that comes with the 
legal obligation to repay and had been preoccupied with 
taking the sorts of risks—political or otherwise—that might 
put them out of a job and behind on their payments. Some 
observers have posited that the increase in student debt 
contributed to the de-mobilization of college students, both 
by preoccupying students with worries about bills (forcing 
them to get jobs when they might have spent that time 
organizing, adding mental stress and thus reducing the 
capacity to take creative and risky political action) and by 
socializing students into the consumerist role discussed 
above.134 On this theory, student debt functioned as a form 
of social control, whether intentionally or not. 
In recent years, there have been some signs that more 
and more student debtors have begun to understand their 
plight not as an individual responsibility but as a collective 
failure.135 As these debtors have started to mobilize, 
 
 134. Cf. Interview by Edward Radzivilovskiy with Noam Chomsky, (Feb. 27, 
2013), https://chomsky.info/20130227/; Chris Maisano, The Soul of Student Debt, 
JACOBIN (Dec. 27, 2012), https://www.jacobinmag.com/2012/12/the-soul-of-
student-debt/. 
 135. See, e.g., James Ceronsky, Five Ways Student Debt Resistance is Taking 
Off, TRUTHOUT (Oct. 28, 2013), https://truthout.org/articles/five-ways-student-
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politicians have begun to take notice. For the first time since 
student debt first became part of federal higher education 
policy, members of Congress and plausible candidates for 
President have proposed bills containing structural reform of 
federal higher education policy that includes cancellation of 
student debt and policies that would prevent further 
accumulation by making college broadly affordable. The 
COVID-19 crisis has only heightened the contradictions and 
made calls for debt cancellation louder. 
The sorts of policies that Truman’s Commission on 
Higher Education concluded were necessary more than 
seventy years ago may finally be on the horizon. There is a 
certain irony here: the introduction of student debt pulled 
federal higher education policy away from the Truman 
Commission’s vision, but the misery that debt brought into 
being may have contributed to the mobilization that would 
bring federal higher education policy back in line with it. 
  
 
debt-resistance-is-taking-off/; Astra Taylor, A Strike Against Student Debt, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 27, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/28/opinion/a-strike-
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III. REASONS TO CANCEL STUDENT DEBT 
Canceling student debt would make individual debtors 
wealthier and end ongoing extractive or coercive 
relationships between debtors and their creditors, servicers, 
or collectors. Both the wealth transfer and the elimination of 
indebtedness (the same thing in accounting terms, but not in 
every way) would make debtors’ lives—and the lives of the 
families, friends, and communities on which debtors 
depend—easier. Since student debts’ burdens are skewed 
along race and class lines, these impacts would 
disproportionately benefit relatively disadvantaged people—
though not the most disadvantaged (on average, those who 
have not attended college are worse off). Eliminating trillions 
of dollars of liabilities would increase aggregate demand, 
stimulating investment and employment and redirecting 
both towards more socially beneficial forms of work. These 
knock-on macroeconomic effects would also make many 
peoples’ lives better (and likely a much smaller number of 
other peoples’ lives worse) in not entirely predictable ways. 
But blanket student debt cancellation is a sideways—or, 
at best, partial—approach to the problems of wealth 
inequality and of demand/investment shortfalls. Regarding 
the former, many student debtors are relatively quite well 
off, and for the student debtors who are struggling the most 
it is not always clear that student debt cancellation is the 
most effective way to make their lives better (or, at the least, 
student debt cancellation would have to be part of a broader 
relief package). Regarding the latter, student debt 
cancellation does not provide the biggest stimulus effect.  
What student debt cancellation is not a sideways 
approach to, though, is removing a burden on individuals 
and society that has no good justification. Student debt 
cancellation makes the most sense as a form of restitution 
and revitalization. It is best situated in a program that wipes 
our collective hands clean of a way of financing higher 
education that places the primary burden on individuals, 
with racist, anti-egalitarian, and anti-democratic effects. 
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Canceling student debt repudiates the legitimacy of this 
allocation of burdens. When paired with a plan to  
de-commodify and democratize higher education, and 
especially when paired with a series of reforms of the way we 
organize wealth distribution, labor, and investment, it 
contributes to rebuilding a higher education system on the 
principle of collective responsibility for investing in skills, 
forms of knowledge, and ways of knowing that benefit all of 
us. It would be part of building a system more along the lines 
envisioned by the Truman Commission, before student debt 
was invented. 
That doing so would also make millions of peoples’ lives 
better both directly and indirectly cannot be counted against 
it. That its distributional consequences would be ambiguous 
in the short term provides reason to pair it with other 
reforms to make our society more equal, not a reason not to 
undertake an otherwise worthy plan. 
A. Student Debt as Illegitimate 
The most fundamental argument for canceling student 
debt begins from the proposition that student debt burdens 
individuals and distorts higher education and political 
systems in ways that are unjustified. Put differently: there 
is no good reason to force people to take out debt to get an 
education or to keep people in debt because they got an 
education. When there is no good reason to keep people in 
debt, there is a good reason to cancel their debt. 
The simplest form of this argument is the most extreme: 
student debt is fundamentally misguided and should not 
exist at all. This is the view for those who believe education 
of all levels is a collective responsibility—whether 
understood as a public good, a right, or in some other terms—
and to make individuals pay for their own educations is to 
fail to meet that responsibility. It is to treat education as a 
privilege. Rather, we should all chip in, whether according to 
our ability to do so, according to the degree to which we have 
been benefited by a society with these educational 
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institutions, or according to some other principle of shared 
burden. The notion of collective responsibility for education 
can be supported instrumentally (we all benefit from living 
among highly educated people in a way that cannot be 
measured at retail), deontologically (each of us has a right to 
a certain amount of education), social-contractually 
(reasonable people would agree to providing a certain 
amount of education), or in some combination. It could be 
grounded in a political theory of a free and democratic 
society, in which education plays the role of socializing 
people for self-governance, providing skills the value of 
which can be collectively determined, and facilitating the 
sort of critical thinking that enables collective freedom to be 
exercised. Fleshing out the details of these views and how 
they might line up to different sorts of financing structures 
is beyond the scope of this Article. But it is worth noting that 
this general way of thinking is familiar for K-12 education in 
the United States. Even primary and secondary education 
are not actually funded in accordance with a belief in 
collective responsibility (i.e. they are highly unequally 
funded, with advantages going to the already wealthy, and 
especially to white families), the discussion usually begins 
from the premise of collective responsibility rather than 
individual investment. 
The simple anti-debt view can also be grounded in a more 
pragmatic, and potentially complementary, set of reasons. 
The basic way of thinking here would be that creating a 
market for individual indebtedness to finance education 
might have been a justifiable compromise to expand access 
to higher education during a time when higher education 
was still seen by many as a privilege and as primarily a 
responsibility of the several states and when there was no 
reason to believe student debt would be anything but a minor 
burden on a few people. But we live in a time when higher 
education has become increasingly necessary, when the 
higher education system would collapse without continued 
federal government support, and when student debt has 
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come to transform our whole way of viewing higher 
education. Canceling student debt would eliminate the 
political coalition that continues to privatize and financialize 
higher education, causing worse consequences for those who 
have already been failed by our educational system and are 
duped by for-profit colleges. For that matter, it would 
eliminate the scam industry built on pretending to help 
people make student debt payments easier—because there 
would be no such payments to help people make. A whole 
slew of grifters would be out of business. A full repudiation 
of student debt would reorient the way people think about 
the role of higher education. It would give students more 
autonomy in determining what to study and what sort of 
work to do. (This autonomy would be more, not maximal: the 
job market’s pressures would still loom large absent other 
reforms.) It would create less pressure on institutions to 
teach narrowly “practical” classes, to produce a “return on 
investment,” and/or to satisfy financiers and donors, opening 
up space for more academic freedom. 
Less full-throated versions of these ways of thinking 
could provide reasons for a middle ground view in support of 
some but not all debt cancellation. How far the anti-debt 
argument goes depends on the circumstances in which one 
thinks it is justifiable to have individuals who cannot afford 
the upfront cost be financially responsible for their own 
educations. At the level of principle, one might think that, for 
instance, we collectively owe it to each other and to ourselves 
as a society to make education, and more specifically higher 
education, easily accessible, but not necessarily free or even 
debt-free. Perhaps so long as most of the cost of education is 
collectively borne, then affordability is enough. Affordability 
does not inherently exclude the need to take on debt to pay—
suppose the debt is easily paid off as soon as a student 
receives her first year’s worth of post-college paychecks, for 
instance—and so forcing people to take on student debt does 
not inherently violate this type of right to education. One 
might pair this view with at least a partial endorsement of 
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the importance of price signaling—i.e. of internalization of 
cost—such that an individual should bear more of the cost of 
her education when she learns something that produces less 
social benefit. Or perhaps when she goes to school without 
actually learning anything—using up social resources on 
education without actually being educated—or when she 
reaches some pre-determined limit of schooling (as a way of 
rationing social resources). 
At a pragmatic level, one might take the view that lower 
amounts of student debt (both in the aggregate and 
individually relative to income/wealth) do not produce the 
sorts of burdens on individuals or the political system that 
higher amounts do. So full cancellation would not be 
necessary to achieve the goals of cancellation. On this view, 
the original view for student debt as a gap-filler made sense 
and should be preserved, but this time with a policy 
apparatus more focused on keeping it in check. The benefit 
of hindsight would become a form of foresight. 
One can calibrate up or down, and a full discussion goes 
well beyond our purposes here. The basic principle to get 
across is that there is a link between one’s view about the 
wisdom of individual responsibility for higher education at a 
political, moral, and practical level and one’s view about 
whether current student debt burdens are justifiable. The 
less justifiable current burdens are, the better the reason for 
canceling student debt. 
This way of justifying a student debt jubilee treats it as 
a way to right a (social and individual) wrong. It is morally 
justified for that reason, independently of 
welfare/distributional effects of cancellation, just as 
providing a remedy for an intentional tort or a violation of 
property rights is justified (to the extent it is!) regardless of 
the relative resources of the plaintiff and the defendant. This 
is not to say that the distributional effects of student debt 
may not provide part of the reason to think that student debt 
is (or is not) a wrong that merits a remedy, just as a tort or 
property rule might be justified in part on net distributional 
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terms. But finding student debt unjustified—and the 
cancellation of it justified—in part because of the 
distributional implications of funding higher education 
through individual indebtedness is not the same thing as 
finding the cancellation of student debt justified only insofar 
as it is a means to increase the material wellbeing—as a 
transfer of wealth—of those who are currently worst off. 
B. Eliminating the Burdens of Student Debt 
Whatever the reason for canceling student debt, doing so 
would remove student debtors’ need to set aside a certain 
portion of their income to pay off their debts, thereby freeing 
up income streams for other uses. This increase in 
purchasing power can be thought of as equivalent to a cash 
transfer. Increased purchasing power benefits former 
student debtors and their intimates by giving these 
beneficiaries access to more goods and services, by increasing 
their willingness to make big purchases like houses and cars, 
by making it more financially sensible to start a family, by 
increasing emotional and physical well-being, and in any 
number of other ways that having more money is beneficial 
in a society where money increases access to nearly 
anything. It would, in other words, make less likely at least 
some of the negative life outcomes associated with student 
debt discussed above. Recent research suggests that these 
benefits would contribute to narrowing the Black-White 
wealth gap, because Black households tend to hold relatively 
more student debt for a given level of income or wealth than 
do white households.136 There is some debate, however, over 
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the optimal design of a debt cancellation policy if one’s goal 
is narrowing this gap.137 
Increasing the purchasing power of many people at once 
also has knock-on macroeconomic effects when the people 
with increased purchasing power use that to buy goods and 
services, stimulating business investment, increasing 
employment, etc. in the familiar Keynesian virtuous cycle. A 
study published by the Levy Institute of Economics at Bard 
University found that “the positive feedback effects of [full] 
student debt cancellation could add on average between $86 
billion and $108 billion per year to the economy,” which 
would “create 50 percent to 70 percent as many jobs in its 
peak year as the current economic expansion creates in an 
average year, and could continue to sustain about one-third 
of the job creation seen in the cancellation’s peak years 
throughout the duration of the cancellation.”138 At least 
given the state of the macroeconomy in 2017, this expansion 
would have negligible inflationary effects.139 
The main source of objection raised by that way of 
thinking is that a transfer payment just to student debtors—
and a transfer payment that takes the form of debt 
cancellation rather than cash transfers—is not the best way 
to target such payments.140 If one’s goal is macroeconomic 
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stimulus, one could generate a greater multiplier effect by 
targeting spending differently: to infrastructure, to the 
poorest, etc. If one wants to target macroeconomic stimulus 
according to some sort of industrial policy—i.e. to develop 
certain areas of investment, skills development, and 
innovation, rather than letting financiers decide where to 
spend the money based on profitability projections—then one 
should direct spending towards the area in which one wants 
to create the investment. Thus, investment in green tech, in 
high-speed trains, in public housing, in reparations for 
slavery and native genocide, and the like would be a better 
macroeconomic program than canceling student debt. 
From a distributional angle, there is reason to doubt that 
student debtors should get a benefit that people who have 
had to reduce their consumption to pay off their student debt 
should not.141 Or, rather, if one’s sole goal is to increase 
purchasing power for those where that increase would do the 
most good, one should simply pay cash to people in the most 
need of it: i.e. those with the least income and/or wealth.142 
Student debtors tend to be relatively well off, since a majority 
of the population does not go to college at all, gaining not 
even the college premium that student debtors benefit from. 
And a substantial fraction of student debtors are quite well 
off: highly paid doctors, lawyers, financiers, and the like have 
large debts if they recently graduated. Paying cash rather 
than canceling debt would have the added advantage that it 
would not mandate how recipients of the transfer payment 
must spend it: they could direct income streams according to 
their own priorities. 
None of these arguments address the sorts of reasons for 
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canceling student debt discussed above. Assuming that one 
does not find these arguments convincing—that one thinks 
that student debt does not distort higher education, because, 
say, one thinks that student debt is fundamental for 
producing productive workers according to whatever the 
market demands—each of these arguments has some merit. 
But, even on that assumption, they all implicitly assume that 
there is a trade-off between student debt cancellation and 
other transfers from the government. Without such a trade-
off, they are not arguments against the value of increasing 
the purchasing power of the population of people who happen 
to have student debt (by canceling their debts), but rather 
arguments that other ways of increasing purchasing power 
would be even better. Put differently: why not (assuming one 
shares these priorities) enact student debt cancellation in 
addition to antipoverty programs, a Green New Deal, 
reparations, etc.? 
Here’s one potential reason: there is only so much fiscal 
space in which the government can operate, whether due to 
a concern about raising taxes, about inflation, about “the 
national debt,” or some combination. But it is doubtful that 
student debt cancellation would have much impact on the 
fiscal space in which the federal government can operate. 
The national debt is not something to worry about in the 
abstract, and the national deficit is to be celebrated, 
especially during recessionary periods—especially during 
the current crisis. There is little reason to be concerned about 
inflation in the contemporary environment (this was so even 
before the COVID-19 crisis). But even if there were a need to 
create fiscal space for other priorities, there are plenty of 
ways to do so: plenty of places in the budget could do with 
trimming (most notably the military budget could be cut by 
hundreds of billions of dollars while harming only defense 
contractors and arms dealers and by tens of trillions of 
dollars with enormous benefits for humanity), and there is 
plenty of room to raise taxes both to stave off inflation and to 
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remove power from the rich.143 
Another potential worry is that there is a limited supply 
of “political capital” for progressive priorities, and policies 
like universal healthcare, expanding public housing, 
strengthening unions, restructuring the criminal legal 
system, or even equalizing resources for K–12 education 
should be in line before student debt cancellation (perhaps 
even if it’s understood as part of a program of  
de-commodification). But even accepting that student debt 
cancellation should not be a high priority in terms of its 
relative contribution to social justice and even accepting that 
limits on political capital make setting priorities necessary, 
there is a problem with treating political capital as only 
usable for (as it were) consumption goods. Less cryptically: 
some expenditures of political capital are investments. They 
create or strengthen or grow a political base, or make a tit-
for-tat exchange easier, or put political opponents on the 
back foot, or otherwise make enacting other priorities easier 
in the future.  
It seems at least plausible that canceling student debt 
would function in this way. Student debt cancellation would 
benefit tens of millions of people in a direct and tangible way, 
and more indirectly. It would both disproportionately benefit 
young people, perhaps encouraging them to vote and even 
motivating them to engage more deeply with progressive 
politics, and benefit highly educated people, who are more 
likely to vote. Combined with a package of other policies, it 
could contribute to building a broad political coalition, rather 
than shrinking the pie. Perhaps it would go otherwise, 
perhaps student debtors would pull up the ladder. But that 
is not obvious in the abstract: whether that would be so 
would surely depend on the details of the policy and the 
circumstances of its enactment. 
The most elemental potential trade-off derives from the 
fact that enacting policies takes time. One cannot do 
 
 143. See Levitz, supra note 140. 
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everything at once, and the further in the future one plans to 
do something the more certain it is. So one must set priorities 
for what should be done first. It cannot be denied, of course, 
that some things have to be done before others. Time 
marches ever onward. And so we come to the root of these 
worries about badly targeted benefits: the worry that student 
debtors just are not that deserving relative to others. 
Certainly it is true that, if one’s priority is to determine 
who most deserves an increase in purchasing power and how 
that increase would most stimulate the macroeconomy, other 
distributional considerations are more important. And it is 
also true that, even if one’s priority is relieving the burdens 
of student debt (or, more narrowly, relieving the burdens of 
those who were made worse off by taking on student debt, 
even accounting for the benefits of some college education), a 
means-tested intervention that also includes payments to 
some people who have paid off their debts but are worse off 
because they had to divert resources to do so would be better 
targeted. But even if those things are true, they do not 
undermine the point that canceling student debt would have 
beneficial effects, which, even purely understood in terms of 
purchasing power, are reason to give it some priority. And 
there are other reasons in its favor, some of which have just 
been reviewed. Distributive implications could be accounted 
for in the details of the design of the plan. 
There remains the question of what to do for people who 
already paid off their student debt or what to do about the 
fact that canceling student debt would not prevent future 
people from taking it on. The latter question would be 
directly addressed if student debt cancellation were paired 
with a plan to make higher education free/affordable, as it 
should be and (as we will discuss) as the leading plans do.144 
The former I will not address at any length: any removal of 
 
 144. There are some complications here: nobody is proposing to make all higher 
education free, so graduate level education and private higher education would 
still generate debt. 
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an injustice always fails to benefit those who have already 
experienced the injustice. In any case, canceling student debt 
does not in itself preclude paying those who paid theirs off 
early or who scrimped and saved to avoid taking it on. 
Finally, concerns about the distributional implications of 
debt cancellation do not in themselves provide a reason not 
to cancel any student debt. They provide a reason to apply 
some sort of limitation on a jubilee, likely via some sort of 
means test. Doing so might be a good idea, but it would have 
to be weighed against the difficulty of coming up with the 
right way of targeting relief and the administrative burden 
that such means testing inevitably creates, which often 
creates conditions that prevent the most vulnerable from 
accessing relief. Others have begun to hash out these details. 
C. Debt Cancellation as Jubilee 
A jubilee is not exactly the same thing as a transfer of 
cash or benefits in kind. It is a different way of increasing 
wealth. It ends a particular type of obligation, a claim on a 
flow of income over time. Doing so has effects that are not 
entirely reducible to increasing purchasing power. It ends 
the need to come up with liquidity (i.e. cash) to pay off a debt, 
which makes the pressure to find employment less intense 
and increases one’s ability to pay other bills. This is 
especially important in when, say, incomes suddenly freeze 
up. Canceling debt also reduces a household’s leverage and 
eliminates creditors’ power over their debtors. Reducing 
leverage makes households less vulnerable to business cycle 
downturns (or full-blown economic crises) and makes it less 
risky to do things that might result in losses of income or 
increases in costs. It is also likely to improve credit scores (on 
average), which increases opportunities to take on other debt 
on better terms, to get approved for an apartment, to get a 
lower rate on insurance, and even to get a job. Reducing 
aggregate leverage enables more productive borrowing 
and/or decreases the potential for debt deflationary effects in 
a downturn. 
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Eliminating the relationship between debtor and 
creditor makes it such that a debtor does not have to worry 
about the debt or anything associated with it anymore: 
staying on top of payments, signing up for the right 
repayment plan, dealing with errors or predatory practices 
from servicers and collectors, avoiding scams, etc. It makes 
one freer to make choices without having to think about how 
they will impact one’s ability to pay a debt: to take time off 
from work, to do less lucrative work (or more lucrative work 
without being worried about falling into the cracks of 
repayment plans), to go back to school, etc. It also prevents 
the creditor from setting conditions on what a debtor can do. 
In the case of public student debt, that means, for instance, 
being able to do work that does not qualify for the public 
service loan forgiveness plan or to take a year off from doing 
that type of work without facing a huge penalty. Jubilees 
have been traditionally undertaken for both of these reasons. 
In sum, they create a clean slate, a form of rough justice that 
allows debtors to move on with their lives and reduces total 
leverage. 
A recent study has demonstrated how canceling student 
debt can have knock-on deleveraging effects.145 Researchers 
examined what happened to individuals who suddenly found 
their private student debts canceled because a collector could 
not establish chain of title.146 These borrowers were already 
in default—so they were already not paying on these debts, 
so none of the effects had to do with increased cash flow.147 
Yet they reduced their total indebtedness by an average of 
$4,000 beyond the amount of student loan cancellation they 
received.148 They did both by borrowing less on existing 
accounts (i.e. they had less need to take on a credit card 
 
 145. Marco Di Maggio, Ankit Kalda, & Vincent Yao, The Effects of Debt Relief 
on the Student Loan Market, VOX CEPR POLICY PORTAL (Sept. 7, 2019), 
https://voxeu.org/article/effects-debt-relief-student-loan-market. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
340 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol.  68 
balance for routine purchases) and by taking out fewer 
debts.149 Less debt meant they were significantly less likely 
to go into delinquency or default on their other debts.150 Some 
of the results may be attributable to the fact that these 
borrowers increased their income on average, apparently 
because they were able to find better jobs.151 
D. Conclusion 
In sum, there are multiple overlapping reasons to cancel 
student debt. How these reasons fit together will depend on 
one’s view about the role of higher education in society and 
about the virtues of means-testing programs, among other 
things. Different combinations of the above considerations 
will lead to support for debt jubilees with different scopes. 
And the onset of a world historical economic crisis that 
suddenly makes paying student debt impossible for many 
may well make much of the foregoing obsolete. This Article 
takes no position on the optimal design for a debt jubilee, but 
the foregoing should provide enough reasons in favor of some 
sort of jubilee that it will make sense to explore how one 
might be implemented. 
  
 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
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IV. CANCELING STUDENT DEBT WITHOUT CONGRESS 
Two competing bills for a student debt jubilee, both 
promoted by Democratic Party leaders who were candidates 
for that party’s Presidential nomination, have been drafted 
and lay waiting for the right political moment.152 Although 
they vary in their scope and in some details, both would run 
debt cancellation through the Department of Education—
instructing it to take possession of outstanding FFELP and 
Perkins Loans, to purchase outstanding private student 
loans, and to cancel them alongside outstanding Direct 
Loans.153 Both would make debt cancellation tax-free and 
both are paired with bills that would make at least public 
undergraduate education free for all.154 
For the first time since the federal government created 
student debt, it is well within the realm of possibility that 
the next President would be ready to sign a student debt 
jubilee into law. And more and more members of Congress 
seem likely to vote in favor of sending such a bill to the 
President’s desk. Indeed, it is not out of the question that at 
least some student debt cancellation could come out of the 
current crisis, with Democratic leaders discussing a write-
 
 152. See Student Debt Cancellation Act of 2019, H.R. 3448, 116th Cong. (2019), 
https://www.congress.gov/116/bills/hr3448/BILLS-116hr3448ih.pdf (“Omar 
Bill”); Student Loan Debt Relief Act of 2019, H.R. ___, 116th Cong. (2019) 
(“Cornyn Bill”), https://www.warren.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Student%20Loan 
%20Debt%20Relief%20Act%20(Legislative%20Text).pdf; Bernie Sanders, This is 
How We Will Cancel All Student Debt, MEDIUM (June 24, 2019), 
https://medium.com/@SenSanders/this-is-why-we-should-cancel-all-student-debt 
-6ea987d02ce2; College for All and Cancel All Student Debt, BERNIE, 
https://berniesanders.com/issues/college-for-all/; Team Warren, I’m Calling for 
Something Truly Transformational: Universal Free Public College and 
Cancellation of Student Debt, MEDIUM (Apr. 22, 2019), https://medium.com/ 
@teamwarren/im-calling-for-something-truly-transformational-universal-free-
public-college-and-cancellation-of-a246cd0f910f. 
 153. Clyburn Bill §§ 101(c), (e), (g); Omar Bill §§ 2(c), 3. 
 154. Omar Bill §§ 2(e), 3(e); Clyburn Bill § 101(d); College for All Act of 2017, 
https://www.sanders.senate.gov/download/college-for-all-act?inline=file; 
Summary of Sen. Sanders’ College for All Act, https://www.sanders.senate.gov/ 
download/collegeforallsummary/?inline=file. 
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down of $10,000 or more as part of ongoing relief efforts.155 
Still, another possibility is worth considering: one that 
avoids a notoriously deadlock-prone Congress. This section 
will argue that the Executive Branch already has the power 
to cancel student debt. The Higher Education Act (HEA) 
gives the Secretary of Education a broad discretionary 
authority to “modify” or “compromise, waive, or release” 
DOE’s claims against student debtors.156 This settlement 
authority has only ever been used in a narrow set of 
circumstances, consistent with DOE’s longstanding practice 
of treating student debtors primarily as revenue streams. 
But nothing in the statute requires DOE to continue to use 
these powers narrowly. A Secretary committed to student 
debt cancellation, working in an administration with the 
same commitment, could cancel some or all public student 
debt, which, recall, is 95% of outstanding student debt. 
Doing so would involve using an authority in an 
unprecedented way. And the broader the cancellation, the 
more in tension it would be with the continued existence of 
student debt collection under the HEA. So a court given a 
chance to review an Executive jubilee undertaken via an 
exercise of prosecutorial discretion, especially a court with 
the sort of anti-novelty, anti-administrative-state, and anti-
progressive tendencies as those that increasingly dominate 
the federal judiciary, would likely have some serious doubts. 
The Supreme Court been fairly explicit that Congress does 
not “hide elephants in mouseholes,”157 and that courts and 
agencies should exercise “common sense as to the manner in 
 
 155. Michael Stratford, Student Loans Emerge as Sticking Point in Stimulus 
Debate, POLITICO (Mar. 23, 2020). 
 156. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1082(a)(4), (6) (2018). 
 157. This phrase comes from Whitman v. American Trucking Associations, 531 
U.S. 457, 468 (2001), and has taken on the status of ritual incantation since. See, 
e.g., Cyan, Inc. v. Beaver Cty. Emps. Ret. Fund, 138 S. Ct. 1061, 1071 (2018); Epic 
Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1626–27 (2018); Puerto Rico v. Franklin Cal. 
Tax-Free Tr., 136 S. Ct. 1938, 1947 (2016); EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, 
L.P., 572 U.S. 489, 528 (2014); Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 267 (2006). 
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which Congress is likely to delegate a policy decision of such 
economic and political magnitude to an administrative 
agency.”158 And the Debt Collection Improvement Act does 
require all agencies to “try to collect” debts to the federal 
government as they become due, which must be read in light 
of an HEA that provides quite detailed instructions for how 
the Department of Education is to collect on student debt.159 
There are responses to each of these doubts, and they 
will be discussed in turn. The following will argue that 
governing law provides strong support for the proposition 
that DOE has absolute discretion to determine when to stop 
collections, when to collect less than the full amount, and 
when to release claims debtors’ in toto. And, aside from the 
law (and assuming any potential challenger would have 
standing), there is some reason to doubt whether a federal 
court, especially in a moment of plummeting legitimacy, 
would be inclined to take a controversial legal position to 
reverse what is sure to be wildly popular massive economic 
relief for tens of millions of people. 
Predicting outcomes is impossible. What follows is an 
argument in favor of the Secretary of Education’s broad 
discretion to cancel student debt paired with a discussion of 
the legal and operational obstacles to be overcome. 
A. The Law of Prosecutorial Discretion at Administrative 
Agencies 
1. Prosecutorial Discretion, Generally 
It is a longstanding principle of Anglo-American law 
 
 158. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000); see 
also id. at 132 (“[A] reviewing court should not confine itself to examining a 
particular statutory provision in isolation. The meaning—or ambiguity—of 
certain words or phrases may only become evident when placed in context.”). 
 159. 31 U.S.C. § 3711(a)(1) (2018) (“The head of an executive . . . agency—(1) 
shall try to collect a claim of the United States Government for money or property 
arising out of the activities of, or referred to, the agency.”); see also Salazar v. 
King, 822 F.3d 61, 83 (2d Cir. 2016) (stating in dictum that § 3711(a)(1) gives 
DOE “the non-discretionary mandate to collect on federal student loans”). 
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that, as stated in Marbury v. Madison, “[w]here the head of 
a department acts in a case, in which executive discretion is 
to be exercised; in which he is the mere organ of executive 
will . . . any application to a court to control, in any respect, 
his conduct, would be rejected without hesitation.”160 
Executive discretion takes multiple forms. One of them—the 
one at issue here—is prosecutorial discretion (sometimes 
also referred to “enforcement discretion”). An agency (acting 
via its officer) exercises such discretion when it determines 
whether or not to enforce a right it has (or may have) against 
a private party. This type of decision is not reserved for 
agents of the state. The common law barred courts from 
reviewing any litigant’s decisions about whether, when, and 
how to bring or dismiss a case, whether civil or criminal.161 
A right to bring a case is not an obligation to do so. This rule 
has applied time out of mind to private litigants and public 
officials alike. 
With respect to public officials in particular, court 
deference derives in part from this principle common to all 
potential litigants and in part out of respect for the 
constitutional separation of powers. To the extent discretion 
is part of what it means to execute the laws, for the Judiciary 
to second guess such discretion would be for it to “invade a 
special province of the Executive.”162 Since prosecutorial 
discretion is at least to some degree inherent in the execution 
of a law, when the Constitution vests “[t]he executive Power” 
in the office of the President and commands her to “take Care 
that the [l]aws be faithfully executed,” it vests the President 
 
 160. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170–71 (1803). 
 161. See The Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S. (7 Wall) 454, 457–59 (1868); see also 
Powell v. Katzenbach, 359 F.2d 234, 234 (D.C. Cir. 1965); United States v. 
Salinas, 693 F.2d 348, 350 (5th Cir. 1982); In re Richards, 213 F.3d 773, 782 (3d 
Cir. 2000). Rule 48(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure now requires 
leave of court to dismiss a criminal case, though generally a prosecutor’s 
“discretion . . . should not be . . . disturbed unless clearly contrary to manifest 
public interest” or in bad faith. United States v. Cowan, 524 F.2d 504, 513 (5th 
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 971 (1976). 
 162. Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 489 (1999). 
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and her officers with the discretion to determine how to go 
about executing the law.163 When Congress makes a law 
enforceable by an instrumentality of the executive, it does so 
against this constitutional background, implicitly delegating 
discretion in enforcement. 
The common law baseline is absolute discretion, but, 
because Congress creates the laws that the Executive Branch 
is charged with enforcing, Congress can alter the common 
law baseline by creating standards for an officer’s 
discretion.164  At least as a default, prosecutorial discretion 
is commonly referred to as absolute and can only be 
challenged with “clear evidence” that an official has engaged 
in selective prosecution that violates one or more individual’s 
constitutional rights.165 In practice, this has meant that, at 
least with respect to criminal prosecutors, courts will never 
interfere with a non-enforcement decision (as long as 
constitutional rights are not violated). As the Supreme Court 
put it in Bordenkircher v. Hayes, “so long as the prosecutor 
has probable cause to believe that the accused committed an 
offense defined by statute, the decision whether or not to 
prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a grand 
jury, generally rests entirely in his discretion.”166 
 
 163. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 (Vesting Clause), art. II, § 3, cl. 4 (Take Care 
Clause); see also Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 922 (1997) (“The 
Constitution does not leave to speculation who is to administer the laws enacted 
by Congress.”); Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985) (discussing the role 
of the Take Care Clause in vesting prosecutorial discretion); Kate Andrias, The 
President’s Enforcement Power, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1031, 1046–47 (2013) 
(discussing the constitutional basis for the President’s enforcement power). 
 164. See, e.g., Fed. R. Crim. Pro. § 48(a). 
 165. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 463–65 (1996); Reno, 525 U.S. 
at 488–91; see also Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962); Bolling v. Sharpe, 
347 U.S. 497 (1954). 
 166. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978). Theoretically, 
exceptions exist for cases in which a prosecutor’s discretion infringes on another 
Constitutional right, but these rarely make an impact in practice. See Armstrong, 
517 U.S. at 464–65; Oyler, 368 U.S. at 456; Bolling, 347 U.S. at 497. For recent 
discussion on the problems with the discretionary power this creates, see EMILY 
BAZELON, CHARGED: THE NEW MOVEMENT TO TRANSFORM AMERICAN PROSECUTION 
AND END MASS INCARCERATION (2018); Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Managerial 
346 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol.  68 
Prosecutors have used this discretion as a form of de 
facto lawmaking, for both good and ill. In the latter category, 
prosecutors have developed “pre-trial diversion” programs 
without any statutory authorization and, in recent years, 
have openly refused to prosecute certain victimless crimes, 
the enforcement of which has contributed mightily to racial 
injustice.167 In the former, the Department of Justice 
categorized some financial firms as “too big to prosecute” in 
the wake of the financial crisis. Where these decisions have 
been challenged, they have been resoundingly upheld.168 
Even where courts of first instance have the explicit 
responsibility to review consent judgments, they have been 
rebuked by appellate courts when they came close to 
usurping an agency’s judgment as to whether, and how far, 
to pursue a case.169 
The name should not be misleading: prosecutorial 
discretion does not apply only to criminal prosecutions, or 
only to cases (criminal or civil) brought by the DOJ or state-
level office that employs “prosecutors.” The foundational 
cases on prosecutorial discretion focus on the power of the 
Attorney General and other Department of Justice (DOJ) 
officials.170 These cases have sometimes been said to 
establish that the Attorney General has an “inherent 
authority” to exercise prosecutorial discretion,171 but they 
 
Justice and Mass Misdemeanors, 66 STAN. L. REV. 611 (2014); William J. Stuntz, 
Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law’s Disappearing Shadow, 117 HARV. L. REV. 
2548 (2004); Steven J. Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 101 YALE L.J. 
1979 (1992). 
 167. See Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 197 (5th Cir. 2015) (King, J., 
dissenting) (discussing pre-trial diversion programs), https://www.motherjones 
.com/crime-justice/2018/03/philadelphias-new-da-found-an-innovative-way-to-
legalize-pot-and-other-cities-should-pay-attention/. 
 168. For many years, prosecutors in states controlled by white supremacists 
declined to prosecute murders, assaults, and other acts of brutality if committed 
against Black people. 
 169. See, e.g., S.E.C. v. Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., 673 F.3d 158 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 170. See Swift & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 311, 331–32 (1928); The 
Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S. (7 Wall) 454, 454 (1868). 
 171. E.g., U.S. Att’y’s Manual 4-3.100 (1994) (“The Attorney General has the 
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actually relied on the logic just articulated. Congress granted 
the Attorney General broad enforcement authority with the 
Judiciary Act, which, read against the common law baseline 
of absolute prosecutorial discretion for both private and 
public litigants, should be understood as a grant of broad 
prosecutorial discretion.172 In other words, these cases 
provide no reason to treat the Attorney General’s (or the 
DOJ’s, or any prosecutor’s) prosecutorial discretion as 
unique, aside from the fact that the grant of discretion 
extends to a particularly broad variety of cases. Moreover, 
nothing in these decisions restricted prosecutorial discretion 
to the DOJ’s criminal functions: the foundational 
Confiscation Cases explicitly treated civil and criminal 
litigation as on a par.173 
 
inherent authority to dismiss any affirmative action and to abandon the defense 
of any action insofar as it involves the United States of America, or any of its 
agencies, or any of its agents who are parties in their official capacities.”). 
 172. See Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 464–65 (US Attorneys have broad “latitude 
because they are designated by the statute as the President’s delegates to help 
him discharge his constitutional responsibility to ‘take Care that the Laws be 
faithfully executed.’”) (emphasis added); Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S. at 456–59. 
See generally Rebecca Krauss, The Theory of Prosecutorial Discretion in Federal 
Law: Origins and Developments, 6 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 1, 9–11 (2012) 
(discussing circuit court cases). 
 173. See Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S. at 457–59. This includes “[p]ower to 
release or otherwise dispose of the rights and property of the United States,” even 
though that power is “lodged in the Congress by [Article IV of] the Constitution.” 
Royal Indemnity Co. v. U.S., 313 U.S. 289, 294 (1941) (citing U.S. CONST. art. IV, 
§ 3, cl. 2). That is because Congress can confer that power to an official in the 
executive branch (and confer the power to delegate it), including by giving an 
official the power to dispose of federal property, to enter into contracts, to settle 
claims, and the like. See id.; Alcoa, Inc. v. Bonneville Power Admin., 698 F.3d 
774, 791–92 (9th Cir. 2012). Moreover, it is not entirely clear whether Royal 
Indemnity applies to cabinet-level officials, since it only concluded that 
“[s]ubordinate officers of the United States are without [the power to dispose of 
the rights and property of the United States], save only as it has been conferred 
upon them by Act of Congress or is to be implied from other powers so granted.” 
Royal Indemnity Co., 313 U.S. at 294 (emphasis added); but see Warren v. United 
States, 234 F.3d 1331, 1337–38 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (citing Royal Indemnity for the 
proposition that “the Government cannot abandon property without 
congressional authorization” and applying that proposition to the Coast Guard); 
Rio Grande Silvery Minnow (Hybognathus amarus) v. Bureau of Reclamation, 
599 F.3d 1165, 1185 (10th Cir. 2010) (citing Warren and applying it to the Bureau 
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Early focus on the DOJ seems to be merely an artifact of 
the Judiciary Act’s vesting primary enforcement power in 
that office and the ability of the DOJ to handle nearly all 
cases on behalf of the federal government. As the 
administrative state grew, so did the number of offices in the 
Executive Branch with enforcement powers. For some years, 
there was uncertainty about the authority of these officials 
to exercise discretion to settle even the most trivial of cases, 
and common practice was to refer every potential  
non-enforcement or compromise determination to the DOJ 
for approval unless the agency had an explicit grant of 
settlement authority.174 
As will be discussed further below, the resulting burden 
on the DOJ eventually led it to encourage Congress to pass 
the Federal Claims Collection Act (FCCA), which granted a 
default settlement authority to all administrative 
agencies.175 But subsequent case law has made clear that the 
FCCA was unnecessary to create such authority, and the 
uncertainty that preceded it was unfounded. 
As with the Judiciary Act, the Administrative Procedure 
Act enacted the common law presumption that an official 
charged with the enforcement of a particular set of claims 
has absolute discretion to determine whether and how to do 
so.176 Prosecutorial discretion is implicit in the power to 
enforce a law, whether that power is vested in an employee 
 
of Reclamation); U.S. General Accountability Office, Principles of Federal 
Appropriations Law (3d ed. 2008): The Government’s Duty and Authority to 
Collect Debts Owed to it, 2008 WL 6969346, at *1 (“It follows [from Royal 
Indemnity] that, without a clear statutory basis, an agency has no authority to 
forgive indebtedness or to waive recovery.”). 
 174. See Improvement of Procedures in Claims Settlement and Government 
Litigation, 89th Cong. 23 (1966); Sidney B. Jacoby, The 89th Congress and 
Government Litigation, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1212, 1223–24 (1967); see generally 
H.R. REP. NO. 89-533 (1965) (discussing this practice).  
 175. Federal Claims Collections Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-508, 80 Stat. 308 
(1966). 
 176. Heckler, 470 U.S. at 831–32 (citing 5 K. Davis, Administrative Law § 28:6 
(1984)); see Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 607–10 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(discussing the common law baseline in more detail). 
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of the DOJ or another administrative agency. Their 
prosecutorial discretion is of the same nature and subject to 
the same principles of (non-)review.177 
2. Prosecutorial Discretion of Administrative Agencies: 
The Heckler Framework 
The leading case on administrative agencies’ 
prosecutorial discretion is Heckler v. Chaney. In that case, 
death row inmates had petitioned the FDA to take 
enforcement action against companies that were producing 
and selling the drugs used for lethal injections. Although 
these drugs had all been approved as “safe and effective” for 
some uses, they had not been tested or approved for use in 
executions.178 The Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act (FDCA) 
prohibited (and continues to prohibit) unapproved uses, and 
mandates that those who violate this prohibition be 
punished by fine or imprisonment.179 The FDA’s own 
published rules carried out this mandate by requiring the 
agency to “investigate . . . thoroughly and to take whatever 
action is warranted to protect the public” from unapproved 
uses.180 The FDCA contained (and still contains) a grant of 
permission to exercise discretion to refrain from initiating 
proceedings, but only in the case of “minor violations.”181 The 
inmates argued that the FDA was thus required to at least 
temporarily ban the use of these drugs while an investigation 
into their safety and effectiveness for use in executions was 
undertaken. The FDA claimed it had “inherent discretion” to 
determine whether such enforcement action was warranted 
 
 177. See Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 464 (citing Heckler in determining not to 
review a criminal prosecutor’s discretion, thus implicitly treating them as on a 
par); Heckler, 470 U.S. at 831 (drawing explicitly on the case law regarding the 
DOJ’s prosecutorial discretion to declare the FDA’s discretion absolute). 
 178. Heckler, 470 U.S. at 823–24. 
 179. See Chaney v. Heckler, 718 F.2d 1174, 1186 n.29 (D.C. Cir. 1984) 
(discussing the mandatory nature of the FDCA’s prohibitions). 
 180. Id. at 1186 (quoting Legal Status for Uses Unapproved by the Food and 
Drug Administration, 37 Fed. Reg. 16503, 16504 (Aug. 15, 1972)). 
 181. See Heckler, 470 U.S. at 837. 
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or not, especially given the question of whether it had the 
authority to regulate the use of such uses. 
A divided panel of the D.C. Circuit (with then-Judge 
Scalia dissenting) found that the language and the structure 
of the FDCA mandated investigation of unauthorized uses 
and prosecution of any violations.182 By that point, it had 
become well established that there was a strong presumption 
in favor of reviewability of administrative agencies’ 
actions.183 After all, the APA “waives the federal 
government’s sovereign immunity in actions brought under 
the general federal question jurisdictional statute.”184 
However, following the common law of judicial review of 
agency action, the APA reinstates immunity via § 701(a)(2) 
when “agency action is committed to agency discretion by 
law.”185 At the time, the only Supreme Court case to have 
interpreted § 701(a)(2) was Citizens to Preserve Overton 
Park, Inc. v. Volpe. Volpe had called the exception it creates 
“very narrow,” only applicable when there is “no law to 
apply” for the agency or the reviewing court.186 
In applying this rule, the D.C. Circuit found that the 
FDCA, combined with the FDA’s guidance for implementing 
it, made some enforcement action against unauthorized uses 
of drugs mandatory. Writing for the court, Judge Skelly-
Wright reasoned that, even though it is difficult to review 
exercises of discretion, a court must be “responsible for 
 
 182. Chaney, 718 F.2d at 1176. 
 183. See Block v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 349 (1984); Dunlop v. 
Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 567 (1975); Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 
(1967) (“[O]ur cases [have established] that judicial review of a final agency 
action by an aggrieved person will not be cut off unless there is persuasive reason 
to believe that such was the purpose of Congress.”); see also Mach Mining, LLC 
v. E.E.O.C., 575 U.S. 480, 486 (2015). 
 184. Lunney v. United States, 319 F.3d 550, 558 (2d Cir. 2003) (citing Califano 
v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 105 (1977)). 
 185. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (2018). 
 186. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc., 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971) (quoting 
S. Rep. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 26 (1945)). 
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ensuring that government officials do not negate or frustrate 
congressional enactments through bureaucratic 
arbitrariness.”187 Treating prosecutorial discretion as 
unreviewable rather than deserving of “a great degree of 
deference” would be to abdicate judicial responsibility, 
especially when there was ample “law to apply.”188 In this 
decision, the D.C. Circuit was building on a series of cases 
that had begun to chip away at absolute deference for 
prosecutorial discretion.189 
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed.190 Rather 
than ask whether the statute granted discretion, the Court, 
in an opinion written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, accepted 
the FDA’s argument that an agency has inherent discretion 
to refuse to take enforcement action. It reasoned that, unless 
Congress creates explicit rules for how to determine whether 
to enforce a given type of claim, there is “no meaningful 
standard against which to judge the agency’s exercise” of its 
enforcement power.191 In addition, it disagreed with the D.C. 
Circuit that the FDCA created such a standard or that the 
FDA’s guidance was binding. 
 
 187. Chaney, 718 F.2d at 1191. 
 188. Id.  
 189. See Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159, 1162 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Wong 
Wing Hang v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 360 F.2d 715, 718–19 (2d Cir. 
1966); Heckler, 470 U.S. at 841–49 (Marshall, J., concurring) (discussing some of 
these cases and arguing that they should have applied). 
 190. The decision to reverse was unanimous, but there were three opinions in 
the case. Justice Brennan concurred in the decision and wrote separately to 
clarify that he read the majority opinion narrowly to leave open room for 
clarification of its scope. Heckler, 470 U.S. at 838–39. Justice Marshall concurred 
in judgment. Id. at 840. He would have found that prosecutorial discretion is not 
absolute, but, so long as not clearly prohibited by statute, reviewable for abuse. 
Id. at 840–41.  
 191. Heckler, 470 U.S. at 830. For subsequent development of the “no 
meaningful standard” interpretation of  § 701(a)(2), see Weyerhaeuser Co. v. U.S. 
Fish & Wildlife Serv., 139 S. Ct. 361, 370 (2018); Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 
191 (1993); Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 816–18 (1992); Webster v. 
Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 599–600 (1988); ICC v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 
482 U.S. 270, 282, (1987). 
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Even though the FDCA says quite clearly that violators 
“shall be imprisoned . . . or fined,” the Court held that further 
“case law or legislative history” would have to be adduced to 
indicate that this language, however mandatory it seemed, 
actually mandated prosecution of every violator.192 It found 
that the prohibition of unapproved uses could not serve as 
“law to apply” because it was “simply irrelevant to the 
agency’s discretion to refuse” to enforce that clear 
prohibition.193 It was not even impressed by the argument 
that Congress’s explicit grant of permission to exercise 
discretion in the case of “minor violations” should lead to the 
negative inference that Congress did not grant such 
permission in cases of major violations.194  
But the Court did not just overrule the D.C. Circuit’s 
application of Overton Park. It went on to clarify that courts 
should be significantly more deferential toward exercises of 
agency discretion than Overton Park itself may have implied. 
The “common law of judicial review of agency action”195 has 
required not just “a great degree of deference,” as the D.C. 
Circuit found, but, rather, that “an agency’s decision not to 
prosecute or enforce, whether through civil or criminal 
process, is a decision generally committed to an agency’s 
absolute discretion.”196 In other words, the APA’s 
presumption of reviewability should be flipped: “an agency’s 
decision not to take enforcement action should be presumed 
immune from review under § 702(a)(2)” absent a clear 
statutory indication otherwise.197 
 
 192. Heckler, 470 U.S. at 835. 
 193. Id. at 836. 
 194. Id. at 837. 
 195. Id. at 832. 
 196. Id. at 831 (emphasis added).  
 197. Id. at 832 (emphasis added); see also id. at 831 (referring to the flipping 
of the presumption); Salazar, 822 F.3d at 75 (stating that because of Heckler, “the 
opposite presumption [to the strong presumption of reviewability] applies when 
a plaintiff seeks to require that an agency take an enforcement action”); Montana 
Air Chapter No. 29, Ass’n of Civilian Technicians, Inc. v. Fed. Labor Relations 
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The Court justified this presumption in terms of “the 
general unsuitability for judicial review of agency decisions 
to refuse enforcement.”198 It pointed out that decisions 
regarding whether to enforce involve “a complicated 
balancing of a number of factors which are peculiarly within 
[an agency’s] expertise,” and that the question of expertise 
has long provided justification to defer to agency action.199 It 
also noted that decisions not to enforce do not “infringe upon 
areas that courts often are called upon to protect” because it 
involves decisions not to exercise the “coercive power over an 
individual’s liberty or property rights.”200 Finally, it 
connected administrative agencies’ prosecutorial discretion 
to that of, well, prosecutors, reasoning that “an agency’s 
refusal to institute proceedings shares to some extent the 
characteristics of the decision of a prosecutor in the 
Executive Branch not to indict—a decision which has long 
been regarded as the special province of the Executive 
Branch, inasmuch as it is the Executive who is charged by 
the Constitution to ‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully 
executed.’”201 
The presumption of unreviewability can be rebutted if 
Congress has “provided guidelines for exercise of [an 
agency’s] enforcement power . . . either by setting 
substantive priorities, or by otherwise circumscribing the 
agency’s power to discriminate among the issues or cases it 
will pursue.”202 In such a situation, Congress should be taken 
 
Auth., 898 F.2d 753, 756 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing Heckler for the proposition that 
“[a]n agency’s decision not to take enforcement action generally . . . is presumed 
to be immune from judicial review”); Robbins v. Reagan, 780 F.2d 37, 44 (D.C. 
Cir. 1985) (referring to the “shift in the presumption” of reviewability that 
Heckler created). 
 198. Heckler, 470 U.S. at 831. 
 199. Id. at 831–32. 
 200. Id. at 832. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. at 833. 
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to have “withdr[awn] discretion from the agency.”203 This is 
how the Heckler court explained its previous decision in 
Dunlop v. Bachowski, which summarily affirmed the Third 
Circuit’s determination that when a statute “provides that 
after investigating a complaint, [an agency official] must 
determine whether there is probable cause to believe that 
violations” have occurred and to prosecute them if no 
settlement can be reached, a court can review a decision not 
to prosecute an alleged violation for arbitrariness.204 
Rebutting the presumption through explicit statutory 
language is also how the Court explained the D.C. Circuit’s 
earlier finding in Adams v. Richardson that HEW 
“consciously and expressly adopted a general policy which is 
in effect an abdication of its statutory duty” when it 
repeatedly refused to enforce mandatory school integration 
orders.205 Although the Supreme Court “express[ed] no 
opinion” on the Adams decision or the general principle that 
repeated refusal to enforce a statutory scheme could rebut 
the presumption of unreviewability, it did “note [in a 
footnote] that in those situations the statute conferring 
authority on the agency might indicate that such decisions 
were not committed to agency discretion.”206 In other words, 
if an agency’s discretionary decision to adopt a pattern of 
non-enforcement is to be reviewable, it is only insofar as that 
decision undermines the statute’s allocation of discretionary 
authority. With respect to the Adams case in particular, it is 
helpful to note that the relevant statute set forth specific 
procedures for enforcement, including specific situations in 
 
 203. Id. at 834.  
 204. See id. at 833–34. The quote is from the Third Circuit’s decision. 
Bachowski v. Brennan, 502 F.2d 79, 88 (3d Cir. 1974). The Supreme Court 
reviewed this decision at length—reversing in part and affirming in part—but it 
treated this particular aspect of the decision summarily in a footnote. See Dunlop 
v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 567 n.7 (1975). 
 205. Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159, 1162 (1973). The discussion in 
Heckler is at 470 U.S. at 833 n.4. 
 206. 470 U.S. at 833 n.4 (internal quotations omitted).  
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which the alternative of “voluntary compliance” could be 
used.207 It also involved more than a case of non-
enforcement, since HEW was “actively supplying segregated 
institutions with federal funds, contrary to the expressed 
purposes of Congress.”208 
In the same footnote, the Supreme Court also held out 
the possibility that “a refusal by the agency to institute 
proceedings based solely on the belief that it lacks 
jurisdiction” might not count as an exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion.209 
3. Prosecutorial Discretion of Administrative Agencies 
after Heckler 
Heckler continues to provide the guiding framework for 
determining when a federal agency’s decision is too 
discretionary to be justiciable. Several aspects of the 
framework have been elaborated in subsequent cases, 
although the case law is not entirely consistent. 
Unsurprisingly, given the number of administrative law 
cases it hears, the D.C. Circuit has developed the most well 
paved trail of analysis. “To determine whether a matter has 
been committed to agency discretion,” it first “consider[s] 
both the nature of the administrative action at issue and the 
language and structure of the statute that supplies the 
applicable legal standards for reviewing that action.”210 
Although it is not always straightforward to separate out 
analysis of the nature of the action from the way the 
statutory scheme treats the type of action at issue, analysis 
is to begin with the former. As relevant here, “decisions not 
 
 207. 480 F.2d at 1163. 
 208. Id. at 1162. 
 209. 470 U.S. at 833 n.4. 
 210. Sierra Club v. Jackson, 648 F.3d 848, 855 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (internal 
quotation marks omitted); see also Assoc. of Irritated Residents v. EPA, 494 F.3d 
1027, 1037 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Sec. of Labor v. Twentymile Coal Co., 456 F.3d 151, 
156 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Steenholdt v. FAA, 314 F.3d 633, 638 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Drake 
v. FAA., 291 F.3d 59, 70 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
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to take enforcement action,” which includes settlements, are 
presumed unreviewable.211 Non-enforcement decisions are to 
be distinguished from “routine dispute that federal courts 
regularly review,” as when a private party objects to an 
agency’s determination about that party’s rights212 or when 
an agency determines whether exhaustion requirements 
have been met in an appeal of its decision.213 The 
presumption of non-justiciability may be rebutted if a review 
of the statute reveals “meaningful standards to cabin the 
agency’s otherwise plenary discretion.”214 “On the other 
hand, if the statute in question does not give any indication 
that violators must be pursued in every case, or that one 
particular enforcement strategy must be chosen over another 
and if it provides no meaningful guidelines defining the 
limits of the agency’s discretion, then enforcement is 
committed to the agency’s discretion.”215 
The Supreme Court has clarified that, in addition to 
“express language” in a statute, the “structure of the 
statutory scheme, its objectives, its legislative history, and 
the nature of the administrative action involved” can also be 
considered to determine whether there is “law to apply” in 
 
 211. Sierra Club v. Jackson, 648 F.3d at 856; Irritated Residents, 494 F.3d at 
1031 (involving settlement agreements); Schering, 779 F.2d at 687 (also involving 
settlement agreement); see also Block v. SEC, 50 F.3d 1078, 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 
Other types of judgments have also been found presumptively non-reviewable. 
See, e.g., Locomotive Engineers, 482 U.S. at 282; Webster, 486 U.S. at 601; Lincoln 
v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182 (1993); Lunney v. United States, 319 F.3d 550 (2d Cir. 
2003). 
 212. Weyerhaeuser Co. v. United States Fish & Wildlife Serv., 139 S.Ct. 361, 
370 (2018). 
 213. Smith v. Berryhill, 139 S.Ct. 1765, 1777 (2019); see also Salazar, 822 F.3d 
at 75 (“The presumption against judicial review of decisions not to take 
enforcement action protects agency discretion in allocating its resources to choose 
their enforcement targets. See id. Unlike the plaintiffs in Chaney, who asked the 
court to compel the FDA to take enforcement measures against third parties 
within the agency’s sphere of regulation, the plaintiffs here ask the court to 
review whether the DOE acted arbitrarily and capriciously in taking enforcement 
actions against plaintiffs.”). 
 214. Sierra Club v. Jackson, 648 F.3d at 856 (quoting Drake, 291 F.3d at 70). 
 215. Id.; see also Irritated Residents, 494 F.3d at 1033. 
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reviewing an apparently discretionary act.216 Again, the 
nature of the action and the meaning of the statutory scheme 
are intertwined. Justice Scalia has provided some guidance 
to sorting them out in an influential dissent in Webster v. 
Doe.217 There, he argued that courts should look “to such 
factors as whether the decision involves ‘a sensitive and 
inherently discretionary judgment call,’ whether it is the sort 
of decision that has traditionally been nonreviewable, and 
whether review would have ‘disruptive practical 
consequences.’”218 The idea is that whether an action is 
“committed to agency discretion by law,” as § 701(a)(2) puts 
it, depends not just on what the statute itself says, but in 
addition on the “common law of judicial review of agency 
action” and executive action more broadly, incorporating 
traditional and contemporary judgments about the wisdom 
of judicial interference with executive discretion in different 
circumstances. Whatever a statute says, review is less wise 
in, say, matters regarding national security than in matters 
regarding the design of the census.219 Deferring to how to 
 
 216. Block v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 345 (1984). Block was 
interpreting § 701(a)(1), but it has been applied in subsequent cases inquiring 
into the applicability of § 701(a)(2). See Weyerhaeuser Co. v. United States Fish 
& Wildlife Serv., 139 S. Ct. 361, 370 (2018); Mach Mining, 575 U.S. at 490; 
Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 601 (1988); see also FDA v. Brown & Williamson 
Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 125, (2000) (“Regardless of how serious the problem 
an administrative agency seeks to address, however, it may not exercise its 
authority in a manner that is inconsistent with the administrative structure that 
Congress enacted into law.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 217. This part of the dissent was not disputed by the majority and was 
subsequently cited by the unanimous opinion in Vigil, 508 U.S. at 191. 
 218. Webster, 486 U.S. at 609 (Scalia, J. dissenting) (citing Department of Navy 
v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 527 (1988); ICC v. Locomotive Engineers, 482 U.S. 270, 
282 (1987); Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821; Southern R. Co. v. Seaboard Allied 
Milling Corp., 442 U.S. 444, 457 (1979)). 
 219. Justice Stevens has expressed a similar sentiment regarding the wisdom 
of understanding a statutory grant of discretion against a background 
understanding of the wisdom of judicial interference in the area at issue. See 
Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 817–18 (1992) (Stevens, J. concurring) 
(“While the operations of a secret intelligence agency may provide an exception 
to the norm of reviewability, the taking of the census does not.”). This concurrence 
was also cited approvingly in Vigil, 508 U.S. at 191–92. 
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prioritize resources is wiser than deferring to how to balance 
competing interests. To give full meaning to § 701(a)(2), and 
to differentiate from § 701(a)(1)’s limitation to statutes that 
“preclude judicial review,” requires locating a statutory 
scheme within a broader jurisprudential analysis and 
exercise of good sense. 
Yet the inquiry should not be entirely freewheeling. In 
the recent case of Trump v. Hawaii, the Supreme Court 
found that when a grant of discretion is clear from the text 
of the statute, no further inquiry into structure or purpose is 
required.220 This decision sits somewhat in tension with 
some recent Supreme Court cases that have emphasized that 
the presumption of non-reviewability is to be “quite 
narrowly” drawn, limited to “those rare circumstances where 
the relevant statute [provides] no meaningful standard 
against which to judge the agency’s exercise of discretion.”221 
However, these cases can be distinguished both on the 
grounds that they involved statutes that did not clearly leave 
a decision to agency discretion and that they involved actions 
that were not of the sort to which courts generally differ.222 
They can best be read as warnings not to extend the 
presumption of non-reviewability too far beyond situations 
in which there is truly no law to apply. 
Courts are more likely to find that a statute creates law 
to apply to review a discretionary determination if a statute 
 
 220. See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2410 (2018); Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 
U.S. 182, 194 (1993) (noting the fact that Congress approved of a particular 
program funded with lump sum appropriations does not “translate through the 
medium of legislative history into legally binding obligations” to earmark funds 
for that program absent express statutory language). 
 221. Weyerhaeuser, 139 S.Ct. at 370 (quoting Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 191 
(1993)); see also Mach Mining, 575 U.S. at 486 (“the agency bears a heavy burden 
in attempting to show that Congress prohibited all judicial review of the agency’s 
compliance with a legislative mandate.”) (internal punctuation omitted). 
 222. For instance, Mach Mining involved a statutory mandate that the EEOC 
engage in a conciliation process as a “reviewable prerequisite to bringing suit” 
and Weyerhaeuser involved a mandatory procedure that the U.S. Fish and 
Wildlife service had to go through in determining how much habitat to protect. 
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creates procedural requirements and/or standards, however 
bare bones. Regarding procedural requirements, in 
Weyerhaeuser the Supreme Court found that a statute that 
commanded “the Secretary [of the Interior] to consider the 
economic and other impacts of” restricting development in a 
given area to protect a particular species and created factors 
“to guide the agency in the exercise of its discretion,” which 
invited a court to review whether the Secretary had 
“appropriately consider[ed] all of the relevant factors” in 
making any such determination.223 In Mach Mining, the 
Court found that a statute’s direction that the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission “eliminate [the] 
alleged unlawful employment practice by informal methods 
of conference, conciliation, and persuasion” created a 
reviewable “duty to attempt conciliation of claims,” even if it 
also gave the EEOC “abundant discretion . . . to decide the 
kind and extent of discussions appropriate in a given 
case.”224 Regarding substantive standards, in Sierra Club v. 
Hodel, a divided panel of the Tenth Circuit found that it 
could review a decision by the Bureau of Land Management 
to decline to stop construction on a road that went through 
federal lands, because the relevant statute provided a 
“definite standard” for review by requiring the BLM to 
manage the area in question “in a manner so as not to impair 
the suitability of such areas for preservation as wilderness” 
including taking “any action required to prevent unnecessary 
or undue degradation” and by creating a “duty to define and 
protect roadless areas of more than 5,000 acres having 
wilderness characteristics.”225 
 
 223. 139 S.Ct. at 371. 
 224. 575 U.S. at 495. 
 225. Sierra Club v. Hodel, 848 F.2d 1068, 1073–75 (10th Cir. 1988) (internal 
punctuation and citations omitted). These obligations were actually assigned to 
the Department of the Interior, of which the BLM is a part. At least one crucial 
issue in Hodel seemed to be that the exercise of discretion enabled private parties 
to alter the status quo such that statutory provisions would no longer be 
applicable to them. The statute at issue explicitly required the agency to at least 
maintain the status quo, even if it did not require taking particular enforcement 
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Courts are more likely to find a decision beyond the 
bounds of review if the statute contains permissive rather 
than mandatory language and/or if there are no discernible 
procedural requirements or substantive standards to apply. 
In Perales v. Casillas, the Fifth Circuit found that because 
“[p]re-hearing voluntary departure and employment 
authorization for the beneficiaries of approved visa petitions 
are purely creatures of regulation, and nothing in the 
Immigration and Nationality Act immunizes a deportable 
alien from deportation when a visa petition filed on his behalf 
is approved,” it had no law to apply to review any decision by 
the Immigration and Nationality Service to deny such 
authorizations.226 It quoted the Seventh Circuit’s decision in 
Achaeoso–Sanchez v. INS: “When there are no rules or 
standards there is neither legal right nor legal wrong. There 
may be moral or prudential claims, but such claims are the 
province of other actors, be they administrators or 
legislators.”227 In Sierra Club v. Jackson, the D.C. Circuit 
found that “Congress’s mandate to the Administrator is that 
she shall ‘take such measures, including issuance of an order, 
or seeking injunctive relief, as necessary [to prevent the 
construction or modification of a major emitting facility]’” 
created no “guidance to the Administrator or to a reviewing 
court as to what action is ‘necessary.’”228 In Drake v. FAA, it 
found that “a provision that allows the Administrator to 
[dismiss a complaint] when she ‘is of the opinion that the 
complaint does not state facts that warrant an investigation,’ 
gives the FAA virtually unbridled discretion” to determine 
when to dismiss a complaint, with or without a hearing.229 
There is one more twist in the dance between the nature 
 
action. See also Westchester, 778 F.3d at 420; Sluss v. United States Dep’t of 
Justice, Int’l Prisoner Transfer Unit, 898 F.3d 1242, 1252 (D.C. Cir. 2018); 
Friends of Animals v. EPA, 383 F. Supp. 3d 1112, 1117–18 (D. Or. 2019). 
 226. 903 F.2d 1043, 1048 (5th Cir. 1990).  
 227. Id. at 1047 (quoting 779 F.2d 1260, 1265 (7th Cir.1985)). 
 228. 648 F.3d 848, 856 (D.C. Cir. 2011).  
 229. 291 F.3d 59, 70–71 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
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of the action and the content of the statutory scheme. As the 
D.C. Circuit, the Second Circuit, and the Seventh Circuit 
have all recognized, even if an agency has discretionary 
authority over an area, its decisions can be reviewed if it 
cabins its own discretion.230 Regulations can cabin 
discretion, of course, since agencies must comply with their 
own regulations.231 But even guidance and statements can 
do so, at least in the D.C. Circuit, so long as “the statements 
create binding norms by imposing rights or obligations on the 
respective parties.”232 
Even when confronted with a non-enforcement decision 
that is presumptively non-reviewable without any evidence 
to rebut this presumption, “the D.C. Circuit has recognized 
two exceptions to the general rule of unreviewability.”233 
First, “agency nonenforcement decisions are reviewable 
when they are based on a belief that the agency lacks 
jurisdiction.”234 Second, “an agency’s statutory 
interpretations made in the course of nonenforcement 
decisions are reviewable.”235 The latter is hardly an 
exception, since courts can always review the statutory 
interpretations of agencies. As for the former, it comes from 
footnote four of Heckler itself. Although Heckler only left the 
 
 230. Cardoza v. CFTC, 768 F.2d 1542, 1550 (7th Cir. 1985); Steenholdt v. FAA, 
314 F.3d 633, 639 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Salazar, 822 F.3d at 76–77. 
 231. Cardoza, 768 F.2d at 1550; see also Nat’l Fam. Plan. Reprod. Health Ass’n, 
Inc. v. Sullivan, 979 F.2d 227, 234 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (“[A]n agency issuing a 
legislative rule is itself bound by the rule until that rule is amended or revoked.”) 
(citing United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 695–96 (1974); United States. ex rel. 
Bilokumsky v. Tod, 264 U.S. 149, 155 (1923)). 
 232. Steenholdt, 314 F.3d at 639; see also Sierra Club v. Jackson, 648 F.3d at 
846. 
 233. Montana Air Ch. 29, Assoc. of Civilian Technicians, Inc. v. FLRA, 898 F.2d 
753, 756 (9th Cir. 1990); see also Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. DHS, 908 F.3d 
476, 495–97 (9th Cir. 2018), cert. granted 193 S.Ct. 2779 (2019). 
 234. Montana Air, 898 F.2d at 756 (citing International Longshoremen’s Ass’n 
v. National Mediation Bd., 785 F.2d 1098, 1100 (D.C.Cir.1986)). 
 235. Id. (citing International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace & 
Agricultural Implement Workers v. Brock, 783 F.2d 237, 245 (D.C.Cir.1986)). 
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question open as to whether agency non-enforcement actions 
based on a judgment of lack of jurisdiction would be an 
exception to the general presumption of non-reviewability, 
both the Ninth and D.C. Circuits have resolved the issue 
definitively. 
It is this exception to the presumption of non-
reviewability that the Ninth Circuit applied in determining 
that it could review the Trump Administration’s decision to 
repeal  the Obama Administration’s policy of Deferred Action 
for Childhood Arrivals (“DACA”).236 In doing so, it merged 
the two exceptions into one: “an agency’s nonenforcement 
decision is outside the scope of the Chaney presumption—
and is therefore presumptively reviewable—if it is based 
solely on a belief that the agency lacked the lawful authority 
to do otherwise.”237 Applying this rule, that Court found that, 
because the Trump Administration had repealed the DACA 
because it thought that it was unlawful (and not just because 
it wanted to as a matter of policy), a court could review that 
decision. This decision is currently being reviewed by the 
Supreme Court. 
Ironically, the Fifth Circuit has also found that at least 
some decisions about deferred action on removal are 
reviewable, but it did so in striking down another Obama 
Administration policy: Deferred Action for Parents of 
Americans (“DAPA”).238 The reasoning in the decision is not 
entirely clear, but it is worth examining because of its 
potential relevance. “Deferred action” (originally called 
“nonpriority”) is the name for the longstanding practice of 
immigration enforcement authorities to decline to pursue 
deportation against certain classes of legally deportable 
 
 236. Regents, 908 F.3d at 499. 
 237. Id. at 497; see also ICC v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng’rs, 482 U.S. 270, 
283 (1987) (“[I]f the agency gives a ‘reviewable’ reason for otherwise unreviewable 
action, the action becomes reviewable.”). 
 238. Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 166 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d by default 
in U.S. v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016). 
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immigrants “at any stage of the administrative process.”239 
This long recognized exercise of prosecutorial discretion has 
been exercised both “for humanitarian reasons” as well as for 
more self-interested reasons like avoiding bad publicity.240 
Either way, it has served to effectively reshape immigration 
laws purely through Executive discretion and “without 
express statutory authorization” even as Congress has 
designed the immigration scheme with deferred action in 
mind—granting certain rights and privileges to those who 
benefit from it.241 
In 1997 the Fifth Circuit had ruled that deferred action 
“is unreviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act 
because a court has no workable standard against which to 
judge the agency’s exercise of discretion.”242 
It “reject[ed] out-of-hand the State’s contention that the 
federal defendants’ alleged systemic failure to control 
immigration is so extreme as to constitute a reviewable 
abdication of duty. The State does not contend that federal 
defendants are doing nothing to enforce the immigration 
laws or that they have consciously decided to abdicate their 
enforcement responsibilities. Real or perceived inadequate 
enforcement of immigration laws does not constitute a 
reviewable abdication of duty.”243 
The Supreme Court had also declined to review deferred 
action (absent “clear evidence displacing the presumption 
that a prosecutor has acted lawfully”),244 relying on the 
principle that prosecutorial discretion “is particularly ill-
suited to judicial review,” as much, if not more, in the 
 
 239. Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Com, 525 U.S. 471, 483–84 
(1999). 
 240. Id. at 483 n.8. 
 241. Id. at 484 (quoting 6 C. Gordon, S. Mailman, S. Yale-Loehr, Immigration 
Law and Procedure § 72.03[2][h] (1998)). 
 242. Texas v. United States, 106 F.3d 661, 667 (5th Cir. 1997). 
 243. Id. 
 244. Reno, 525 U.S. at 498 (internal quotations omitted). 
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immigration context as in the criminal context.245 
However, when the Obama Administration used 
deferred action to create more systematic processes that 
enabled certain classes of undocumented immigrants to 
“come out of the shadows” and apply for a renewable two-
year period of deferred action that could ultimately result in 
eligibility for a work permit, the Fifth Circuit reversed 
direction and the Supreme Court has indicated that it might 
as well.246 In particular, in 2015 a split panel of the Fifth 
Circuit ruled that DAPA is reviewable because it “is much 
more than nonenforcement: It would affirmatively confer 
‘lawful presence’[] and associated benefits on a class of 
unlawfully present aliens.”247 Having found that DAPA did 
not amount to an exercise of prosecutorial discretion, the 
majority went on to ask whether the relevant statutes 
authorized the agency to initiate such a program at all, let 
alone without rulemaking.248 It explicitly set aside “the issue 
of whether the presumption against review of such discretion 
is rebutted” when used to create a systematic deferred action 
process.249 
The dissenting judge pointed out that the benefits 
associated with deferred action were “a function of statutes 
and regulations that were enacted by Congresses and 
administrations long past” that were neither challenged nor 
challengeable in the action at bar, making the only action 
challenged the discretionary one as to how to determine who 
should be eligible for those benefits.250 Viewed in this light, 
 
 245. Id. at 490 (quoting Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985)); see 
also Robeldo-Soto v. Lynch, 845 F.3d 834, 836 (7th Cir. 2017) (discussing Reno’s 
holding). 
 246. See Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015).  
 247. Id. at 166.  
 248. See id. at 177–82. 
 249. Id. at 168 n.108. 
 250. Id. at 197 (King, J. dissenting); see also Texas v. United States, 787 F.3d 
733, 770–75 (5th Cir. 2015) (Higginson, J., dissenting) (arguing DAPA was an 
exercise of prosecutorial discretion in denying a stay). 
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she argued, DAPA is akin to “pretrial diversion in the 
criminal context—which also developed over a period of 
decades without express statutory authorization.”251 
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court, in a 4-4 decision without 
opinion issued after Justice Scalia’s death and before Justice 
Gorsuch’s appointment, affirmed the majority’s opinion by 
(non-precedential) default.252 
One way to square this fragile result with the case law 
just reviewed is to read it as akin to one aspect of the D.C. 
Circuit’s reasoning in Adams. Recall that Adams involved a 
challenge to HEW’s non-enforcement of school integration 
orders. One reason the D.C. Circuit gave for reviewing 
HEW’s decision was that it involved not just non-
enforcement because HEW was actively providing benefits to 
schools that were in open violation of the law HEW was also 
charged with enforcing.253 Similarly, the Fifth Circuit 
reasoned that the Department of Homeland Security was not 
just declining to enforce immigration laws, but actively 
changing the immigration status of people who had violated 
immigration laws, making them eligible for benefits 
normally available only to people who have not violated 
immigration laws (to greatly oversimplify). The principle to 
extract might sound something like: if the decision not to 
enforce a law is simultaneously a decision that entitles those 
not subject to enforcement to a government benefit, a court 
should hesitate to treat it as merely an exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion. 
It is not clear that this principle can be stated in a way 
that can sustain a defensible distinction among precedents. 
Every decision not to enforce a law against a violator is a 
decision to entitle that violator to whatever benefits are 
 
 251. Id. at 197. 
 252. See United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016). Neil v. Biggers, 409 
U.S. 188, 192 (1972) (affirmance by an equally divided court has no precedential 
value). 
 253. Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159, 1159–61 (1973).  
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available to those who have not violated the law. The FDA’s 
discretion not to enforce the usual rules for controlled 
substances for lethal injection drugs entitled particular drug 
manufacturers access to patent protections, to government 
contracts, and to other benefits. Pretrial diversion and other 
exercises of prosecutorial discretion in the criminal context 
entitle beneficiaries access to benefits that people in prison 
or with criminal records are not entitled to. What arguably 
made Adams different was that the agency’s exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion was also a decision to maintain 
benefits delivered by that same agency. In the case of DAPA 
and DACA, a decision to grant deferred action to a given 
individual did not provide any benefits directly to 
immigrants that the law did not otherwise entitle them to, 
nor (as the dissent points out) was it even changing their 
immigration status. 
Another potential explanation for the turn in deferred 
action jurisprudence is that the political valence of the 
exercise of prosecutorial discretion matters. When 
prosecutorial discretion is used to further progressive social 
policies or to undermine conservative legislation, even 
conservative judges normally in favor of unfettered executive 
discretion are likely to view it with more suspicion. It has 
long been liberal judges who have been skeptical of the 
Executive’s arguments in favor of unreviewable discretion: 
in the domain of prosecution as much as in the domain of 
national security, of immigration enforcement, of racial 
integration, etc. As a general matter, that likely remains the 
case, but as conservative strategies to deadlock Congress has 
borne fruit, progressive attempts to use the expanded powers 
of the Executive creatively may have begun to engender a 
more targeted skepticism from conservative judges. 
Having got this far, the reader might be suspicious that 
a ball has been hidden. Didn’t Heckler leave open the 
possibility that an act of prosecutorial discretion could be so 
dramatic as to amount to an “abdication of [an agency’s 
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statutory duty]”?254 Since that possibility seems relevant to 
an analysis of using prosecutorial discretion to implement 
mass debt cancellation, wouldn’t it be useful to know how 
that possibility has been fleshed out in the case law? Well, 
yes, but unfortunately no case after Heckler (or Adams, on 
which Heckler relied in raising the possibility of such an 
exception) has addressed this possibility. It remains 
undetermined what sort of case would trigger it that would 
not also be a case in which a court found that the statute 
limited an agency’s discretion, and, if such a case exists, what 
principles a court would apply in reviewing the discretion at 
issue. 
4. What Happens if Non-Enforcement is Reviewable? 
Although the analysis in this Article will only focus on 
the question of whether the Secretary of Education’s 
authority to modify or waive claims over student debts 
counts as a form of unreviewable prosecutorial discretion, a 
brief note on how courts proceed when they find Heckler 
inapplicable. Basically, other sections of the APA apply. 
Which section applies depends on the nature of the action at 
issue. Discretionary decisions are reviewed for abuse of 
discretion under § 706(2)(A).255 Decisions that amount to 
policy judgments are reviewed under the standard 
framework to determine whether an interpretation amounts 
to a rule and, if so, whether the requisite rulemaking 
procedures have been followed.256 The Chevron framework 
for implementing § 706(2), with all of its twists and turns, 
applies to interpretations of the statute in the process of 
implementing a regulation.257  
 
 254. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 853 (1985).  
 255. See Weyerhaeuser Co. v. United States Fish & Wildlife Serv., 139 S.Ct. 
361, 370 (2018); see also Mach Mining LLC v. EEOC, 575 U.S. 480, 495 (2015). 
 256. See Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 170–78 (2015). 
 257. See id. at 178 (discussing applicability of Chevron). 
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B. Applying the Law of Prosecutorial Discretion to the HEA 
1. The Nature of the Action 
The action proposed here is that the DOE cancel some or 
all student debt owed to it. This action could be characterized 
as a modification and/or as a waiver of claims (or potential 
claims) it has the right to enforce (or attempt to enforce) 
against each borrower. Writing down some of a given 
borrower’s debt (e.g. turning a $20,000 debt into a $5,000 
debt) could be styled a modification of the amount owed (from 
$20,000 to $5,000) or as a waiver of some of the obligation to 
pay ($15,000 worth). Eliminating all of a given borrower’s 
debt could be styled a modification of the amount owed to $0 
or a waiver of the entire obligation. Canceling some or all 
debt across some or all borrowers could thus be effected by 
mass modification or mass waiver. 
The most natural way to characterize either of these 
actions is as a decision not to enforce rights that the HEA 
grants to the DOE. At the retail level, debt cancellation is 
akin to a settlement agreement or a unilateral decision not 
to spend resources pursuing a claim is akin to pretrial 
diversion. It is well established that a decision not to enforce 
a right against a private party—whether as part of a 
settlement or otherwise—is an exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion that is presumptively unreviewable. At the 
wholesale level, settling multiple claims as part of a plan is 
akin to pretrial diversion in the criminal context or deferred 
action in the immigration context. Both of these actions are 
also presumptively unreviewable exercises of prosecutorial 
discretion. 
Of course, we have seen that at least one form of deferred 
action has been adjudged not an act of prosecutorial 
discretion. The reason given for this judgment was that the 
deferred action in question, as characterized by the Fifth 
Circuit, was not just non-enforcement. It granted positive 
rights that also created duties in third parties (i.e. the 
several states). 
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Assuming the soundness of that judgment, cancellation 
of student debt can be easily distinguished. The DOE would 
be entitling (former) student debtors to no additional rights 
or privileges as a result of debt cancellation. Or, rather, 
whatever rights and privileges debtors would be entitled to 
would be incidental to the debt cancellation at issue: the 
right to have their credit rating amended, for example. This 
is quite unlike a decision not to deport somebody that 
simultaneously changes that person’s immigration status.  
2. What the Statute Says 
Nothing in the HEA rebuts the presumption that the 
DOE has broad discretion to waive or modify claims against 
students. In fact, the HEA directly grants both powers 
without any meaningful limits on them. 
When Congress first created student loans in the NDEA, 
it placed the Commissioner of Education (then the head of a 
division of the Department of Health, Education, and 
Welfare) in charge of enforcing claims of the government 
against student debtors. Though the power to enforce implies 
the power not to enforce, Congress also explicitly granted the 
Commissioner “power to agree to modification of agreements 
or loans made under this title and to compromise, waive, or 
release any right, title, claim or demand, however arising or 
acquired under” the NDEL program.258 When Congress 
passed the HEA, it gave the Commissioner “[i]n performance 
of, and with respect to, the functions, powers, and duties 
vested in him [sic] by” the Higher Education Act’s student 
loan provisions to, among other things, “modify” and to 
“enforce, pay, compromise, waive, or release any right, title, 
 
 258. National Defense Education Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-864 § 209(a), 72 
Stat. 1580, 1587 (1958). As discussed above, NDEL were eventually merged into 
Perkins Loans before being discontinued. See 20 U.S.C.§ 1087hh(2) (2018) (“In 
carrying out the provision of this part [regarding Perkins Loans], the Secretary 
is authorized to enforce, pay, compromise, waive, or release any right, title, claim, 
lien or demand, however acquired . . . .”). 
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claim, lien, or demand, however acquired.”259 Let us refer to 
these as the Secretary’s “modification” and “settlement” 
authorities. The HEA further provides that their exercise 
“shall be final and conclusive upon all accounting and other 
officers of the government.”260 In 1979, Congress split the 
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare into the 
Department of Education and the Department of Health and 
Human Services. As part of the new DOE, it created the 
office of the Secretary of Education, endowed with all of the 
powers of the Commissioner (and then some).261 As relevant 
here, all of the Commissioner’s settlement authorities 
carried over. 
Recall that both the FFEL and Perkins Loan programs 
facilitate the creation of loans by parties other than the 
DOE—financial institutions in the case of FFEL and 
institutions of higher education in the case of Perkins. Thus, 
DOE only has direct claims against debtors under these 
programs if it takes possession of loans created thereunder. 
Direct Loans, on the other hand, create a direct claim against 
debtors from the moment they become due. When Direct 
Loans were first created as a pilot in 1992, the statute did 
not mention settlement authority, and no subsequent 
amendment has explicitly done so.262 However, that statute 
did—and does—make Direct Loans subject to “the same 
terms, conditions, and benefits as [FFELP].”263 DOE has, 
without objection, interpreted this provision to include 
prosecutorial discretion.264 It was right to do so, as argued in 
 
 259. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1082(a)(4), (6) (2018) (Federal Family Education Loan); 20 
U.S.C. §§ 1087hh(1), (2) (2018) (Perkins Loans). 
 260. 20 U.S.C. § 1082(b) (2018). 
 261. Department of Education Organization Act, Pub. L. No. 96-88, § 301(a), 
93 Stat. 668, 677 (1979).  
 262. See Higher Education Amendments of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-325, 106 
Stat. 572 (1992). 
 263. Higher Education Amendments of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-325, § 456, 106 
Stat. 572 (1992) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1087a(b)(2) (2018)).  
 264. See Student Assistance General Provisions, Federal Perkins Loan 
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the margin.265  
The last Congressional statement with respect to the 
DOE’s settlement authority came in the Higher Education 
Opportunity Act of 2008 (“HEOA”), as follows: “The 
Secretary may not enter into any settlement of any claim 
[under FFEL or Perkins, or by incorporation, Direct Loans] 
that exceeds $1,000,000 unless (1) the Secretary requests a 
review of the proposed settlement of such claim by the 
Attorney General; and (2) the Attorney General responds to 
such request.”266 It is unclear whether “settlement” here 
refers to both DOE’s modification and its settlement 
authority (is modification a form of settlement?) or not. 
These provisions do not create any practical limits on 
DOE’s discretion given the current reality of student debt 
 
Program, Federal Family Education Loan Program, William D. Ford Federal 
Direct Loan Program, and Teacher Education Assistance for College and Higher 
Education Grant Program, 81 Fed. Reg. 39330, 39368 (June 16, 2016) (to be 
codified at 34 C.F.R. Pt. 30) (discussing authority to issue regulations regarding 
compromise authority over Direct Loans by invoking “Section 451(b)”, i.e. 20 
U.S.C. § 1087a(b) (2018)). 
 265. Consolidating control in the federal government was designed both to 
eliminate the needless budget line for private lenders’ profits and to enable the 
government to reduce the burden of student loan repayment by making at least 
some student loans not profitable. It was meant to give the Department of 
Education more authority over student loans. See Jonathan Glater, The Other 
Big Test: Why Congress Should Allow College Students to Borrow More Through 
Federal Aid Programs, 14 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 11, 38–40 (2011). 
Accordingly, the Direct Loan program kept constant all the aspects of FFELP 
loans that were previously in place, including all of the Secretary’s powers 
regarding them, except those that Congress specifically altered (mostly, but not 
entirely, to make student debt less burdensome). Eliminating the Secretary’s 
settlement authority through silence is inconsistent with this purpose, especially 
when there is a provision explicitly putting Direct Loans on a par with FFEL. 
Certainly there is no indication in the text of the relevant statutes or in the 
legislative history that Congress meant to reduce the Secretary’s settlement 
authority. If it had determined to do so, it is not clear why it would have done so 
only for Direct Loans and not for FFELP and Perkins. As Eileen Connor, Deanne 
Loonin, and Toby Merrill have pointed out, if powers related to FFELP did not 
carry over to Direct Loans, DOE would be unable to issue regulations or sue or 
be sued with relation to Direct Loans. See Ltr. From Eileen Connor, Deanne 
Loonin, and Toby Merrill to Senator Elizabeth Warren, 3n.5 (Jan. 13, 2020). 
 266. Higher Education Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 110-315 § 433(a), 122 Stat. 
3078 (2008) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1082(b) (2018)). 
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levels. It is silent as to when and why and with whom DOE 
may or must settle a debt. It merely requires the DOE to 
request the AG’s approval for settlements, and then only if 
the settlement is below a certain amount. And the $1 million 
ceiling it sets on settlement size is too high to make even this 
supervisory mechanism have any bite. It is a ceiling on “any 
settlement of any claim,” which can only be made sense of if 
read as a per claim, i.e. a per promissory note limit.267 If 
Congress had wanted the limit to be on a collection of claims 
it could have used “any settlement of any claim or claims” or 
just “any settlement.” Similarly, the reference to “the 
proposed settlement of such claim”—as opposed to “the 
proposed settlement of such claim or claims” or just “the 
proposed settlement”—makes little sense except as reference 
to a limit on each individual claim. That Congress put in 
“any” twice fairly well emphasizes the fact that the limit is 
per claim. Read as such, the provision commands only that if 
the Secretary decides to compromise an obligation of over $1 
million, it must consult the Attorney General. If the 
Department were to compromise multiple claims of less than 
$1 million that together exceeded $1 million, it would not 
have to do so. This is how the Department itself has read this 
provision when it promulgated regulations, and without 
controversy.268 This author knows of no evidence that any 
student loan borrower owes more than $1 million to the 
Department of Education.269 
 
 267. 20 U.S.C. § 1082 (2018) (emphasis added). We say “per promissory note” 
rather than “per borrower” because the Department would have multiple 
potential claims against a borrower with multiple student loans. 
 268. 34 C.F.R. § 30.70(e)(2) (2019) (referring to the limit as on “a debt that 
exceeds $1,000,000”) (emphasis added). 
 269. That raises the question of why Congress would have enacted a totally 
toothless provision, perhaps implicating the principle that statutory 
interpretation ought to avoid absurdity. See, e.g., Pub. Citizen v. United States 
Dep’t. of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 470 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“When used 
in a proper manner, this narrow exception to our normal rule of statutory 
construction does not intrude upon the lawmaking powers of Congress, but rather 
demonstrates a respect for the coequal Legislative Branch, which we assume 
would not act in an absurd way.”). But the result here is not absurd. It is, firstly, 
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What, then, is the scope of DOE’s settlement authority? 
Begin with the authority of “modify” claims against debtors. 
To modify is to change. A debt can be modified any number 
of ways—by changing the timing of payments, by adding or 
eliminating conditions, etc. Clearly reducing the amount 
owed is a modification of a debt. Reducing a debt to nil—i.e. 
eliminating it—would also seem to fall within the ordinary 
meaning of “modify.” Doubts could surely be raised (would a 
provision enabling waiver of a claim be rendered surplusage 
if the modification provision enabled effectively waiving a 
claim?), but, as Eileen Connor, Deanne Loonin, and Toby 
Merrill point out, “the Secretary has used the modification 
power to cancel out, or modify to zero, loan obligations under 
FFELP and [the Direct Loan Program] in certain 
circumstances” without even a whiff of objection from 
courts.270 
The authority to “compromise, waive, or release” is also 
about as broad as can be on its face. Each of these terms refer 
to a litigant’s or potential litigant’s ability to determine 
whether and how far to pursue a legal claim without a court’s 
supervision. This broad discretion is clearest in the case of 
 
not absurd in the sense that the text makes no sense whatsoever. See, e.g., United 
States v. Pabon-Cruz, 391 F.3d 86 (2d Cir.2004) (interpreting a statute that said 
“[a]ny individual who violates . . . this section, shall be fined under this title or 
imprisoned not less than 10 years nor more than 20 years, and both . . . .”) 
(emphasis added). Nor does it have absurd or perverse results. See In re Kane, 
336 B.R. 477, 486 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2006) (making this distinction). Congress may 
well have meant to place no actual limit in the near term or in the normal run of 
cases, but may have thought it wise to create a cap on settlement power just in 
case student debt suddenly ballooned or there was an outré situation in which it 
made sense to have the Attorney General review the settlement. If the number 
Congress had chosen had been so high that it was not conceivable that it would 
create any limit, then perhaps avoiding absurdity could be invoked. But then the 
question would be how to avoid it: to interpret the statute as pertaining to any 
settlement, including any number of claims? To interpret the $1 million number 
as a typo, and reading it as $100,000 (as the FCCS prescribes, see infra)? 
 270. Ltr., supra note 265, at 5 n.21 (citing Carr et al. v. DeVos, Case No. 19-cv-
6597 (S.D.N.Y.), Dkt. No. 15-1 (Decl. of Cristin Bulman), 16 (Stipulation of 
Dismissal)). 
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“waive” and “release.” Black’s271 defines “release” as 
“[l]iberation from an obligation, duty, or demand; the act of 
giving up a right or claim to the person against whom it could 
have been enforced,” and declares it synonymous with 
“discharge” and “relinquishment.”272 Similarly, to “waive” is 
“to abandon, renounce, or surrender (a claim, privilege, right, 
etc.); to give up (a right or claim) voluntarily.”273 Avoiding 
surplusage might compel us to somehow differentiate 
between these two words—one possibility is that “waiver” 
must be voluntary and knowing, while “release” need 
not274—but it is hard to see how that would matter in this 
context. Both refer to a litigant’s or prospective litigant’s 
ability to choose to give up a right to enforce a legal 
obligation—apparently for any reason or no reason. 
Whatever differences between the definitions, they do 
not relate to the scope of discretion that the person doing the 
waiving or releasing may exercise. Courts generally do not 
review waivers or releases of claims, except perhaps for 
voluntariness.275 On the other hand, Black’s defines 
“compromise” as “[a]n agreement between two or more 
persons to settle matters in dispute between them; an 
 
 271. It is now standard Supreme Court practice to refer to multiple 
dictionaries, sometimes even keying them to the year in which the statute was 
passed. Both for the sake of brevity and because it seems to us that a legal 
dictionary is most appropriate for these legal terms of art, we restrict our 
discussion to the most recent edition of Black’s Law Dictionary. 
 272. Release, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019), Westlaw. 
 273. Waive, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019), Westlaw. 
 274. This distinction would be related to, but more general than, the 
waiver/forfeiture distinction in federal procedure. See Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 
443, 458 n.13 (2004) (“Although jurists often use the words interchangeably, 
forfeiture is the failure to make the timely assertion of a right; waiver is the 
intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.”) (internal 
punctuation and citation omitted); see also Hamer v. Neighborhood Hous. Servs. 
of Chicago, 138 S. Ct. 13, 17 n.1 (2017); Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 482, 
(2011); United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993). If this is the distinction 
between the two words, it would have no relevance to our considerations here, 
and perhaps no impact at all. Surely no Congressional authorization is needed 
for an administrative agency to be able to inadvertently fail to prosecute a claim. 
 275. See Olano, 507 U.S. at 733.  
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agreement for the settlement of a real or supposed claim in 
which each party surrenders something in concession to the 
other” as well as a “debtor’s partial payment coupled with the 
creditor’s promise not to claim the rest of the amount due or 
claimed.”276 On either definition, a “compromise” requires 
both parties to give up something—perhaps it even requires 
consideration, in the contract law sense.277 That might make 
the “compromise” power more fit for debt write-downs (in 
which the debtor “agrees” to continue to pay something)278 or 
for cases in which debtors have colorable defenses or 
counterclaims (such as the defrauded debtors discussed 
above) than for unilateral decisions not to enforce a debt for 
any or no reason. Still, a compromise is generally up to the 
discretion of the parties, and, absent any indication of 
skullduggery or any rules explicitly constraining the 
circumstances in which a compromise can be entered into 
(such as in class action settlements or consent judgments), 
not generally subject to the review of any court. 
What to make of the fact that the DOE’s modification 
and settlement authorities can only be exercised “[i]n 
performance of, and with respect to, the functions, powers, 
and duties vested in [the Secretary] by [the relevant parts of 
the HEA]”?279 At the most general level, this qualifying 
clause merely clarifies that the DOE’s prosecutorial 
 
 276. Compromise, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019), Westlaw. 
 277. This would be especially appropriate to the extent that a compromise were 
an actual contract, as it often is. 
 278. If a write-down were arrived at through the Department’s unilateral 
decision, it would not really be an agreement. Were an actual agreement required 
for a settlement to count as a “compromise,” it would limit this provision to cases 
in which borrowers were in a position to bargain—most obviously in cases in 
which they were engaged in litigation against the Department (whether as 
plaintiffs or defendants). Insisting on applying a meaning of “compromise” 
developed originally for private litigants would be absurdly formalistic in this 
case, however. It would force borrowers to find lawyers (or class action lawyers 
to find borrowers) in order to obtain a settlement that they would otherwise be 
entitled to on the merits. 
 279. 20 U.S.C. § 1082(a) (2018) (Federal Family Education Loan); 20 U.S.C. 
§ 1087hh (2018) (Perkins). 
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discretion pertains to claims related to the student loans over 
which it has direct or contingent ownership interests. The 
clause granting prosecutorial discretion does not itself clarify 
which sorts of claims it covers; it only makes clear that it 
covers any of the claims it covers, whatever those are. The 
“in performance of . . .” clause fills in that gap by tying the 
grant of discretion to the portion of the statutory scheme it 
covers. That sort of qualification does not add much: it 
merely establishes that the compromise authority is over the 
relevant type of student debt: FFELP in the case of § 1082(a), 
and Perkins in the case of § 1087hh (and Direct via 
incorporation of FFELP’s provision). 
Yet the qualifying clause does tie prosecutorial 
discretion specifically to “the functions, powers, and duties 
vested in” the Secretary of Education in the HEA with 
respect to student loans. If the Secretary’s “duties” include 
specific obligations regarding enforcement of student debts 
and/or how to determine when not to enforce them that are 
concrete enough to constrain discretion and to guide a court 
in reviewing that discretion, then it might be argued that 
Congress created “law to apply” that constrains DOE’s 
discretion, making it reviewable by a court. 
What duties might those be? Unlike in the cases in which 
courts have found non-enforcement decisions reviewable, the 
HEA does not contain any explicit standard that DOE must 
apply, any process that the DOE must go through, or any 
obligations that DOE must fulfill in determining whether to 
reject enforcement. It does have what the Second Circuit 
called a “non-discretionary mandate to collect on federal 
student loans” in the sense that it is commanded, like every 
other “head of an executive . . . agency” to “try to collect a 
claim of the United States Government for money or 
property arising out of the activities of, or referred to, the 
agency.”280 It also has the duty to “protect the United States 
 
 280. See Salazar v. King, 822 F.3d 61, 83 (2d Cir. 2016); 31 U.S.C. § 3711(a)(1) 
(2018).  
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from the risk of unreasonable loss” from FFELP loans and 
otherwise to supervise the federal loan program to ensure 
that collections are occurring.281 As well, the HEA charges 
DOE with discharging debts under specific circumstances: 
death, total disability, a school’s misbehavior or closure, 
completing the public service loan forgiveness program, 
etc.282 One might draw the negative implication that DOE 
has the duty to collect in circumstances other than these.283 
These duties do not seem specific enough to make a non-
enforcement decision reviewable under the framework that 
Heckler developed. Heckler explicitly rejected drawing 
negative implications about how much prosecutorial 
discretion an agency has based on a statutory grant of 
discretion narrower than that exercised by the agency.284 
More generally, it provided a number of reasons to reject the 
notion that a broad mandate to collect on claims or to enforce 
a given area of law provided sufficiently specific “law to 
apply” to undermine the presumption in favor of 
prosecutorial discretion, let alone an explicit grant thereof. 
Recall that in Heckler the FDA declined to take any 
enforcement action with respect to drugs used to execute 
people even though the drugs at issue had never been tested 
or approved as “safe and effective” for use in lethal 
injections.285 Yet the Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act (FDCA) 
 
 281. 20 U.S.C. § 1078(c)(2)(A) (2018).  
 282. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1087, 1087e(h), (m)(3) (2018). 
 283. Legislative history is of no help in clarifying the meaning of these 
provisions of the HEA. As noted above, settlement power was first introduced in 
the NDEA. The first version of the bill that became that law—The Federal 
Scholarship Act of 1957—contains no explicit settlement authority. H.R. 85-4490. 
It appears in the final version without any prior record; the legislative history 
available reveals no mention. See National Defense Education Act of 1958, H.R. 
REP. NO. 85-2688 (1958). The HEA’s legislative history is similarly vacant. It 
seems the NDEA’s provision was merely transferred over, or perhaps the initial 
conversations about settlement authorities that led to the passage of the Federal 
Claims Collection Act in the next year influenced the drafting staffers. 
 284. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 837 (1985). 
 285. Id. at 823–24. 
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prohibited (and continues to prohibit) such unapproved uses 
and requires that those who violate this prohibition be 
punished by fine or imprisonment, which implicitly requires 
the FDA to take enforcement action.286 The FDA’s own rules 
made this even more explicit by requiring its officers to 
“investigate . . . thoroughly and take whatever action is 
warranted to protect the public” from unapproved uses.287 
The Heckler Court held that none of this was enough to 
undermine the FDA’s discretion to decline to enforce the law. 
To reiterate, it characterized the prohibition on unapproved 
uses as “simply irrelevant to the agency’s discretion to 
refuse” to enforce it.288 Creating a scheme of enforcement, 
making that scheme mandatory, and even creating explicit 
exceptions thereto are not on their own sufficient to make an 
agency’s prosecutorial discretion reviewable. A general duty 
to enforce the law (or to “try to collect” on claims) will always 
be violated by a decision not to do so. It is in the nature of 
prosecutorial discretion that it sits in tension with full 
enforcement. Heckler and its progeny make clear that the 
tension is generally not for courts to resolve, at least not 
unless Congress articulates a specific set of standards or a 
process for how to do so. 
And there is no such standard or process here. The clause 
at issue here is unlike that found in Mach Mining, which 
mandated that the EEOC make the effort to conciliate before 
taking enforcement action, or Hodel, which required the 
Department of Interior to consider certain factors before 
determining whether or not to enforce. There is no 
procedural framework, set of substantive considerations, or 
even the vaguest standard to employ to sort one 
discretionary act from another. 
 
 286. Chaney v. Heckler, 718 F.2d 1174, 1186 n.29 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (discussing 
the mandatory nature of the FDCA’s prohibitions). 
 287. Id. at 1186 (quoting Legal Status for Uses Unapproved by the Food and 
Drug Administration, 37 Fed. Reg. 16503, 16504 (Aug. 15, 1972)). 
 288. Heckler, 470 U.S. at 836. 
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3. Do DOE’s Regulations Tie its Hands? 
It is not only statutes that can make prosecutorial 
discretion reviewable. Agency’s own regulations and 
interpretive actions that create “binding norms” can also 
create “law to apply.” DOE has created regulations and 
interpretive actions, but they leave open ample room for 
discretion. 
DOE has promulgated regulations that limit how it may 
exercise its settlement authority. It first issued such 
regulations in 1988—i.e. 33 years after the passage of the 
HEA.289 Most of these regulations pertained to other 
settlement authorities (i.e. over programs other than student 
loans), most of which are governed by the Federal Claims 
Collection Act (“FCCA”) rather than the HEA. But, because 
DOE gets its settlement authority over student loans from 
the HEA and the FCCA only governs where an agency does 
not have a separate grant of settlement authority, the FCCA 
does not govern DOE’s authority over student loans.290 
 
 289. 53 Fed. Reg. 33,424 (Aug. 30, 1988) (codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 30 (2019)). 
 290. One could come to this conclusion as an application of the general 
principle that the specific governs the general, see, e.g., Morales v. Trans World 
Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 384 (1992) (“[I]t is a commonplace of statutory 
construction that the specific governs the general.”); RadLAX Gateway Hotel, 
LLC v. Amalgated Bank, 566 U.S. 639, 645 (2012), but one need not, since 
Congress explicitly said that “[n]othing in [the FCCA] shall increase or diminish 
the existing authority of the head of an agency to litigate claims, or diminish his 
existing authority to settle, compromise, or close claims.” Federal Claims 
Collection Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-508, § 4, 80 Stat. 308 (1966). The Federal 
Claims Collection Standards reaffirm this principle. 31 C.F.R. § 900.4 (2019) 
(“Nothing in [the Federal Claims Collection Standards] precludes agency 
disposition of any claim under statutes and implementing regulations other than 
[the Federal Claims Collection Act] . . . In such cases, the laws and regulations 
that are specifically applicable to claims collection activities of a particular 
agency generally take precedence over [the FCCS].”). DOE is far from the only 
agency with a separate grant of settlement authority. See U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, 14 GAO-RB PT. D, S. 2, 2008 WL 6969346, *2, THE 
GOVERNMENT’S DUTY AND AUTHORITY TO COLLECT DEBTS OWED TO IT (2008) 
(providing examples of agencies that have such separate authority); 19 U.S.C. 
§ 1505(b) (2018) (customs duties); 15 U.S.C. § 634(b)(2) (2018) (Small Business 
Administration); 38 U.S.C. § 3720(a)(4) (2018) (Department of Veterans Affairs); 
10 U.S.C. § 8823(a) (2018) (the Navy); 42 U.S.C. §§ 2651–52 (2018) (various 
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Accordingly, regarding the Secretary’s student loan 
settlement authority, the 1988 regulations said: 
“Notwithstanding [other of the Department’s settlement 
authorities] the Secretary may compromise a debt, or 
suspend or terminate collection of a debt, in any amount if 
the debt arises under [the FFELP or Perkins Loan 
Program].”291 They said nothing further. In sum, they stated 
that DOE had whatever settlement authority over student 
loans the HEA gave it without doing anything to clarify, let 
alone narrow, that authority. 
This provision remained stuck in place for nearly two 
decades, even as Congress created the Direct Loan program 
and the $1 million limit. It was finally updated in 2016 as 
part of a regulatory process focused on another set of rules.292 
There was no debate or discussion of the changes to 
settlement authority among otherwise highly contested 
regulatory proceedings regarding the conditions in which 
student debtors who were mistreated by their school can 
have their debts discharged.293 The Department presented 
the changes to prosecutorial discretion regulations as 
“technical corrections” that would not bring about 
“significant change in current practices.”294 It explained the 
 
agencies with respect to third-party claims for hospital or medical care); 26 U.S.C. 
§§ 6321–26, 6331 (2018) (tax liens and tax levy, respectively). 
 291. 53 Fed. Reg. 33,424, (Aug. 30, 1988) (codified at former 34 C.F.R. 
§ 30.70(h)). 
 292. Student Assistance General Provisions, 81 Fed. Reg. 39,330, 39,368–69, 
39,407–08 (June 16, 2016) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. pts. 30, 668, 674, 682, 685, 
686). The Department is in the process of repealing and rewriting these 
regulations. The Department’s main purpose in doing so is to make it more 
difficult to cancel student debt even for borrowers who were defrauded, so it 
seems unlikely that the revised regulations would alter this provision. See Erica 
L. Green, Education Department Has Stalled on Debt Relief for Defrauded 
Students, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/05/us/ 
politics/betsy-devos-student-loan-debt-relief.html. 
 293. The final rule does not note any such comments. See Student Assistance 
General Provisions, 81 Fed. Reg. at 39,330. The author was at all of the 
negotiating sessions, acting as adviser to the student negotiator, and recalls no 
discussion of this provision whatsoever. 
 294. Id. at 39,331, 36,397. 
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changes as merely reflecting the “series of statutory changes 
[since 1988] that have expanded the Secretary’s authority to 
compromise, or suspend or terminate the collection of, 
debts.”295 
The new regulations include three noteworthy changes. 
First, they include Direct Loans as on par with FFELP and 
Perkins based on the reasoning that the statutory provision 
that puts Direct Loans on par with FFELP requires it.296 
Second, they seem to restrict the exercise of DOE’s authority 
to “compromise, suspend, or terminate collections” to 
situations covered “under the provisions of 31 CFR part 902 
or 903.”297 Those CFR provisions are the Federal Claims 
Collections Standards (“FCCS”), which were developed 
jointly by the DOJ and Treasury to guide agencies that get 
their settlement authority from the FCCA (but wait? Didn’t 
I say that the FCCA doesn’t govern? Yes. All will be revealed 
shortly).298 Through the FCCS, the DOJ and Treasury give 
permission to other Executive Branch officers to 
“compromise a debt” if they “cannot collect the full amount 
because:” (1) “a debtor is unable to pay the full amount in a 
reasonable time,” (2) the agency “is unable to collect the debt 
in full within a reasonable time by enforced collection 
proceedings,” (3) “the cost of collecting the debt does not 
justify the enforced collection of the full amount” or (4) “there 
is significant doubt concerning the [agency’s] ability to prove 
its case in court.”299 Agencies that adopt the FCCS may 
deviate from these conditions “as an aid to enforcement and 
to compel compliance, if the agency’s enforcement policy in 
terms of deterrence and securing compliance, present and 
 
 295. Id. at 39,369.  
 296. 34 C.F.R. § 30.70 (2019).  
 297. Id.  
 298. Federal Claims Collection Standards, 31 C.F.R. §§ 900–04 (2019).  
 299. Id. § 902.2(a). The FCCS limit suspending collection to situations where 
“(1) the agency cannot locate the debtor, (2) the debtor’s financial condition is 
expected to improve, or (3) the debtor has requested a waiver or review of the 
debt.” Id. § 903.2(a). 
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future, will be adequately served.”300 And, as a general 
matter, the Attorney General must sign off on any 
compromises and suspensions of collections on claims above 
$100,000.301 
Of these three, only the first and third alteration reflect 
the “series of statutory changes” since 1988. We have already 
discussed how the HEOA does not impose any real 
restrictions on DOE. The second alteration is the only 
candidate for imposing the sort of “law to apply” that might 
actually restrict DOE’s discretion. It imposes a new set of 
requirements beyond the statutory baseline. Because the 
Secretary gets her settlement power from a statute other 
than the FCCA, DOE is under no obligation to implement the 
FCCS.302 Of course the DOE had the option of following the 
FCCS, but it was not bound to do so before it tied its 
authority to “compromise, suspend, or terminate collections” 
to the FCCS. 
It seems likely that DOE did not mean to narrow its 
regulatory authority by promulgating this provision. As 
noted above, DOE explained these regulations as mere 
“technical corrections” and did not make any effort to justify 
the changes during the negotiated rulemaking or comment 
periods leading up to their enactment. There is no reason to 
believe that DOE meant to restrict its authority. “To the 
contrary,” Connor, Loonin, and Merrill rightly note, “the 
regulation was revised so as to reflect expansions in the 
Secretary’s authority.”303 Indeed, it is not at all clear that the 
2016 regulatory drafters (unlike the 1988 drafters) realized 
that DOE is not bound by the FCCA with respect to claims 
on student debtors. They do not seem to have considered the 
interaction between HEA and FCCA at any length. 
Otherwise, why would they have bound themselves to 
 
 300. Id. § 902.3. 
 301. Id. §§ 902.1, 903.1. 
 302. See supra note 290. 
 303. Ltr., supra note 265, at 5. 
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regulatory guidelines that require consultation with DOJ for 
claims over $100,000 while also incorporating the HEOA’s 
aforementioned $1 million ceiling?304 
One way to treat this regulatory change, then, is a 
massive drafting error. A mistake to be ignored. 
Even if we do not do that, there are several reasons to 
think that this regulation does not constrain DOE’s 
discretion much if at all. First, it does not seem to alter 
DOE’s power to modify its claims305 or its power to 
compromise, waive, or release claims not in collections (and 
one might also quibble as to whether release and waiver of 
claims is the same as “termination” thereof). The regulation 
that refers to the FCCA only refers to DOE’s power to 
“compromise, suspend, or terminate collections.” If 
“collections” here refers to the procedures DOE (or any 
debtor) goes through to collect on a defaulted claim 
(including instituting suit), then the regulation would seem 
to be inapplicable to DOE’s decision to release claims over 
non-defaulted debt. Generally, this is what is meant by 
“collections” in the world of debt enforcement. If “collections” 
is read more broadly to include any activity involved in 
managing claims based on debts still due, then this 
regulation is more broadly applicable. Either way, 
modification of a claim is distinct from compromise, 
suspension, or termination of collections. A modification can 
be implemented in the process compromising a claim or to 
effectively terminate or suspend collections, but it can also 
be exercised for other reasons and with other effect. 
Similarly, the FCCS only refer to an agency’s power to 
“compromise” or to “suspend” claims, providing no guidance 
with respect to when or how modification is appropriate. 
As well, if we are to make sense of the interaction 
 
 304. Student Assistance General Provisions, 81 Fed. Reg. 39,408 (codified at 
34 C.F.R. § 30.70(e)(2)) (2019). 
 305. As Connor, Loonin, and Merrill have pointed out. See Ltr., supra note 265, 
at 6. 
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between the HEA and the FCCA, we ought to note that, given 
the context of their enactment, the FCCS are best understood 
to have an implicit fifth condition when an executive branch 
official may compromise a debt: whenever the Attorney 
General says it is okay (so long as the Attorney General does 
so within statutory and constitutional bounds). If so, the 
regulation creates merely a procedural hurdle for DOE to 
jump through—namely, obtaining approval of DOJ. To see 
why, begin by imagining that the DOE got its authority from 
the FCCA. 
The FCCA was enacted against the background 
understanding that the Attorney General has authority to 
exercise full prosecutorial discretion, which includes full 
discretion in determining whether to bring, to compromise, 
or to otherwise settle claims. Agencies without explicit 
statutory grants of prosecutorial discretion would bring 
claims to the DOJ to borrow the AG’s inherent authority. The 
DOJ drafted the FCCA to make clear that agencies without 
explicit statutory authority could compromise claims below a 
certain amount without having to ask permission from the 
Attorney General, but it conditioned the ability to do so on 
regulations promulgated by the Treasury and the DOJ.306 
Effectively, then, the FCCA created a form of pre-approval, a 
blanket permission to settle claims under certain conditions. 
It did nothing to limit the Attorney General’s own authority 
to compromise (or otherwise settle) claims above the 
threshold amount or to grant permission to compromise 
claims below the threshold amount for reasons beyond those 
explicitly listed in the ex ante permission slip of the FCCS. 
The FCCS themselves reflect the FCCA’s structure, first 
granting the compromise authority below the threshold 
amount, then declaring that the “authority to accept 
compromises” of any claims higher than the threshold 
 
 306. 31 U.S.C. § 3711(a)(2) (2018) (unconditioned compromise authority, 
compare with (a)(3)’s suspension authority, which incorporates an ability to pay 
condition), (d) (conditioning suspension and compromise authority on agency, 
Justice, and Treasury regulations and standards). 
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amount “rests with the Department of Justice,” then 
articulating the conditions under which an agency may 
exercise its (sub-threshold) authority without having to ask 
permission.307 The FCCS say nothing about the conditions 
under which the Department of Justice can exercise its 
compromise (or other settlement) authority, nor do they 
restrict an agency from referring a sub-threshold claim to the 
Department of Justice for the Attorney General to do what 
she will. Accordingly, were DOE to have got its prosecutorial 
discretion from the FCCA, it would merely be borrowing the 
AG’s discretion for sub-threshold amounts subject to the 
conditions of the FCCS. Nothing in the FCCA or the FCCS 
would prohibit it from declining to exercise its discretion 
according to the FCCS and referring a claim to the AG/DOJ 
to exercise discretion not limited by the FCCS. After all, such 
referral is what it would have done had it had no statutory 
permission to exercise prosecutorial discretion.  
Understood in context, the FCCS constrain the 
discretion of executive branch agencies on terms created by 
the DOJ and Treasury, but enable DOJ to override any of 
those constraints in a case-by-case basis. When the DOE 
adopted the FCCS, it incorporated this structure into its 
implementation of the discretion that the HEA granted it. In 
effect, it outsourced its prosecutorial discretion to the DOJ: 
tying its hands to compromise only in situations pre-
approved by the DOJ (and Treasury) via the FCCS or 
situations in which the AG gives specific approval, subject to 
whichever other limits the HEA creates. 
None of which denies that DOE has constrained its own 
discretion by adopting the FCCS, only the practical 
importance of that constraint should DOJ and DOE be of the 
same mind with respect to how much student debt should be 
canceled. In such a circumstance, the new regulations merely 
 
 307. 31 C.F.R. § 902.1(a) (granting sub-threshold authority); § 902.1(b) 
(reserving supra-threshold authority to Justice); § 902.2 (articulating conditions 
for exercise of sub-threshold authority). 
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require DOJ to decide where DOE would have been legally 
able to do so on its own. In fact, somewhat ironically given 
the history of the FCCA, it has apparently been normal 
practice for the DOE to obtain approval from the DOJ before 
deciding on even the most trivial settlement.308 This practice 
apparently developed because Justice represents Education 
in any litigation and its attorneys want to make sure things 
go according to their own standards. This regulation merely 
maintains that peace between these instrumentalities of the 
Executive. 
If all else fails, DOE could avoid any of these limitations 
by simply repealing and replacing its regulations with an 
updated version of what it had in place from 1988 to 2016: a 
regulation that merely reaffirms its full statutory authority. 
Doing so would require going through a time-consuming 
negotiated rulemaking proceeding, but it is perfectly 
permissible.309 
4. Does DOE’s Practice Create a “Binding Norm”? 
Setting aside regulations, has DOE’s implementation of 
its settlement and modification authorities created any 
limitations? In short, no. 
Public information on how DOE uses and thinks about 
these authorities is scarce. Its announced view is that 
“[s]pecific guidance related to settlements and compromises 
is confidential, given that publicizing this information is not 
in the best interest of the government as it could enable 
borrowers to reduce their repayments below the amount they 
can legitimately afford.”310 But what information is available 
 
 308. Bergeron, infra note 314. 
 309. Regarding the obligation to follow the same process to amend or repeal a 
regulation as to promulgate one, see Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n., 135 S. Ct. 
1199, 1206 (2015); F.C.C. v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515 
(2009). Regarding the Department of Education’s obligation to use negotiated 
rulemaking in addition to notice and comment, see 20 U.S.C. § 6571(b) (2018).  
 310. FED. STUDENT AID OFF. OF THE U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., LOAN SERVICING AND 
COLLECTION – FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS (2018), https://getoutofdebt.org/wp-
2020] STUDENT DEBT JUBILEE 387 
indicates that DOE has consistently understood its 
settlement authority as something to be used rarely, in cases 
in which it seemed likely that further collection would not be 
worth the expense. 
In a 1993 guidance document for guaranty agencies, the 
Department advised that these agencies would not sacrifice 
their right to the Department’s insurance if they exercised 
their discretion to compromise with borrowers who had 
defaulted on FFELP loans and were “repeatedly unemployed 
and have no prospects for future employment,” were 
“repeatedly public assistance recipients,” were “chronically 
ill, partially disabled, or of an age that results in their 
inability to work,” or had “potential for future earnings [that 
was] limited or non-existent”—that is, so long as they had 
“no other funds available to them from other sources, such as 
an inheritance.”311 In other words, it would not require 
guaranty agencies to draw blood from stones, so long as they 
really really made sure they were dealing with stones. Since 
the Department only takes possession of FFELP loans once 
a guaranty agency assigns it over to them (and a guaranty 
agency only takes possession in case of default or discharge), 
this guidance document likely reflected the Department’s 
own internal standards for when the Secretary should 
exercise its settlement authority. 
Bolstering this interpretation, as late as 2009 the 
Department had posted a PCA manual that described 
similar standards for collections companies it contracts with 
to pursue borrowers who default on any loan.312 The 
Department’s most recent statement, in response to queries 
from the National Consumer Law Center in 2015 is that 
“[s]ettlements and compromises are only available to 
 
content/uploads/2018/06/IFAP-Loan-Servicing-and-Collection-FAQ_new.pdf.  
 311. NAT’L COUNCIL OF HIGHER EDUC. LOAN PROGRAMS, STANDARDIZED 
COMPROMISE AND WRITE-OFF PROCEDURES (1993), https://www.studentloan 
borrowerassistance.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/ex_6.pdf. 
 312. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., PCA PROCS. MANUAL: 2009 DOE COLLECTIONS 
CONTRACT 71–73, 2009. 
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defaulted borrowers and are intended as a last resort after 
other repayment options have been exhausted.”313 
According to David Bergeron, a former acting assistant 
secretary for postsecondary education, the reason DOE 
concluded that its prosecutorial discretion only applies to 
defaulted loans is that, under the FFELP program, DOE only 
takes possession of loans in case of default.314 And one can 
only exercise prosecutorial discretion over debts one owns. 
As for Direct Loans, DOE has apparently reasoned that, 
because their settlement discretion derives entirely from the 
fact that they are available on the same terms as FFELP 
loans, that discretion only kicks in when the DOE would 
have been able to exercise it for FFELP loans: i.e. when they 
default.315 
This line of practice, inasmuch as it can be discerned, 
does not seem sufficient to “create binding norms by 
imposing rights or obligations on the respective parties,” as 
D.C. Circuit precedent requires.316 DOE keeps its practices 
confidential precisely because it seeks to avoid altering 
private parties’ behavior. That is, it seeks to avoid even 
creating expectations about its conduct, let alone creating an 
enforceable right based on such an expectation. 
While the Supreme Court has held that “the 
longstanding practice of the government can inform [a 
court’s] determination of what the law is” 317 and that “a 
systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the 
knowledge of the Congress and never before questioned, can 
raise a presumption that the action had been taken in 
 
 313. FED. STUDENT AID OFF. OF THE U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., supra note 310.  
 314. Email from David Bergeron, Senior Fellow, Ctr. for Am. Progress, to Luke 
Herrine, Ph.D. in Law Candidate, Yale Law Sch. (June 18, 2019, 10:05 EST) (on 
file with author). 
 315. Id. 
 316. Steenholdt v. FAA, 314 F.3d 633, 639 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
 317. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Canning, 573 U.S. 513, 525 (2014) (internal 
citations and punctuation omitted). 
2020] STUDENT DEBT JUBILEE 389 
pursuance of its consent,”318 the Court has never held that 
an agency’s failure to act in a certain way makes that action 
prohibited. Put differently: failing to test the limits of a 
power has never been treated as setting the limits of that 
power, through some sort of estoppel principle. Such a 
principle would be hard to justify. When an action of 
questionable legality has long been performed without 
objection, it might be presumed legal. But when an action 
has never been attempted, nobody would have had the 
chance to object or not. No information about its legality—
presumptive or otherwise—is produced. So the justification 
for the former does not apply to the latter. What is more, 
limiting officials to staying within the boundaries of prior 
practice regardless of their paper grant of power would seem 
to incentivize them to test the limits of their power early and 
often to avoid losing the opportunity to do so later, which 
would seem a recipe for nearly constant constitutional crisis. 
The substance of DOE’s reasoning for a narrow reading 
of its own discretion is also flawed. First of all, it is not true 
that the Department only holds defaulted FFELP debts. It 
also takes possession of FFELP debts by paying off loans on 
behalf of debtors who are eligible for a discharge under the 
HEA.319 And, as we will discuss later, it may have other ways 
of taking possession of them. But, in any case, the 
Department need not wait to be the holder of a loan over 
which it has ultimate enforcement authority in order to make 
a determination about whether it will enforce or discharge 
the obligation to pay that loan. There is nothing in the 
relevant statutes that prevents the Department from 
determining whether it will enforce a FFELP loan should it 
come in possession before it actually does, and it seems 
absurd to prevent the Department from planning in advance 
 
 318. Medellín v. Texas, 532 U.S. 491, 531 (2008) (internal punctuation 
omitted). 
 319. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1087(a)(1), (b), (c)(1), (d) (2018) (requiring Department to 
pay loan on borrower’s behalf and order a discharge); see also 34 C.F.R. 
§ 682.402(a) (2019) (developing procedure for discharge). 
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how it will exercise its rights to collect a debt should it come 
to hold the debt. Indeed, such an interpretation would 
undermine the Department’s explicit statutory authority to 
issue ex ante regulations pertaining to how it will manage 
debts in which it is not in possession should it come into their 
possession.320 
But the Department’s authority to determine how it will 
manage debts that it does not yet but may hold is not 
restricted to those cases in which the Department is granted 
explicit authority to grant discharges. In particular, the 
Department has long had the ability to determine that a loan 
is not or would not be legally enforceable against the holder 
of the loan due to misconduct in inducing the debtor to take 
on the loan and to refuse to pay out a guarantee for such 
loans.321 As far back as 1973, the Department informed 
guarantee agencies that it would not pay out insurance on 
loans taken out to attend for-profit colleges where there was 
(more likely than not) consumer fraud.322 In such situations, 
the Department can determine in advance that no holder of 
the loan should continue to enforce it because it is not legally 
owed. 
A reasonable extension of this principle would be to 
enable the Department to pay less than the full claim to the 
guarantee agency in order to take possession of the debt to 
ensure that it will be canceled. Doing so would involve a 
determination that refusing to pay insurance would actually 
not be the best way to prevent collection of legally non-
enforceable debts by parties that have an incentive to 
maximize collections even when legally questionable. The 
Secretary would be exercising discretion to pay somewhere 
 
 320. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. §§ 1082(a)(1), 1087(a)(1) (2018). 
 321. See 34 C.F.R. § 684.402(a)(4)–(5) (2019); see also Margaret Reiter, 
Comment on Dep’t of Educ. Proposed Rule, Docket ED-2015-OPE-0103, p. 7–10 
(Aug. l, 2016), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=ED-2015-OPE-0103-
10697 (reviewing history of non-payment on non-enforceable notes, going back at 
least to 1973). 
 322. Reiter, supra note 321, at 7. 
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in between all and none of its guarantee to ensure the overall 
purpose of the HEA is fulfilled. 
In sum, nothing in DOE’s understanding limits its 
discretion over FFELP loans in its possession (in which case 
DOE has a claim over the debtor) or that it has the right to 
bring within its possession (in which case DOE can 
determine how it would exercise its claim over a debtor were 
it to obtain one). But, in any case, whatever limits there are 
on FFELP do not carry over to Direct Loans just because they 
are subject to “the same terms, conditions, and benefits.”323 
That is because Direct Loans are subject to the same terms, 
conditions, and benefits except insofar as they are not. 
“Direct Loans” is not merely a new label for FFELP, it is a 
modification of the student loan program that makes 
otherwise identical loans available on more uniform terms 
and subject to more direct control by DOE. Indeed, the main 
difference between FFELP and Direct Loans is precisely that 
DOE does not need to take any action or pay any entity to 
come into possession of Direct Loans. It issues them directly. 
Thus Direct Loans obviously do not inherit the terms and 
conditions that involve private lenders, guarantee agencies, 
and insurance arrangements between DOE and these 
parties. The whole point of creating Direct Loans was to 
eliminate the complications involved with these particular 
terms and conditions, such as they are. Since the settlement 
authority itself says nothing about when it can be exercised, 
it would be absurd to limit DOE’s authority to settle Direct 
Loans to circumstances when it would have been able to take 
possession of FFELP loans merely because the structure of 
FFELP loans created a de facto limitation on the settlement 
authority. 
As for the more general principle that DOE’s discretion 
can only be exercised to minimize administrative cost or 
perhaps in cases where the legality of the claim would be 
 
 323. Pub. L. No. 102-325, 106 Stat. 572 (1992) (codified at 20 U.S.C. 
§ 1087a(b)(2) (2018)). 
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dubious (and thus where collection might generate costly 
litigation or even be ruled unlawful), there is no HEA 
provision that even remotely restricts the HEA in that way. 
And reading that restriction into the HEA would be in 
tension with the basic principle of presuming prosecutorial 
discretion to be unreviewable, since it conditions non-
reviewability on a court’s determination of the proper 
reasons for which that discretion may be exercised.  
5. Is Debt Cancellation an “Abdication of [DOE’s] 
Statutory Duty”? 
As noted, Heckler left open the possibility that an agency 
that used its discretion to “consciously and expressly adopt[] 
a general policy which is in effect an abdication of its 
statutory duty” would not be entitled to normally applicable 
deference.324 This exception is consistent with the general 
principle of administrative law that “[r]egardless of how 
serious the problem an administrative agency seeks to 
address . . . it may not exercise its authority in a manner that 
is inconsistent with the administrative structure that 
Congress enacted into law.”325 As also noted, abdication of 
duty has never served as a basis for finding an otherwise 
discretionary agency action reviewable. Would DOE using its 
prosecutorial discretion to enact a student debt jubilee 
present the opportunity to develop this possibility? 
The most likely scenario in which a court would find that 
DOE has abdicated its duty by undermining the purpose of 
the statute would be if it stopped collecting student debt 
altogether. The argument for abdication of duty would be 
that, whatever the scope of DOE’s discretion, it cannot be so 
great that it can unilaterally decide that student debt ought 
no longer be collected. The HEA charges it with creating and 
enforcing such debts, after all. Congress cannot be said to 
have granted DOE discretion so broad as to enable it to 
 
 324. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 855 n.4 (1985).  
 325. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 125 (2000). 
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override Congress’s decision to have an operational student 
loan program. The core purpose of prosecutorial discretion, it 
is often said, is to enable an agency to prioritize some claims 
over others.326 Refusing to enforce all claims prioritizes no 
claims at all. It goes against the structure of the statute. It 
violates the oft-repeated principle that Congress does not 
“hide elephants in mouseholes,”327 not to mention that courts 
and agencies should exercise “common sense as to the 
manner in which Congress is likely to delegate a policy 
decision of such economic and political magnitude to an 
administrative agency.”328 
The main defense of a refusal to collect would be to point 
to the routine exercises of prosecutorial discretion to refuse 
to enforce laws perceived as overly harsh or otherwise 
socially or morally problematic. As William Eskridge has 
shown, sodomy laws, though universally enacted among U.S. 
states for most of their history, were “rarely enforced . . . 
against anyone before 1880, even when such illegal activities 
were notorious in the community.”329 Recent years have seen 
several district attorneys refusing to enforce laws that 
criminalize various drug-related offenses.330 No court I am 
 
 326. See Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 609–10 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting); 
Ass’n of Irritated Residents v. EPA, 494 F.3d 1027, 1032 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (“These 
judgments—arising from considerations of resource allocation, agency priorities, 
and costs of alternatives—are well within the agency’s expertise and discretion.”); 
Schering Corp. v. Heckler, 779 F.2d 683, 687 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (describing FDA’s 
decision to settle as a product of “precisely the sort of balancing of agency 
priorities and objectives, informed by judgments based on agency expertise, that, 
absent some ‘law to apply,’ should not be second-guessed by a court”). 
 327. This phrase comes from Whitman v. Am. Trucking Assocs., 531 U.S. 457, 
468 (2001), and has taken on the status of ritual incantation since. See, e.g., Cyan, 
Inc. v. Beaver County Employees Retirement Fund, 138 S. Ct. 1061, 1071 (2018); 
Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018); Puerto Rico v. Franklin 
California Tax-Free Trust, 136 S. Ct. 1938 (2016); EME Homer City, 572 U.S. at 
528; Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 267 (2006). 
 328. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000). 
 329. WILLIAM M. ESKRIDGE, JR., DISHONORABLE PASSIONS: SODOMY LAWS IN 
AMERICA: 1861–2003 21 (2008). 
 330. Brooklyn DA Moves to Vacate 1,400 Pot Warrants, Overturn 28 
Convictions, ABC7NY (Dec. 19, 2018), https://abc7ny.com/marijuana-convictions-
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aware of has ever ruled that prosecutors’ decision not to 
enforce these and other laws was an abdication of statutory 
duty reviewable by a court. 
But suppose we assume that a total refusal would be 
reviewable, perhaps by differentiating criminal prosecutions 
from the efforts of the administrative state. Even so, none of 
the proposals on the table involve unilateral refusal to ever 
cancel student debt. Even a full jubilee would only involve 
eliminating all current student debt. Such an action 
(assuming it happens in the absence of other reforms that 
would eliminate student debt) is more like a reset of the 
student debt program than the elimination thereof. It would 
involve a prioritization of resources towards the future 
rather than the past, we might say. 
We might note as well that even if a court were inclined 
to rule against a DOE-enacted jubilee, it would likely be 
given pause by the fact that doing so would surely be a 
tremendously politically unpopular decision, transcending 
partisan divides at least somewhat. A court that re-imposed 
student debt on millions of people who just had the 
experience of having that debt lifted off their shoulders 
would at the least have a serious PR problem on its hands. 
Especially a court worried about its eroding legitimacy might 
think twice before taking the case. 
Something less than total cancellation—say an across-
the-board haircut and/or sliding-scale cancellation 
depending on income—is even more obviously a matter of 
prioritization rather than total abdication. Indeed, once we 
are outside the realm of total elimination of debt, it is hard 
to see what principles could guide a court in determining how 
much discretion is too much to be beyond court review. So 
long as the cancellation plan does not go outside the realm of 
non-enforcement into the realm of granting or eliminating 
 
pot-brooklyn-da-district-attorney/4927578/; Joe Trinacria, Larry Krasner Sues 
Big Pharma, Drops All Marijuana Possession Charges, PHILLYMAG (Feb. 16, 
2018), https://www.phillymag.com/news/2018/02/16/krasner-big-pharma-
marijuana-possession/. 
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borrowers’ rights (by, say, conditioning debt cancellation on 
borrowers’ waiver of the right to vote), any line drawn 
between reviewable and non-reviewable discretion would 
seem to be equivalent to a court substituting its judgment 
about the appropriate use of discretion for that of the 
administrative agency charged with exercising such 
judgment. 
6. Even if Reviewable, Debt Cancellation Could Survive 
Review 
Of course, a finding that a given action is reviewable is 
not a finding that it is unlawful. If a court were to review 
DOE’s use of its discretion to cancel student debt, it would 
have to apply the APA. I will spare the reader the full 
analysis of what that would look like, but it could be either 
review for abuse of discretion or arbitrary and capricious 
review. 
C. Complications with FFELP and Perkins Loans 
In what remains, we will assume that DOE can cancel 
student debt and avoid or survive court review. Yet further 
legal matters remain in designing a debt cancellation plan. 
As discussed above, not all public student loans are owed 
directly to DOE, even if DOE has regulatory authority over 
them. In particular, FFELP and Perkins Loans are initially 
issued by and owed to non-governmental entities. Eighty-five 
percent of outstanding FFELP loans—or 16% of all 
outstanding public student—is held by entities other than 
DOE. Because DOE can only decline to enforce debts it has 
the ability to enforce, the fact that DOE does not have direct 
claims on most FFELP or any Perkins debtors presents a 
problem. Existing jubilee proposals introduced in Congress 
address this issue by expressly giving DOE authority to 
assume the obligation on FFELP and Perkins Loans. (This 
problem does not pertain to Direct Loans, of course.) How 
might DOE obtain possession of FFELP and Perkins loans 
without this additional authority? 
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1. FFELP 
DOE has the authority to take possession of FFELP 
loans when such a loan has been in default long enough and 
after enough efforts at collection for a guaranty agency to 
have paid out its guarantee and to have given up on 
collection efforts itself. This authority would not be all that 
helpful unless, perhaps, many debtors refused to pay, 
whether in protest or in anticipation of a potential jubilee. 
DOE also has the ability to “compromise[] any claim on, or 
arising because of” its insurance on the guaranty on FFELP 
loans.331 Using this authority, it might announce its plan to 
exercise its discretion to cancel or write down (i.e. to decline 
to enforce, to waive or release) some or all FFELP Loans that 
ultimately come within its possession and then negotiate 
with guaranty agencies to pay out a lump sum in exchange 
for assignment of the relevant debts. Debtors would have a 
lessened incentive to pay these debts, giving holders/lenders 
an incentive to sell instead of expending further collection 
costs. 
2. Perkins 
Similarly, DOE can take assignment of a Perkins Loan 
from a college where the loan has “been in default despite 
due diligence on the part of the institution in attempting 
collection thereon” or where “an institution of higher 
education determines not to service and collect” it.332 Once 
DOE takes possession of a Perkins Loan via assignment from 
a college, it must “attempt to collect” on it “until all 
appropriate collection efforts, as determined by the Secretary, 
have been expended.”333 DOE might exercise this authority 
after encouraging colleges that hold Perkins to “determine[] 
not to service or collect” Perkins Loans anymore, which 
 
 331. 20 U.S.C. § 1082(a)(5) (2018).  
 332. 20 U.S.C. § 1087cc(a)(4), (c)(5) (2018). 
 333. 20 U.S.C. § 1087gg(b) (2018) (emphasis added). It is not clear if this is any 
different than the obligation to “try to collect” any debts owed to the federal 
government at 31 U.S.C. § 3711(a)(1) (2018).  
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would then require (and, a fortiori, enable) the colleges to 
assign the loans to DOE.334 Loans assigned in this way do 
not require DOE to make any payments to colleges.335 
Though some colleges might be willing to get on board with 
such a plan based on a belief in the value of student debt 
cancellation alone, others might require further incentive. 
DOE might be able to “compromise” with some sort of 
incentive, such as providing some form of regulatory relief. 
DOE also has the authority to “consent to modification” 
of the terms of a Perkins Loan and/or to “waive any . . . claim” 
over colleges who, for instance, write down a loan in a way 
that runs afoul of the HEA.336 DOE might coordinate with 
colleges willing to write down or cancel Perkins loans by 
committing to exercise one or both of these authorities so 
that colleges face no consequences for doing so. 
3. Conclusion 
None of these approaches to resolving the problem of the 
indirect claims under FFELP and Perkins is foolproof. 
However, a creative Secretary of Education could potentially 
find a way to mix them together to ensure as uniform a 
treatment of different kinds of public student loans as 
possible under a debt cancellation program. 
E. Budgetary and Tax Implications: Getting OMB and the 
Treasury’s Approval 
Assuming the Secretary were to decide to use her 
settlement power to cancel a large amount of student debt 
and setting aside the legal questions of whether doing so 
would be based on a proper interpretation of the relevant 
 
 334. The HEA also enables DOE to authorize colleges to directly compromise 
with student debtors, but only if the compromise results in the debtor paying a 
lump sum amounting to at least 90% of the principal and all of the interest and 
fees. 20 U.S.C. § 1087dd(f) (2018). 
 335. Indeed, any amount DOE collects on such a loan assigned in this way 
must be distributed to colleges other than the assignor. 
 336. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1087hh(1), (2) (2018). 
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statutory authorities, there are two further potential 
limitations: the legal implications of the effect of such 
cancellation on the federal budget and the potential that the 
IRS could treat the cancellation as a form of income for tax 
purposes. 
1. There are No Budgetary or Separation-of-Powers 
Limitations on Debt Cancellation 
There are three potential legal problems that 
administrative discretion with a major impact on the federal 
budget could have: it could contravene the constitutional 
separation of powers, whether under non-delegation doctrine 
or the Appropriations Clause; it could violate a statutory 
restriction on use of appropriated funds; or it could violate 
an executive directive on how funds can be used. 
Non-delegation doctrine is currently in a state of flux. 
Under current law, as long as Congress provides some 
minimal “intelligible principle” to guide agency action—i.e. 
as long as Congress does not create an agency that convenes 
political coalitions to bargain over the terms of multiple 
sectors of the economy—a delegation does not undermine the 
constitutional separation of powers.337 However, it seems 
likely that there is now a majority of Supreme Court Justices 
willing to give non-delegation doctrine more bite.338 Non-
delegation doctrine has never been used to strike down 
quasi-prosecutorial discretion, although it has never 
confronted quasi-prosecutorial discretion of the scope 
envisioned here. And a more aggressive version of the 
doctrine might at least be used as a background threat of 
unconstitutionality to counsel a narrower statutory 
interpretation on constitutional avoidance principles. 
Speculating further on the matter would be more tedious 
than interesting, but it is worth noting the risk. 
 
 337. See Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116 (2019).  
 338. See Ian Millhiser, The Supreme Court’s Covert Plan to Gut the EPA, THE 
NEW REPUBLIC (June 21, 2019) https://newrepublic.com/article/154266/supreme-
courts-covert-plan-gut-epas-powers. 
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Constitutional restrictions on appropriations are more 
easily set aside. The Appropriations Clause of the 
Constitution provides: “No Money shall be drawn from the 
Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by 
Law.”339 The Supreme Court has understood this clause as 
quite “straightforward and explicit.”340 “It means simply that 
no money can be paid out of the Treasury unless it has been 
appropriated by an act of Congress.”341 This prohibition is 
strict: it prohibits a President from using the pardon power 
to “order to repay from the Treasury the proceeds derived 
from the sale of the convict’s forfeited property” and even 
inadvertent expenditures in excess of appropriations.342 
But it has no teeth in this case. It has nothing to say 
about non-collection of debts, since failing to deposit money 
into the Treasury is not the same as withdrawing money 
from the Treasury. So it has nothing to say about settling 
Direct Loans or FFELP Loans already in the Department of 
Education’s possession. In theory, it might restrict the 
Department’s payout of insurance to guaranty agencies in 
the case of FFELP loans not already in the Department’s 
possession, but Congress has granted blanket authority for 
the Department to cover the costs of these loans. FFELP is 
an entitlement program for which Congress pre-authorized 
funds to pay out loan guarantees paid out in accordance with 
law.343 
 
 339. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7. 
 340. Off. of Personnel Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 424 (1990). 
 341. Id. (quoting Cincinnati Soap Co. v. United States, 301 U.S. 308, 321 
(1937)). 
 342. Id. at 425–26 (1990) (citing Knote v. United States, 95 U.S. 149, 154 
(1877)); see also U.S. Dep’t of Navy v. Fed. Labor Rel. Auth., 665 F.3d 1339, 1347 
(D.C. Cir. 2012). 
 343. See 20 U.S.C. § 1081 (2018) (creating an ongoing “insurance fund” to cover 
any costs of insuring FFELP loans and authorizing the Secretary to borrow from 
the Treasury as appropriate to cover costs); 2 U.S.C. § 661c(c)(1) (2018) (explicitly 
using “the guaranteed student loan program” as an example of the types of 
entitlement programs that are exempt from the usual appropriations process). 
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There also seem to be no statutory restrictions related to 
budgetary impact. It is difficult to prove a negative, but none 
of the most likely candidate laws seem to apply. The 
Antideficiency Act prohibits Executive Branch officers from 
spending money in excess of Congressional appropriations 
(as the Constitution does) and of regulatory restrictions.344 
But canceling debt would not authorize expenditures above 
amounts appropriated, nor would paying off insurance. The 
Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act 
(BBEDCA) and the Statutory Pay-As-You-Go Act (“Statutory 
PAYGO”) both require Congress to generate revenue to 
“offset” new expenditures, but neither apply to 
administrative agencies or even to already authorized 
expenditures.345 The Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990 
(FCRA), enables loans to be issued only to the extent that 
their “costs” are annually appropriated by Congress.346 
However, as Connor, Loonin, and Merrill point out, “FCRA 
specifically exempts any ‘direct loan or loan guarantee 
program’” that “constitutes an entitlement (such as the 
guaranteed student loan program . . .); from this 
appropriations requirement. Likewise, subsection (c) 
exempts mandatory programs such as FFELP and DLP from 
the requirement that any outstanding direct loan or loan 
guarantee ‘shall not be modified in a manner that increases 
its cost’ unless the cost increase is provided for in an 
appropriations Act,347 Congress also anticipated and 
provided ‘permanent indefinite authority’ for agencies’ 
‘reestimate’ of the cost for a group of direct loans or loan 
guarantees made in a single fiscal year.”348 
Perhaps this does not prove a negative, since your 
humble pro-jubilee author does not have a sufficient 
 
 344. 31 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1514, 1517 (2018).  
 345. 2 U.S.C. § 900–22 (2018); Pub. L. 111-39 (Feb. 12, 2010). 
 346. 2 U.S.C. § 661c(b) (2018). 
 347. 2 U.S.C. § 661c(e) (2018). 
 348. Ltr., supra note 265, at 6 (quoting 2 U.S.C. § 661c(c), (e), (f) (2018)). 
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incentive to find limitations. But take heart. Congresspeople 
with ideological motivations to find such an authority have 
failed to do so. In a 2016 letter to the Secretary of Education, 
Republican Chairmen of the House and Senate Budget 
Committees expressed concern that: “[t]here are at present 
no [Congressional] budget control mechanisms to limit the 
cost of administrative changes to student loan programs 
made pursuant to current law, however great the cost or 
departure from long-standing policy.”349 
However, since the George W. Bush Administration, the 
OMB has imposed budgetary restrictions on administrative 
agencies under what has become known as “Administrative 
PAYGO.”350 The details of these restrictions are not fully 
public, but it is known that they apply to any “discretionary 
administrative action” by an agency official—apparently 
including everything from new regulations to increased 
staffing—that “increase[s] mandatory spending” (i.e. pre-
authorized Congressional spending) “relative to the 
projection in the most recent [President’s annual budget 
request] or Mid-Session Review of what is required, under 
current law, to fund the mandatory-spending program.”351 
Any such increase must be presented to the OMB for 
approval alongside cost estimates and “one or more proposals 
for other administrative actions . . . that would comparably 
reduce mandatory spending,” which is to say, an “offset.”352 
 
 349. Letter from Tom Price, Chairman of the House Budget Committee, and 
Mike Enzi, Chairman of the Senate Budget Comm., and Mike Enzi, Chairman of 
the Senate Budget Comm., to John B. King, Sec’y of Educ. (Jul. 14, 2016), 
https://www.budget.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/EnziPriceLetter.pdf. 
 350. See Clinton T. Brass & Jim Monke, OMB Controls on Agency Mandatory 
Spending Programs: “Administrative PAYGO” and Related Issues for Congress, 
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE (Aug. 19, 2010), https://nationalaglaw 
center.org/wp-content/uploads/assets/crs/R41375.pdf. 
 351. Id. at 1, 3 (quoting Memorandum from Joshua B. Bolten, Director of OMB, 
to heads of departments and agencies, “Budget Discipline for Agency 
Administrative Actions,” M-05-13, May 23, 2005, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
omb/memoranda_2005/). 
 352. Id. at 4 (quoting Memorandum from Joshua B. Bolten, at ¶ 1). 
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One might quibble as to whether refraining from collecting 
debt counts as increasing spending, but ultimately the 
OMB’s interpretation would win the day. And it seems likely 
that an OMB skeptical of the budgetary impact of student 
debt cancellation would apply Administrative PAYGO to any 
exercise of the settlement authority that substantially 
reduced the Department of Education’s revenues, especially 
if that lack of revenue would require the Department to 
borrow from the Treasury to maintain other parts of its 
budget. On the other hand, since Administrative PAYGO 
only applies if the OMB says it does, it could be repealed 
entirely (as it should be) or waived for any particular case of 
“spending” increases. And if the President had prioritized 
canceling student debt enough to appoint a Secretary of 
Education willing to employ novel interpretations of existing 
law to do so, surely that President would appoint an OMB 
director who would cooperate. 
2. Tax Implications 
The Treasury would also have to cooperate, because 
“cancellation of indebtedness” is generally treated as income 
for tax purposes, and frequently referred to as “COD 
income.”353 If this general principle were applied to 
households that benefited from discretionary student debt 
relief, it would trade their indebtedness to DOE for 
indebtedness to the IRS. The debt would be smaller as an 
absolute amount (because it would only be a fraction of the 
debt relief granted) but would be due as a lump sum 
immediately, without any of the repayment plan or 
forbearance options available on student loans. As such, it 
would likely make most intended beneficiaries worse off. 
Any debt cancellation that originates within the 
executive branch—i.e. without Congress explicitly making it 
 
 353. 26 U.S.C. § 61(a)(12) (2018); see also INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., U.S. DEP’T 
OF THE TREASURY, PUB. NO. 4681, CANCELED DEBTS, FORECLOSURES, 
REPOSSESSIONS, AND ABANDONMENTS (Jan. 14, 2019), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
pdf/p4681.pdf. 
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such that the cancellation is tax-free—would require 
coordination with the Treasury’s Office of Tax Policy and 
with the IRS to determine whether and how to ensure 
favorable tax treatment. Because the COD principle has 
multiple exceptions and an uncertain scope, there could be 
several ways to do so, each of which would have distinct 
implications for the design of the jubilee.  
As an initial matter, it is important to note that there is 
no authoritative definition of COD income and its exceptions, 
so the IRS has a good deal of leeway in determining its 
applicability to any given situation. The Internal Revenue 
Code, as Richard C.E. Beck points out, “does not specify what 
kinds of obligations are subject to income treatment when 
canceled, and it speaks ambiguously of ‘indebtedness’ . . . 
without any further limitation at all.”354 For its part, “the 
Treasury has never promulgated any regulations in this all-
important area,” instead filling out the law case-by-case 
through Revenue Procedures and a smattering of not really 
coherent court decisions.355 Neither of Revenue Procedures 
or court decisions do much to constrain the IRS’s ability to 
determine that a particular cancellation of indebtedness is 
non-taxable. Revenue Procedures are not binding on the IRS: 
the “rules” they announce can be overruled by future revenue 
procedures (without notice and comment) or by regulation. 
Court decisions are, of course, binding, but they do not limit 
the IRS from adopting interpretations (or regulations) that 
result in less tax enforcement, not least since nobody would 
challenge such interpretations. 
Nevertheless, some patterns have emerged, and the IRS 
tends to treat these patterns as if they were binding, with 
some flexibility at the joints.356 These patterns are worth 
 
 354. Richard C.E. Beck, The Tax Treatment of Cancelled Interest and Penalties 
on Consumer Debt, 53 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1025, 1028 (2009). 
 355. Id. 
 356. It seems that the main reason the IRS does so is to avoid creating rules 
that would be easily gamed by the wealthy to avoid taxes. 
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noting as potential grounds the IRS could refer to, but 
ultimately it seems the IRS has leeway to refer to multiple 
grounds or simply to decline to pursue taxes, whether due to 
legal uncertainty or otherwise (After all, who would sue?). 
Perhaps the most straightforward approach would be to 
apply the general welfare exception to COD income. Under 
this exception, government benefits provided to improve 
individual and/or social welfare are not includible in gross 
income. The principle here is similar as the principle in the 
exception of charitable gifts from taxation: an accession to 
wealth based on need should not be undermined by the tax 
code.357 The test developed by the IRS to determine whether 
a government benefit qualifies for the general welfare 
exception has three parts. The benefits must “(1) be made 
pursuant to a government program, (2) be for the promotion 
of general welfare (that is, based on need), and (3) not 
represent compensation for services.”358 For a benefit to be 
“based on need,” it need not be based on financial need, or to 
use policy-speak, “means-tested.” Government benefits for 
the blind, for disabled people, for vocational training, for 
victims of natural disasters, among others, have been found 
to be “based on need” for purposes of qualifying for the 
general welfare exception.359 As Senator Elizabeth Warren 
pointed out in a letter to the Treasury while it was 
determining how to treat cancellations of student debt for 
students who qualified for defense-to-repayment discharges, 
educational background has been treated as a need-based 
category previously.360 Funding for vocational programs has 
also been treated as non-taxable, so long as it only includes 
 
 357. 26 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2018). 
 358. Rev. Proc. 2014-35, 2014-26 I.R.B. 1110; see also Bailey v. Comm’r, 88 T.C. 
1293, 1300 (1987). 
 359. Rev. Proc. 2014-35 at 4–6; Letter from Senator Elizabeth Warren to Jack 
Lew, Sec’y of the Treasury, and John Koskinen, Comm’r of the Internal Revenue 
Service 2–3 (Aug. 11, 2015) [hereinafter “Warren Letter”]. 
 360. See Warren Letter, supra note 359, at 3.  
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“reasonable expenses.”361 Confusingly, the IRS has treated 
Pell Grants as non-taxable to the extent that they fund 
education expenses but not room and board, apparently 
because it applies the “scholarship exception” rather than 
the “general welfare exception.”362 
As a general matter, loans are not taxable income, so the 
only question is whether turning loans into grants subject to 
a discretionary authority to cancel some or all of a repayment 
obligation would qualify for the general welfare exception. 
Public student loans are “made pursuant to a government 
program,” and canceling them would be done according to a 
statutory authority created as part of that program. The 
loans were provided based on the need for education. That 
would seem sufficient to establish need. Cancellation 
functionally turns a loan (non-taxable) into a grant 
(potentially taxable), so the appropriate question is the 
purpose for which the grant was provided. It should also be 
of no object whether any of the loan was spent on room and 
board, since appropriate funds for room and board have been 
found to be part of the general welfare exception in job 
training programs, even if not for Pell Grants, and there is 
no principled reason to differentiate. 
In any case, one could also argue about whether the 
cancellation was based on need. With respect to some 
debtors, this argument would be straightforward: those who 
are facing financial hardships or whose lives are otherwise 
made much worse by student debt would benefit from a 
program of cancellation. Even those debtors for whom 
student debt is relatively less onerous would have that 
burden lifted, and would be able, for instance, to pursue 
different careers or to get married or buy a house when they 
could not before. Either way, neither the initial payment nor 
 
 361. Rev. Proc. 2014-35 at 5.  
 362. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, PUB. NO. 970, 
TAX BENEFITS FOR EDUCATION (Jan. 17, 2019), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
pdf/p970.pdf. 
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the cancellation would represent compensation for services. 
Applying this exception has the advantages that it is well 
established, it is flexible enough to cover cancellation of 
nearly any breadth (unless one thinks that “need” should be 
understood more narrowly), and it, since it is keyed to a 
specific government benefit, it cannot easily be used as 
precedent for tax avoiders to game the tax system.  
The general welfare exception is an exception to any 
“accession to wealth.” There are also exceptions specifically 
for COD income. The related “disputed debt” and “purchase 
price adjustment” doctrines were both created by courts. The 
former refers to situations in which a dispute between debtor 
and creditor as to the reality, enforceability, or amount of a 
debt leads to the creditor accepting less than the original 
amount claimed. The latter refers to situations in which a 
creditor agrees to accept less than the original amount owed. 
As these (hesitantly offered) descriptions suggest, there is 
some overlap between these two doctrines and no agreement 
as to how they ought to be differentiated.363 The most widely 
cited disputed debt cases involve situations where the legal 
enforceability of the debt is called into question, but other 
authorities (pointing out that a settlement on an 
unenforceable debt is actually a loss for the taxpayer) argue 
for preserving the term “disputed debt” for factual disputes 
as to the existence or amount of the debt. Some authorities 
have used purchase price adjustment as the term for cases of 
dispute over legal enforceability. 
For our purposes, it is more important to know how much 
territory the two of them occupy together than how to draw 
a boundary between them. What is clear is that, whatever 
their label, cases where a downward reduction in amount 
owed due to an “infirmity that clearly relates back to the 
 
 363. Even more confusingly, there is also a “contingent liability doctrine” that 
applies in an overlapping set of cases. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-2(a)(3) 
(1980); Central Paper Co. v. Comm’r, 158 F.2d 131 (6th Cir. 1946). 
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original” transaction are not taxable.364 Nor are cases in 
which the reality or amount of the debt is genuinely in 
dispute. What is less clear is when debt write-downs or write-
offs that are not attributable to a legal infirmity or genuine 
dispute count as non-taxable changes in the price of debt 
rather than taxable cancellations of indebtedness. It is 
difficult to see how at least write-offs of interest and fees 
should not count as price adjustments, but the IRS has 
tended to insist that the answer is never or almost never and 
some courts have agreed.365 Nothing stops the IRS from 
going further, though the further it goes the more the line 
between that cancellation and modification of indebtedness 
fades.366 
Under existing interpretations, the most natural 
application to student debt cancellation would be to those 
whose student debts were issued under legally questionable 
circumstances. Although its Revenue Procedure was not 
entirely clear, the former seems to have been the primary 
justification the IRS gave for declining to tax the “income” 
generated by canceling the debts of (some) defrauded for-
profit college students.367 This reasoning might apply to 
millions of others, but it would still only apply to a fraction 
of debtors and not to any debtors facing hardship who were 
not subject to fraud. The purchase price adjustment doctrine 
could also apply to write-downs of interest and fees for any 
debtor if the IRS modifies its current position on that issue. 
Of course, broader interpretations would enable broader 
applicability. 
 
 364. Rev. Rul. 92-99, 1992-46 I.R.B. 5; Sherman; Zarin. 
 365. See Beck, supra note 354, at 1033–37. 
 366. Professor Beck points out that adjustments of the price of services 
(including educational services) are not treated in the Tax Code’s purchase price 
adjustment provision, and there are even stronger reasons to treat such 
adjustments as non-taxable adjustments (the equivalent of cash-back bargains) 
rather than COD income, since when one receives a service one does not obtain 
an asset that might be re-sold to obtain liquid assets that could be used to pay a 
tax. See id.  
 367. Rev. Proc. 2015-57, 2015-51 I.R.B. 863. 
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A potentially broader but less well-established exception 
might be called the “avoidance of loss doctrine.” As Beck puts 
it, “although the case law is sparse, it seems agreed . . . that 
canceled debts do not give rise to income if they were 
originally incurred without loan proceeds—for example such 
obligations as fines and penalties, tort judgments, alimony, 
child support, taxes, or pledges to make a gift to charity.”368 
Although cancellation of such debts does free assets in the 
sense that has gained freedom in how to use one’s existing 
assets, it does not result in an “accession to wealth.” When 
such debts were incurred, they did not increase assets but 
rather imposed a legal obligation that, if complied with, 
would reduce one’s assets. Cancellation of these debts thus 
does not result in a gain but an avoidance of a loss. Moreover, 
as will become more important in a moment, cancellation of 
such debts does not increase the assets with which a 
taxpayer might pay a tax. Collection of such taxes thus does 
not comply with horizontal equity and, in practice, might 
turn out to be more trouble than it is worth.  
Courts have been uneven in the application of this 
doctrine, but it has been applied in at least some contexts 
and could be picked up on by the IRS. There are at least two 
arguments that it could be applied to student debt 
cancellation. The first would apply to debts incurred as a 
result of the government’s payments to third parties 
(colleges, bookstores, etc.) rather than as the result of a 
disbursement of cash to the borrower. The reasoning here 
would be that the debtor did not actually receive loan 
proceeds, but rather received a benefit that came with an 
obligation to repay—effectively a 100% tax, payable in 
installments with interest. Cancellation of this obligation—
effectively transforming it into a government grant—avoids 
the loss that would have come with paying that tax. A 
broader application would be to any student debt, used for 
 
 368. Beck, supra note 354, at 1029 (citing Comm’r v. Rail Joint Co., 61 F.2d 
751 (2d Cir. 1932); Eagle Asbestos & Packing Co. v. United States, 348 F.2d 528, 
531 (Ct. Cl. 1965)). 
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any purpose. The reasoning would be that whether the 
debtor received loan proceeds (i.e. cash) or not does not 
matter, since the cancellation of the obligation to repay 
effectively switches the program from a grant with a 100% 
tax to an unconditional grant. The debtor avoids loss that 
would have come with the tax but does not (necessarily) gain 
any assets that could be used to pay a tax. 
This last argument shades into the more radical, and 
more rational, approach suggested by Beck: only tax COD 
income for individuals when it results in a “realization of 
gain,” i.e. an increase in liquidity with which a tax obligation 
could actually be paid. The theoretical reason for doing so 
would be that the tax code generally only treats realized 
gains as taxable. Appreciation of an asset is only taxed when 
the asset is sold, and receipt of valuable opportunities that 
are not themselves fungible assets (such as an introduction 
to a wealthy friend or a job offer) are not taxable unless and 
until they result in a gain in assets. Also, treating unrealized 
gains results in violations of horizontal equity when, for 
instance, a gratuitous cash refund is not taxed but a 
gratuitous purchase price adjustment via cancellation of 
indebtedness is. On a practical level, imposing a tax on a 
theoretical “freeing of assets” through dis-encumbrance 
when the taxpayer has not actually gained any assets that 
could be used to pay the tax (or even sold to gain the liquidity 
necessary to pay the tax) results in situations in which a tax 
might not actually be payable, leaving the IRS to expend 
more on the cost of pursuing a taxpayer than it would 
actually receive in taxes. In fact, it turns out that this was 
the approach prior to the IRS’s overreading of the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Kirby Lumber. Kirby Lumber itself 
involved a situation in which cancellation of indebtedness 
resulted in a realization of gain, but the IRS used that 
decision to justify taxation of a broader and broader swath of 
COD income. Courts and tax lawyers have gone along, but 
only at the expense of creating a series of not fully thought 
through exceptions that overlap with each other in confusing 
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ways. 
To the extent the IRS would be interested in more 
broadly reconsidering its approach to COD income in this 
way, it would have no trouble classifying cancellation of 
student debt as non-taxable. Such cancellation, after all, 
results in no realized gain, only an avoidance of loss. 
The IRS need not even choose between the above options. 
It can declare that it will not treat cancellation of student 
debt as taxable income (and not require the submission of 
1099s) by vaguely gesturing at the variety of reasons 
adduced in the foregoing. This was the approach the IRS took 
when it decided not to treat as taxable the cancellation of the 
student debts of debtors who were fraudulently induced to 
take on such debts. It reasoned as follows: 
The Treasury Department and the IRS believe that most borrowers 
whose Corinthian student loans are discharged under the Defense 
to Repayment discharge process would be able to exclude from gross 
income all or substantially all of the discharged amounts based on 
fraudulent misrepresentations made by the colleges to the students, 
the insolvency exclusion, or another tax law authority. However, 
determining whether one or more of these exceptions is available to 
each affected borrower would require a fact intensive analysis of the 
particular borrower’s situation to determine the extent to which the 
discharged amount is eligible for exclusion under each of the 
potentially available exceptions. The Treasury Department and the 
IRS are concerned that such an analysis would impose a compliance 
burden on taxpayers, as well as an administrative burden on the 
IRS, that is excessive in relation to the amount of taxable income 
that would result. Accordingly, the IRS will not assert that a 
taxpayer within the scope of this revenue procedure recognizes 
gross income as a result of the Defense to Repayment discharge 
process.369 
Similarly, the IRS could cite the above doctrines, note 
the probability that at least the great majority of borrowers 
would not have taxable income, cite the compliance cost, and 
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CONCLUSION 
The last Part of this Article argues that the law is no 
impediment to canceling student debt. The first Part argues 
that doing so would be a great benefit to millions of people, 
directly and indirectly. But there is something of a 
disconnect between these parts. Many of the most important 
benefits of student debt cancellation—those pertaining to the 
structural reform of the political economy of higher 
education—could not be realized merely through an 
Executive Branch jubilee. That is because such a jubilee 
could not be paired with a program to prevent future student 
debt from accumulating.  
So it may be. But debt cancellation now does not preclude 
more reforms later. Jubilees can create fresh starts in more 
ways than one. 
